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<§J 1985 by Richard C. Pipan 
PIPAN, RICHARD C., Ed.D. Curriculum and Collective Consciousness: 
Speculations on Individualism, Community and Cosmos. (1985) Directed by 
Dr. David E. Purpel. 335 pp. 
This study joins the work of a number of contemporary curriculum 
theorists who are attempting to foster a "language of possibility" for 
education. The impetus for this study is derived from, and the first 
chapter addresses, the paradoxical modernist situation where both 
increasing technological innovation and individualist approaches to 
development and competence have resulted in a world poised on the brink 
of catastrophic nuclear war and social disintegration, alienation. 
This study, then, examines the emergence of modernist, technical 
rationality; social, political and philosophical frameworks which 
situate this present historical moment in incommensurable paradigms; 
and the curricular implications of modernist culture. 
Curriculum theory, as it is apr-~0~ched in this study, is portrayed 
as an interpretative science - a critical and expressive endeavor 
which attempts to promote human understanding and meaningful action in 
both practical and liberative intents. The second chapter draws upon 
the recent re-emergence of philosophical hermeneutics as not only a 
research methodology, but as a sophisticated and systematic 
interpretation of the normative dimensions of human interests and 
knowledge. 
The third chapter consists of a hermeneutic interpretation of five 
contemporary curriculum theorists (Henry Giroux, Maxine Greene, James 
B. Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, and Hilliam Pinar) for their significant 
and divergent contributions to the expanding horizon of theory 
development and praxis. Each of the five theorists is examined in 
light of their conceptual frameworks, interpretative methodologies, and 
impact upon the public discourse of the emerging field of curriculum 
theory as well as this author's understanding. 
The last chapter of this dissertation examines contemporary 
philosophical developments which point beyond objectivity and 
relativism, beyond epistemological constructs, to a new rapprochement 
occurring in human science. Human agency and consciousness are 
situated within an ontological condition which offers an ecological 
view of not only human behavior, but human being. A normative 
framework of communitarian ethics combined with strategic 
considerations of behavioral ecology are suggested as a curriculum 
orientation to distributive social justice. Implications for 
curriculum research and practice are discussed particularly as they 
consider contexts beyond school-based practice and focus on the human 
possibility for affiliation and community. 
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IN MEMORIUM 
During our time together we did not have occasion 
to lead a very regular life: even at the abbey we 
remained up at night and collapsed wearily during 
the day, nor did we take part regularly in the holy 
offices. On our journey, however, he seldom 
stayed awake after compline, and his habits were frugal. 
Sometimes, also at the abbey, he would spend the whole 
day walking in the vegetable garden, examining the 
plants as if they were chrysoprases or emralds; and 
I saw him roaming about the treasure crypt, looking 
at a coffer studded with emralds and chrysoprases as 
if it were a clump of thorn apple. At other times he 
would pass an entire day in the great hall of the 
library, leafing through manuscripts as if seeking 
nothing but his own enjoyment (while, around us, the 
corpses of monks, horribly murdered, were multiplying). 
One day I found him strolling in the flower garden 
without any apparent aim, as if he did not have to 
account to God for his works. In my order they taught 
me quite a different way of expending my time, and 
I said so to him. And he answered that the beauty of 
the cosmos derives not only from unity in variety, 
but also from variety in unity. This seemed to me an 
answer dictated by crude common sense, but I learned 
subsequently that the men of his land often define 
things in ways in which it seems that the enlightening 
power of reason has scant function. 
Umherto Eco, The Name ~ the Rose 
The world today is divided into ideological camps. 
The adherents of each tell us with great assurance 
where we're at and what we should do about it. We 
should not believe any of them. 
Peter Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice 
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Three miles above, a jet converts the refined residue of generations 
of plants and animals to thunder and linear clouds, 
swift movement, transportation. 
And in the space above and below, 
the human threads of meaning are cast: 
connecting molecules to morality, 
reason to rhythm, 
speech to silence. 
And so it is, this thread is spun from the stuff of the world, 
woven into a fabric or macrame of myriad designs, 
entangling some, supporting others who cling 
to precipice and promontory in search of insight 
beyond reason, beyond expectation, elusive, grand. 
And these lines drawn from yet another wool gatherer, 
seek to convey the transfer of craft, 
and the regeneration of promise, 
that wraps us in funeral shroud and swaddling clothes alike. 
Ah, the MEANING of the world: 
mean as brutal, 
mean as of humble antecedents, 
mean as intermediate value, 
mean as no count, 
mean as instrumental medium, 
mean as a purpose or intent. 
All these and all homophones, antonyms, roots and negations, 
adverbial and adjectival forms, 
connected in semantic and semiotic systems 
thick in resonance, counterpoint and harmonic. 
And the tracker reads the signs left by a fellow tribesman 
who is wise to his being wise to his tr~cks 
(leaves tied to ankles, brushing sand in print, 
aging the trail but not obliterating it), 
and the best we can do 
is be wise and awake. 
The MEANING of the world: 
all the cast off and collected meanings, . 
the associations, 
institutions, 
cells, 
forgotten correspondences, 
half-illuminated shapes as well as sun and moon shadows, 
whispers and overheard conversations, 
pronouncements, 
pregnant silences, 
moments and intervals, 
tides and timelessness. 
The stretch of impatience, 
the sublime and macabre, 
the letting go while loving. v 
And so it is that the passing from this world 
to the next, 
borderless and binary at the same time, 
shuttles the thread through infinite warp and woof, 
curving back upon itself, 
like nervousness in a funhouse, 
until we too find trail and design 
in this cosmic memory 
residing in the quotidian. 
Richard C. Pipan, 22 November 1983 
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INTRODUCTION 
The currents coursing through ~he field of education in the United 
States during the past thirty years have ebbed and flo.wed with tidal 
force, but perhaps without a regularity that the metaphor implies. The 
Fifties swelled with curricular reforms drawn by twin moons: the 
grotesque moon of McCarthyism and the glittering beacon called Sputnik. 
Blacklists, technological shopping lists, nationalism, and corporatism 
converged to set a powerful agenda for a unified approach to a new 
educational mandate: American education must organize, systematize and 
administer its intellectual and physical resources if it was to remain 
dominant and presumably free in the arena of international affairs. 
Leadership was to be achieved through an unholy alliance of 
technological innovation, political conservatism, and moral fervor. 
Thus, a culture of control emerged where political demagogs conducted 
an American Inquisition, industry and labor turned its back on the 
women 1~ho "manned" its machines during the Second \.Jorlct \o/ar, racial 
segregation was more deeply entrenched through the legislative process, 
and the American Dream scattered suburbs across the landscape. A 
curricular response combined a concern for administration and control 
with a renewed vigor in traditional subject disciplines. 
The Sixties plunged ahead in the chill of Cold War, the surge of 
Civil Rights Hovements (and liberation movements throughout the Third 
'.Vorld), and emerging descriptions of developmental psychology, moral 
development, social and pol i.tical theory. The voices of protest, of 
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humanism, of "alternatives" sparked dramatic social, political and 
cultural revolutions. Open schools, free universities, students' 
rights, desegregation all blossomed in a gush of possibility. But the 
surge left many stranded on the beach of change, and while some newly 
won freedoms took root in the sand (especially the offshoots of civil 
rights and national liberation movements), others withered on the 
vine. The 
narcissism, 
Seventies testerl this uprooting, and the culture of 
the "me-generation," emerged as hothouse flowers 1vhose 
roots grew in an artificial medium and whose fragility we are just 
coming to recognize: alienation, escapism, anomie, and suicide attest 
to the stunted roots grown in such a contrived environment. 
This dissertation is a response to these various currents in 
American culture; it is a response to the contrived and superficial 
environment of individual change, the atomization of collective 
interests and collective consciousness into hyperbolic self-interest; 
it is a response to the 
response to the hegemonic 
relativism. Hore than a 
triumph of 
quality of 
response, 
scientism over science and a 
instrumentalism and normative 
this dissertation offers an 
affirmative arguement for affiliation, community, ecological strategies 
for change, and social justice. 
In Chapter I, "Individuation and Alienation," I trace two streams 
which converge to form a perilous environment: the first stream named 
"Modernist Culture and Pedagogy" examines the social, political and 
cultural conditions which have given rise to the presence of alienation 
and exaggerated self-interest in curriculum designs. 1 explore the 
3 
emergence of curriculum frameworks which situate the individual ;'s the 
primary unit of analysis and practice and examine this emergence in 
light of the human needs for community, engagement and dependence. The 
second stream, "Conceptual Logic," traces the historical development of 
conceptual frameworks which have influenced the formation and 
legitimation of various forms of human knowledge. The section examines 
the rise of positivist science, the connection between human interests 
(variously defined) and knowledge, and ::he normative ambivalence of 
technical rationality. These conceptual and cultural developments have 
led to what some theorists have termed the contemporary crisis of 
understanding. 
Chapter II entitled "Hermeneutics: The Recovery of Meaning in 
Human Science" explores this co·ntemporary crisis of understanding in 
terms of the philosophical approach of ontological hermeneutics which 
both counters the pervasive monomethodological approach of scientism 
and introduces a revisioned possibility for interpreting human 
knowledge as a dynamic, historical continuity. Philosophical 
hermeneutics is examined for its metaphysical representations of 
reality, its normative dimensions, and its contribution to increasing 
the emancipatory possibility of human inquiry and collective 
consciousness. Curriculum theory is examined as an interpretive 
science which, consistent with hermeneutic philosophy, seeks improved 
communication, the transcendent possibility of truth, meaning, and 
understanding. 
4 
In Chapter III entitled "Curriculum Theorizing: Reflections on 
Aims, Purposes and Praxis -- A Hermeneutic Interpretation of Selected 
Texts," I examine five contemporary curriculum theorists who have made 
important contributions to the field and have been most influential in 
my own development as a theorist. Each is interpreted specifically 
lvith regard to what he or she has to say on the selected issues of 
alienation, individualism, and collective interests. Henry Giroux's 
work is examined as it contributes to a revisioning of Marxist analysis 
and attempts to locate a new language of possibility which recognizes 
the collective nature of social, political and cultural forms in terms 
other than classical Marxist categories of class, economy and labor. 
Maxine Greene's existential philosophy emphasizing the agency of the 
individual as project-maker is examined especially in light of her more 
recent comments regarding the importance of the "public domain." James 
B. Macdonald's work, with all its breadth and depth, is examined as it 
specifically has identified the central importance of interpretation in 
curriculum theorizing. Macdonald has clearly been the formative 
influence on my own theorizing, and I attempt to trace his emergence as 
an influential presence in the field as well as my own consciousness. 
Dwayne Huebner's sensitive portrayal of temporality, the ontological 
condition of human being, and his powerfully evocative depiction of 
"structures of care" are examined as important concepts contributing to 
a counter-alienating pedagogy. Huebner's attention to religious 
traditions and spirituality offer a distinctive perspective on 
historical continuity and consciousness. William Pinar's theorizing is 
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the last to be interpreted because some of the more vexing problems 
concerning liberative pedagogy, self-interest, and alienation may be 
found there. Pinar, whose concept of reconceptualization has 
emphasized the importance of freeing oneself from both personally and 
socially distorted meanings, applies literary critical and 
psychoanalytic approaches to interpretation. His passionate attacks 
against oppression in all its forms, has provided the field with a 
pyrotechnic intellectual figure. Pinar 's work is examined especially 
for his concept of "currere" which discusses a possibility of 
"transbiographic" meaning. 
Chapter IV entitled "Rapprochement: Transcending :1ethodological 
Solipsism Speculations on Democratic Pedagogy," traces the 
contemporary philosophical assaults on the concept of epistemology, a 
renewed discussion of metaphysics, expanded units of identity and 
practice which might attend more fully to the behavioral ecology of 
human choice and change, and a discussion of normative dimensions of 
communitarian ethics and social justice. Self-interest is juxtaposed 
against social and collective interests to provide both a critique of 
individualism and an appeal for a renewed commitment to social justice 
and community. 
I. PROBLEH STATEMENT: INDIVIDUA'!'ION AJ.'ID ALIENATION 
A. MODERNIST CULTURE AND PEDAGOGY 
One can say almost anything about human culture now 
and it will be true, for everything is going on at once: 
from the test-tube disappearance of sexuality in 
procreation to the new explosion of sexuality in 
creativity; from the disappearance of the nation-state to 
the explosion of nationalism in Quebec, \vales, Scotland, 
and the land of the Basques; from the appearance of a new 
radicalism to the resurgence of a new conservatism; from a 
planetary miscegenation to a new tribal racism. Yet one 
thing is not happening in America: we are not growing 
together, but are polarizing every conceivable condition to 
its extremes. It is as if only the energy created by the 
violent polarization of the old had sufficient power to 
drive the new evolution of man. 
6 
William Irwin Thompson 
When Shakespeare's Hamlet stated that "Something is rotten in the 
state of Denmark," he alluded to a pervasive sense of malaise, a sensed 
perception not easily grounded upon facts, but rather an intuited 
understanding that something was not "right" with the world. While it 
may be vague and tenuous to begin a dissertation based upon such an 
intuited uneasiness, there is a sense that, to be honest about my 
concern for the "state of the curriculum field," I too am operating 
under the apprehension that "something is not right in the world"-- in 
this case the 1vorld is not only the bracketed domain of curriculum 
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theory, but the cultures which for lack of a better, more definitive 
term, constitute the the modern world. My inquiry into the nature of 
speculation and discourse within the field of educational theory 
springs from an uneasiness and dissatisfaction with prominent themes, 
motifs and conceptual frameworks. I wish to state explicitly and at 
the outset of this study that my research and inquiry emerges from 
accumulated years of experience in a number of educative environments. 
The problem which I am framing for consideration in this dissertation 
is one which is personally meaningful, debated to some extent, but just 
as often, submerged under other preoccupations -- usually technical or 
of a particular "disciplinary" nature -- in curriculum literature and 
which, to be frank, remains a perennial problem. I seek not to come to 
a once-and-for-all resolution of the debate, but simply to engage my 
energies in the effort to increase understanding in complex issues of 
intellectual and social change. 
This dissertation has become a somewhat terrifyj ng intellectual 
challenge. A significant part of the challenge, and the terror, comes 
from reading articulate and penetrating philosophers, historians, 
political scientists, social and cultural critics and theologians. 
This challenge calls for the integration of rich and fertile 
expressiveness. I take some solace in a comment made by Professor John 
Grote (in McDermott, 1967, 1977) of Cambridge: 
Thought is not a professional matter, not something 
for so-called philosophers only or for professed thinkers. 
The best philosopher is the man who can think most 
simply ...• I wish that people would consider that thought 
-- and philosophy is no more than good and methodical 
thought -- is a matter intimate to them, a portion of their 
real selves ••. that they would value that they think, and be 
interested in it .... In my own opinion there is something 
depressing in this weight of learning, with nothing that 
can come in to one 1 s mind but one is told, Oh, that is the 
opinion of such and such a person long ago. . • . I can 
conceive of nothing more noxious for students than to get 
into the habit of saying to themselves about their ordinary 
philosophic thought, Oh, Somebody must have thought it all 
before (p.487). 
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So it is that I am driven to reconcile two somewhat contradictory 
(and ironically complementary) processes in this study: the first being 
the desire to examine, in intimate retrospection, my educational 
experience; and the second, the felt need -- that required of "good and 
methodical thought" -- to examine an expansive literary heritage in 
order to document the intellectual foundations, conceptual frameworks 
and arguments informing curriculum theorizing. Thus, the selection of 
motifs such as "individuation," "alienation" and eventually 
"community," comes from the resonance 0f these motifs as they are found 
in the discourse among curriculum scholars, and with my own 
sensibilities and experience. 
To begin with, then, by juxtaposing individuation and alienation, 
I am not implying that these concepts are diametrically opposed to one 
another; rather, that these are processes and states of bei11g which, 
when examined for their potentially dialectical relationships, reveal 
important dimensions of personal growth, socialization, and collective 
experience. This juxtapositio11, however, as it appears in a critique 
of educational activity, and specifically the discourse within the 
field of curriculum theorizing, is an attempt to uncover assumptions, 
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implied and expressed beliefs, and conceptualizations which may be 
better understood by the pairing of these motifs. 
When \villiam Irwin Thompson (1971) suggest'2d that "It is as if 
only the energy created by the violent polarization of the old had 
sufficient power to drive the new evolution of man" (p.x), he is 
touching upon the basis for this critique of educational theorizing: it 
is from a perspective of the world in extremis that the more subtle 
gradations of change, the nuances of meaning, and the slight though 
influential shifts in direction of human culture may best be 
perceived. Taking Thompson's cue that it is, perhaps, only when Ne 
face catalytic limit situations that the energy for radical revisioning 
occurs, I will then seek to convey the salience of these "limit 
situations" as I am and others are (or are not as they case may be) 
perceiving them. While it is my intention to portray the extreme 
polarization affecting and reflected in curriculum theorizing (and my 
engagement in this process), I have found it difficult, as 
~lerleau-Ponty and Ricoeur have suggested it is necessary to do when 
engaging in phenomenological research, to "bracket" the study and take 
a "distanced" point of view. I fear that this "distancing" may lead to 
the inadvertant situation where, as Thompson has sugt,ested, "the 
expatriot can only achieve identity at the cost of self-distorting 
excess.'' With this caveat in mind, I hope to examine not only 
intellectual and ideological distortions in curriculum discourse 
distortions which entrap rather than emancipate 
inadvertant, participation in this distortion. 
but my 0\vn, if 
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The impetus for this critique springs from personal interest in 
liberative pedagogy. As mentioned previously in the "Introduction," it 
was James B. Macdonald who introduced me to the possibilities of 
critique within curriculum theorizing, critique which, drawing from a 
tradition of the humanities and the political and philosophical thought 
of the Frankfurt School, was to focus on the importance of human 
interests in the generation of knowledge. The catalytic role ·of the 
work of Jurgen Habermas (1971, 1973) on the ideological nature of human 
knowledge, the philosophical contributions of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1976, 
1983) in the area of hermeneutic interpretation, combine to offer new 
perspectives on both the kinds of questions and the scope of inquiry 
into social, political, philosophical and epistemological dimensions of 
education and human culture. In a sense, then, I am inquiring into the 
ideological hegemony which situates the individual at the center of a 
Ptolemaic universe of educational activity .•. a universe which is 
quintessentially conceptual and metaphoric, and is as such yet another 
"useful fiction" to convey a sense of place in the world. 
By "ideological hegemony," I refer to Boggs's ( 1976) succinct 
definition: 
... the permeation throughout civil society 
including a whole range of structures and activities like 
trade unions, schools, the churches, and the family -- of 
an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, 
etc. , that is in one way or another supportive of the 
established order and the class interests that dominate 
it. To the extent that this prevailing consciousness is 
internalized by the broad masses, it becomes part of 
'common sense'.... For hegemony to assert itself 
successfully ir. any society, therefore, it must operate in 
a dualistic manner: as a general conception of life for the 
masses, and as a scholastic program or set of principles 
which is advanced by a sector of the intellectuals (this 
author's emphasis, p. 39). 
ll 
I shall be exploring in this dissertation the dualistic pattern of 
individualism in curriculum principles and alienation, both in a 
broader cultural sense. 
Perhaps one of the most penetrating (if arcane) critiques of 
hegemony is to be found in William Burroughs' (1959) novel Naked Lunch. 
The title, suggested to Burroughs by Jack Kerouac, " ••. means exactly 
what the words say: NAKED Lunch-- a frozen moment when everyone sees 
what is at the end of every fork"(p.xxxvii). This arresting 
juxtaposition reveals a stark mcment where every morsel is illuminated, 
outlined against the murkiness of, as Gramsci (in Hoare and Smith, 
1971) defines hegemony, "the lived systems of meanings and values ••. 
which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally 
confirming." Burroughs writes of the development and exploitation of 
human needs. In his introduction to Naked Lunch, (entitled 
"Deposition: Testimony Concerning a Sickness"), Burroughs claims that 
"The face of 'evil' is always the face of total need" (p.xxxix). Total 
need demands all; it is out of control; it can be bought off only 
temporarily -- it has been and is being sold. 
Burroughs offers as a vivid metaphor of modernist, 
corporate/bureaucratic society, the pyramid distribution system of 
"junk" (narrowly defined as opiates, broadly seen as any controlling, 
exploitive, oppressive system). "Junk" for Burroughs typifies the 
distorted power relationships pervading modernist cultures: 
I have seen the exact manner in which the junk 
virusoperates through fifteen years of addiction. The 
pyramid of junk, one level eating the level below (it is no 
accident that junk higher-ups are always fat and the addict 
in the street is always thin) right up to the top or tops 
since there are many junk pyramids feeding on peoples of 
the world and all built on basic principles of monopoly: 
1--Never give anything away for nothing. 
2--Never give more than you have to give 
(always catch the buyer hungry and 
always make him wait). 
3--Always take everything back if you 
possibly can. 
The Pusher always gets it all back. The addict needs more 
and more junk to maintain a human form ..• buy off the 
Monkey. Junk is the mold of monopoly and possession. The 
addict stands by while his junk legs carry him straight in 
on the junk beam to relapse. Junk is quantitative and 
accurately measurable. The more junk you use the less you 
have and the more you have the more you use (p. xxxvii and 
xxxix). 
12 
In the junk culture, the need is defined by the producer and 
provided along with the product. The lived system of meanings and 
values are essentially outside the control of the junk addict -- "The 
junk merchant does not sell his product to the consumer, he sells the 
consumer to his product" (p.xxxix). Social relations in junk cultures 
are oppressive, manipulative, and based on the principle that the 
system works best when addicts are isola ted. Their "needs" pit them 
against each other in a desperate struggle. Powerlessness underlies 
all personal identity. 
While Burroughs' grotesque depiction of addiction in modern 
society is cited here for its Boschian graphic clarity and revelation 
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of grossly distorted human interactions, I feel that it points to the 
alienation and grotesqueness of aspects of American life which are 
often concealed under a veneer of attractiveness: designer jeans but 
inadequate health care for the poor, national defense secured by a 
strategy of mutually assured destruction. Just as Burroughs has 
attempted to depict the concept of "need" in an extreme and shocking 
manner, I find it necessary to search for a portrayal of American 
modernist culture which can break through the deeply embedded optimism 
which is so pervasive a part of American culture. Certainly in the 
Seventies and now the Eighties, I have been struck by the caricaturing 
emphasis on individual growth and development while, at the same time, 
the experience of alienation, anomie, and loneliness pervades American 
culture. This ironic interplay between increased and increasing 
person-centered educational frameworks and social agendas, and the 
increasing sen~e of personal powerlessness and disfunctionalism has 
been astutely critiqued by Philip Slater (1970) in The Pursuit of 
Loneliness: American Culture at the Breaking Point. In it Slater 
states: 
I would like to suggest three human desires that are 
deeply and uniquely frustrated by American culture: 
1) The desire for community-- the wish to live 
in trust and fraternal cooperation with one's 
fellows in a total and visible collective entity. 
2) The desire for engagement-- the wish to come 
directly to grips with social and interpersonal 
problems and to confront on equal terms an 
environment which is not composed of ego-extensions. 
3) The desire for dependence-- the wish to share 
responsibility for the control of one's impulses 
and the direction of one's life. 
When I say that these three desires are frustrated by 
American culture, this need not conjure up romantic images 
of the individual struggling against society. In every 
case it is fair to say that we participate eagerly in 
producing the frustration we endure -- it is not something 
rr.::-rely done to us. For these desires are in each case 
subordinate to their opposites in that vague entity called 
the American Character (p.S). 
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Slater's suggestion that the primary human yearnings for 
community, engagement and dependence are distorted within a culture 
which fosters competition, privatism, autonomy and greed, I believe, is 
central to my critique of the dominant themes and practices in American 
education. When the curriculum invites educators to develop and 
perpetuate meritocratic reward systems, competence defined by and 
applied to "inctividual achievement," and the development of 
independent, egotistical pursuit of success, we are confronted with 
what I believe to be a distorted perception of and prescription for 
human competence and educational activity. 
These three motifs community, engagement and dependence --
along with the concepts of individuation, collective consciousness, 
participation, competence, and others, will recur frequently in this 
critique. They serve as the "touchstones" upon which I will return to 
integrate the commentary and speculation on curriculum issues. It is 
ironic that this paper, written in the eighties, relies so much on the 
effusive writings of the late sixties and seventies. It is as though 
the flash of brilliant, incisive critique offered by such writers as 
Slater, Lasch, Marin, Sennet, Berger and Young, has been distanced by a 
renewed preoccupation 1vith the rhetoric and mechanisims of progress, 
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authority, efficiency and reform. This ten going on twenty year lag, I 
hope is not attributible to the memory span of conscionable adults ... 
though the history of social awareness as it relates to or, more 
accurately seeks to avoid, eras of heightened conflict and social 
change such as the civil rights movement, the Viet Nam \-Jar, student 
protests, urban riots, and Watergate, probably is worth recalling for 
its fickleness. 
What appear to be conspicuously absent in curriculum literature 
are statements about the transpersonal or collective consciousness --
the affiliative dimension -- from which questions about moral and 
ethical behavior, social competence and justice are derived. I have 
chosen, then, to attempt the task of recapturing the ferment and 
dissatisfaction with a direction of human events which, by the actions 
and inactions of a significant part of the population -- including 
scholars -- are treated as though they are better left unremembered. 
It was a comment made by Suzanne Langer ( 1962) that helped foe us 
my attention on the pervasive and questionable emphasis modern cultures 
place on individualism. According to Langer: 
... what has happened to society, and is still 
happening, is that the individuation of its parts has all 
but reached its limit. Society is breaking up into its 
ultimate units-- single individuals, persons (p.l20). 
Langer goes on to say that "The emotional effect on people as 
individuals is that the holiness goes out of all institutions." And 
this is, perhaps, the cul de sac which has trapped so much of the vital 
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energy and scarce resources available within the curriculum movement. 
Langer draws the distinction, and I believe that it is worth 
noting here, between individualism and individuation, and between 
individuation and involvement. She finds it more appropriate to focus 
not on individualism as a reified social condition, the individual as 
discrete and separate from others, but upon individuation as the 
process and tendency within which uniqueness, self-interest, and 
autonomy are counterposed against integration which allows for the 
range and directions of human growth and development. \vhat makes 
individualism and its focal unit, the individual, so problematic, 
according to Langer, is that such emphases deny or at least discount 
the essential involvement of each of us. in species-wide processes. 
Thus, whether I refer to "individualism" or "individuation," I will 
maintain in mind the distinction between individuation and involvement 
that Langer has identified. I shall try to examine both the impact of 
the concept of individualism on curricular thought, and the processes 
and conceptual orientations which may lead in the directions of 
individuation and/or involvement. 
A prevailing attitude present within modernist cultures, and 
especially liberal reform ideology, is that individualism and autonomy 
are consonant with freedom by increasing one's autonomy and 
fostering the pursuit of self-interest, it is presumed that social 
relations will be less constraining. Langer, Lasch, Sennet, among 
others, have called this attitude into question. Another vieh' of the 
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interplay between individualism and freedom is offered by the 
cross-cultural perspective cited by Dr. Francis L.K. Hsu (1974), a 
Chinese anthropologist. Dr. Hsu maintains that: 
From the Chinese point of view, freedom is not the 
first concern. The importance of personal freedom is a 
Western premise -- it has been from the time of the Greeks. 
On that premise, people always work for individual 
aggrandizement, individual sensuality, individual 
satisfaction. The Chinese have never felt that way. In 
the old days, the Chinese were supposed to submit 
themselves to the family and to the kinship group; nowadays 
they are supposed to submit themselves to a larger group --
a political group. In either case, they consider 
individualism to be selfishness (p.34). 
In their sensitively written article "Revolutionary Optimism: Models 
for Commitment to Community from Other Societies," Ruth and Victor 
Sidel (1981) elaborate upon and further qualify the point that Dr. Hsu 
was making. Instead of the Western preoccupation with autonomy, 
freedom and individualism (or individuation as Langer has expressed 
it), the Sidels point to a characteristically different ethic prominent 
in Chinese society: 
\Vei ren-min fu-wu ("to serve the people"), to work for 
the good of the society, seems to be the prevailing ethic, 
expressed in countless signs and posters and in the 
conversation of all with whom we spoke in China. In order 
to understand more fully the role of the individual within 
the context of this ethical framework, it is helpful to 
distinguish between individuality and individualism as they 
seem to be viewed in China. Individual talents are 
carefully nourished and developed. The excellent Ping-Pong 
player is given extra help and plays on a local or national 
team; the scientist receives further training and is 
provided with facilities for research; the dancer and 
musician have the opportunity to employ their skills; and 
the person who exhibits special qualities of "caring" is 
recruited for medical school or into other ;1elping roles. 
But these individuals are encouraged to utilize their 
talents not for their own sake, not for the sake of 
individual development and fulfillment, but 
the larger society. Thus individuality 
particularly when it meets the needs of the 
individualism is not (p.306-307). 
for the good of 
is encouraged, 
larger society; 
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In part, the critique attempted in this dissertation will examine the 
issue of service and the concommitant value ·frameworks which frustrate 
or foster this experience with regard to educational activity, social 
justice and community. 
Conceptual frameworks which situate individual interests over 
social and communitarian interests (which will be examined more 
thoroughly in Chapter IV) have been adopted by many who have played 
important roles in the development of contemporary educational 
thought. Carl Rogers, for an example, at an ASCD meeting in 1972 made 
the following statement: "The degree to which I can create 
relationships which facilitate the growth of others as separate persons 
is a measure of the growth I have achieved in myself." Rogers, lvhose 
work along with Maslow and Allport in developmental psychology has 
certainly had an impact on the education of teachers in the United 
States, typifies the tendency of placing individualist, existential 
growth ahead of communal or collective values. Despite Rogers' use of 
the word "relationships," his is not an orientation toward humanism in 
a collectivist sense; rather, relationships serve as a means toward the 
end of "separate persons" and "growth I have achieved in myself." 
Humanist psychologists have, in general, placed "needs to belong" --
affiliation needs developmentally prior to self-actualization 
needs. \.Jhat remains to be explored in this critique is the degree to 
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which self-actualization is a means and/or end; and if it is i~rgely a 
means toward some other end, is it an appropropriate or effective 
means; and lastly, what ends other than self-actualization may be 
considered by curriculum practitioners? 
But this emphasis on individual growth and self-actualization can 
be critiqued on yet another level, on a level which again calls 
attention to the social and cultural milieu within which developmental 
psychology and pedagogy are situated. In his penetrating critique of 
contemporary psych0logy entitled Social Amnesia, Russell Jacoby (1975) 
states that: 
The shift in social attention toward psychology is no 
accident; it testifies to a shift in the social structure 
itself. In baldest terms, the individual psyche commands 
attention exactly because it is undergoing fragmentation 
and petrification; the living substance known as the 
individual is hardening. The autonomous ego -- always 
problematic proves to be no match for the social 
collectivity, which has at its call alternatively brute 
force, jobs, television, or the local newspaper. This is 
no conspiracy; rather it is ingrained in social relations 
\vhich both nourish and poison human relations. I.Jhat haunts 
the living is the specter -or--individual and psychic 
suffocation •••• (p.xvii). 
Thus the shift toward existential, humanist psychology, in part a 
shift precipitated by increasingly alienating social relations, 
addresses not so much the fragmenting and oppressive conditions present 
within these svcial relations, but offers instead a coping mechanism to 
bolster the individual against external threats, to redefine the 
criteria by which one's behavior is to be evaluated and one's sense of 
competence is to be achieved. 
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In The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in An ~ge of 
Diminishing Expectations, Christopher Lasch (1979) comments on this 
individualist, imvard shift: 
After the political turmoil of the sixties, Americans 
have retreated to purely personal preoccupations. Having 
no hope of improving their lives in any of the ·..rays that 
matter, people have convinced themselves that what matters 
is psychic self-improvement: getting in touch with their 
feelings, eating health food, taking lessons in ballet or 
belly-dancing, immersing themselves in the wisdom of the 
East, jogging, learning how to "relate," ove1·coming the 
"fear of pleasure." Harmless in themselves, these 
pursuits, elevated to a program and wrapped in the rhetoric 
of authenticity and awareness, signify a retreat from 
politics and a repudiation of the recent past (p.29-30). 
But this ahistoricism, as Lasch has pointed out, is central to the 
ma1?<ise which threatens social consciousness. Hhlle I have the 
intention to engage in an hermeneutic interpretation of the writings of 
selected curriculnm theorists, I shall dra1v upon theorists (such as 
Bateson, Lasch, Langer, Slater, and Sennet) outside the curriculum 
field to assist in this interpretive process. I shall attempt a 
critique which, as Harcuse has suggested is its role, "re-presents 
reality 1vhi1e accusing it." 
Freire (1970, 1973) has pointed to the task that educators must 
face if they are to be held accountable for the role they play in the 
reproduction of a pervasive oppressive ideological hegemony. Freire's 
use of the term "praxis" refers to the "self-reflective critique of 
action." It is this self-reflexivity that underlies the entire process 
of this study. It is this self-reflexivity which has given rise to my 
sense of there being a distorted conceptualization of human competence 
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and educational activity \vhich contributes, if inadvertantly, to the 
ideology of control and manipulation. It is this self-reflexivity 
which has prompted me to examine the predominance of individu<tl 
behavior change in curriculum frameworks. As Karl-Otto Apel (in 
Dallmayr and McCarthy, 1972) has said of pedagogy, it is not merely a 
conditioning technology, but a process of intersubjective 
understanding. According to Apel, the hermeneutic process is one which 
counters pedagogy seen as primarily a conditioning technology: 
•.. pedagogy, for example, is considered to be applied 
psychology, primarily in the sense of conditioning 
technology. Since, however, the human object in this 
conditioning technology is also a co-subject of the 
educator, the question arises as to whether there must be a 
complementary method of critical-humanistic education to 
prevent splitting society into the manipulated and the 
manipulators. Such a split society would, of course, be 
the ideal presupposition of an objectifying social science 
and social technology. It could perform 1·cp~atable 
experiments without being disturbed by n feedback that turn 
controllable predictions into self-fulfilling or 
self-destroying prophecies. But the question remains as to 
whether the humanities, by their very method, shoulj not 
presuppose a relation to social praxi~ that is 
complementary to the ideal objectification of human 
behavior, namely, unrestricted communi:ation by way of 
intersubjective "understanding" (p.293). 
Apel points to a need to reston:! and reinforce the "leading 
interest of knowledge" \vhich has as il:s aim increased corrununication 
(and I might add here, an additional concern for ernancipatory action) 
as opposed to greater prediction and coGtrol which are predominant 
interests of positivist science. By focusing on meaningful action as 
text in the interest of increasing understanrlin<s, an alternative to 
causal explanation is developed. Thus, to ;mraphr::~se ~'!acdonal:l, if we 
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are to understand the meaning of curriculum theorizing we must search 
for the social meaning of the human activity which takes place in that 
discipline; and if \·le wish to examine the :neaning implications of 
curriculum theorizing, we must look at the personal activities of those 
1vho are engaged in this ende&vor. So the shift is away from simply 
what is presented as curriculum theorizing and toward an examination, 
explication and interpretation of meaning structures as they emerge 
from the activity of those engaged in the process. So the hermeneutic 
process becomes (especially as Cox (1973) suggests in his use of the 
term "participatory hermeneutics"), a critical-emancipatory social 
science -- a dialectical process \~hich fosters personal understanding 
and a sense of participation and membership within a community of 
meaning. 
Karl-Otto Apel has identified how pedagogy if developed as a 
"conditioning technology" contributes to the alienation of human 
agency. Apel's assessment of one possible orientation to pedagogy and 
its contribution to alienation leads us to consider just what is meant 
hy the term "alienation." This dissertation is a study of the 
interpenetration of alienation and the "sense of powerlessness" \vhich 
pervades modern American culture and the evolution of curriculum 
theorizing as it contributes to and/or counters this alienation. By 
"alienation" I refer to Fromm's sense of the term which he derived froEl 
~1arx: 
..• that man does not experience himself as the acting 
agent in his grasp of the world, but that the world 
(nature, others, and hi:nself) remain alien to him. They 
stand above and against him as objects, even though they 
may be objects of his own creation (Coser, 1969, p.503). 
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l~ithin modernist cultures, cultures typified by technocratic and 
bureaucratic tendencies, human beings are not only made "objects," they 
are further fragmented in that their social roles rarely call for their 
participation as whole human beings. Positivist science which 
separates the subject from object of study, "Taylorization" in the form 
of scientific management of • . ;orkplace interactions and labor, the 
categorization of populations within a social welfare state, Tyleresque 
models of educational planning and practice, tend to exacerbate the 
fragmentation of personality into conflicting interests. These 
conflicting interests are not only to be understood in a political 
sense, for example as conflicting ideologies, but also in the sense of 
diverse human interests (such as those described by Habermas, Huebner, 
and Holff) which guide personal knowledge and intersubjective 
understanding. Thus, the technical rationality of positivist science, 
Taylorism and the Tyler rationale, while serving well the interests of 
?rediction and control, fail to address a more wholistic consideration 
of human interests 1.;hich might include sue~ interests as consensus, 
emancipation, aesthetics and ethics. 
The American romantic philosopher Emerson anticipated this 
fragmentation when he described alienation rts being "The state of 
society •.. in 1.;hich the members have suffered amputation from the trunk 
and strut about so rJany walking monsters -- a good finger, a neck, a 
stomach, an elbov1, but IH~VIi!f a man" (in Becker, 1967, p.3). In like 
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manner, learning especially learning "guided" by behavioral 
engineering, Tyleresque objectives ::111d the press of minimum competency 
types of educa::ion as they are presently used, dissect not only the 
aggregate of learners into its individual constituent members, but the 
individual learner him or herself into a repertoire of discrete 
behaviors more easily modified and monitored. 
A further example of this fragmentation is [Jrovided by an 
examination of the connection between pedagogy and therapy. Hodernist 
culture, as described by Lasch, situates expertise 
"professionalism" as socially sanctioned status. According to Lasch: 
Recent studies of professionalism show that 
professionalism did not emerge, the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, in response to clearly defined social 
needs. Instead, the new professions themselves invented 
many of the needs they claimed to satisfy ••. (p.385). 
and 
In a sense, I am referring to (as has Burroughs) an iatrogenic 
condition, a problem w·hich emerges through both the definition of needs 
and the very processes and "treatments" of needs. The problem of 
alienation and an eroding sense of personal control, power and 
competence, causes me to examine the field of curiculum theorizing to 
see if the development of curriculum in the United States irr 
contemporary times can be scrutinized for possible complicity in these 
i.lls. This critical perspective, then, prompl:s me to ask: 
HO\v HAVE CURRICULU:'1 Tf-JEORISTS CONTRIBUTED TO OR 
COUNTERED THE PREVAILING CULTURE OF INDIVIDUALIS~l? '10R8 
SPECIFICALLY, HAVE CURiUCULUM THEORISTS CONTRII31JTED TO THE 
REIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL ACHIEVEMENT AS THE PREVAILING 
UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE? 
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I will be exarnini:1g selected curriculum 1vritings not only for 
conceptual frame1vorks and normative orientations Hhich may have 
contributed to individualist concerns, but frameworks which 
specifically have tried to come to a consideration and definition of 
competence which goes beyond the individual as unit of analysis, which 
enhances 011r understanding of the intersubjective dimension central to 
critical theory, hermeneutics and phenomenological inquiry. 
When I 1vas trying to explain my interest in analyzing such 
frameworks to a friend of mine, I offered the following example usins 
"minimum competency tests" as a case in point: Let us say we have a 
class of 30 iadivi.duals who have just taken a competency test. 25 
passed the test; 5 did not. ~1y friend commented that to him the 
results indicated that we had a "partially competent group." I 
maintained that the test results merely indicated who had and had not 
passed the test and ~aid nothing wh~tsoever <!_bout the "competenc_e~ of 
the group. And therein lies a considerable problem. If educators are, 
and I suggest that sorne are and I li!<e to count 'llyself among those who 
are, interestert in freeing ourselves and others from oppressive 
conditions; and if, ::~s Buber suggests, "The opposite of compulsion and 
constraint is not frec~dom, but communion, 11 then curriculum the'Jrists 
ner~d to develop more articulate discourse on the subjl"r_cs of com:nunity, 
PIPAN, RICHARD C., Ed.D. Curriculum and Collective Consciousness: 
Speculations on Individualism, Community and Cosmos. (1984) Directed by 
Dr. David E. Purpel. 335 pp. 
This study joins the work of a number of contemporary currjculum 
theorists who are attempting to foster a "language of possibility" for 
education. The impetus for this study is derived from, and the first 
chapter addresses, the paradoxical modernist situation where both 
increasing technological innovation and individualist approaches to 
development and competence have resulted in a world poised on the brink 
of catastrophic nuclear war and social disintegration, alienation. 
This study, then, examines the emergence of modernist, technicaJ 
rationality; social, political and philosophical frameworks which 
situate this present historical moment in incommensurable paradigms; 
and the curricular implications of modernist culture. 
Curriculum theory, as it is approached in this study, is portrayed 
as an interpretative science -- a critical and expressive endeavor 
which attempts to promote human understanding and meaningful action in 
both practical and 1 iberative intents. The second chapter draws upon 
the recent re--emergence of philosophical hermeneutics as not only a 
research methodology, but as a sophisticated and systematic 
interpretation of the normative dimensions of human interests and 
knowledge. 
The third chapter consists of a hermeneutic interpretation of five 
contemporary curriculum theorists (Henry Giroux, Maxine Greene, James 
B. Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, and William Pinar) for their significant 
and divergent contributions to the expanding horizon of theory 
development and praxis. Each of the five theorists is examined in 
light of their conceptual frameworks, interpretative methodologies, and 
impact upon the public discourse of the emerging field of curriculum 
theory as well as this author's understanding. 
The last chapter of this dissertation exrunines contemporary 
philosophical developments which point beyond objectivity and 
relativism, beyond epistemological constructs, to a new rapprochement 
occurring in human science. Human agency and consciousness are 
situated within an ontological condition which offers an ecological 
view of not only human behavior, but human beinQ. A normative 
framework of communitarian ethics combined with strategic 
considerations of behavioral ecology are suggested as a curriculum 
orientation to distributive social justice. Implications for 
curriculum research and practice are discussed particularly as they 
consider contexts beyond school-based practice and focus on the human 
possibility for affiliation and community. 
affiliation, collective and transpersonal competence. Through this 
revisioning of what the central unit of analysis and educational 
activity, we might be more in tune with questions of behavioral 
ecology, the sociology of knowledge, and philosophical and 
epistemological theories which are exploring the collective nature, 
potentials and possibilities of consciousness. 
B. CONCEPTUAL LOGIC 
1. THE RISE OF POSITIVIS~·l 
In simplicity or in sophistication man tends to 
think in metaphors, intuitively drawn from ~is 
social and personal experience. 
J.H. Plumb 
I will call metaphysical all those propositions 
which claim to represent knowledge about something 
which is over or beyond all experience, e.g. about 
the real Essence of things, about Things in 
themselves, the Absolute, and such like. I do not 
include in metaphysics those theories -- sometimes 
called metaphysical -- whose object is to arrange 
the most general propositions of the various 
regions of scientific knowledge in a well-ordered 
system; such theories belong actually to the field 
of empirical science, not of philosophy, however 
daring they may be. The sort of propositions I 
wish to denote as metaphysical may most easily 
be made clear by some examples: "The Essence and 
Principle of the 1vorld is \Vater," said Thales; 
"Fire," said Heraclitus; "the Infinite," said 
Anaximander; "Number," said Pythagoras. "All 
things are nothing but shadows of eternal ideas 
which themselves are in a spaceless and timeless 
sphere," is a doctrine of Plato. From the Monists 
we learn: "There is only one principle on 1vhich 
all that is, is founded;" but the Dualists tell 
us: "There are two principles." The Materialists 
say: "All that is, is in its essence material," 
but the Spiritualists say: "All that is, is 
spiritual •... " Now let us examine this kind of 
proposition from the point of view of 
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verifigh.ility. It is etisy to realise that 
such propositions are not verifiable .•.• 
Metaphysicians cannot avoid making their 
propositions non-verifiable, because if they 
made them verifiable, the decision about the 
truth or falsehood of their doctrines would 
depend on experience and therefore belong to 
the region of empirical science. This 
consequence they wish to avoid, because they 
pretend to teach knowledge which is of a higher 
level than that of empirical science. Thus they 
are compelled to cut all connection between 
their propositions and experience; and precisely 
by this procedure they deprive them of any 
sense. 
Rudolf Carnap 
B~eak the pattern which connects the items of 
learning and you necessarily destroy all quality. 
Gregory Bateson 
The decline of speculative philosophy is one of 
the diseases of our culture. 
Alfred :-lorth \vhitehead 
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The search for knowledge and for precise as well as adequate 
explanations of human activity and consciousness, as the somewhat 
sarcastic quote of Carnap has depicted, has lead us a merry chase! The 
evolution of modern philosophical thought has reflected paradigmatic 
shifts from "1-Jestern Positivism" whose roots originate among the Greek 
materialists and later include theorists such as Hobbes, Darwin, Hall; 
to "European Subjectivism" of Rousseau and Spangler, to the more recent 
phenomenological and experientialist philosophies of Husserl, 
Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Herleau-Ponty. These later theories have 
provided a threshold across which contemporary philosophers and social 
theorists focus on dialectical and dialogic modes of inquiry. These 
theories not only unite the subject with the "object" of study, but 
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also unite subjects within communities of discourse and meanin~. It is 
within this last transformation the shift from phenomenological and 
experientialist philosophy to the dialectical orientations 
characteristic of critical theory, that a renewed consideration of the 
social 'construction of reality and of ethical rationality emerge as 
central concerns and which offer, I believe, the most challenging 
discourse for curriculum theorizing. Just as Karl-Otto Apel has 
suggested rather pointedly that pedagogy is more than a technical, 
manipulative endeavor, so have other philosophical and social theorists 
addressed the role of technical rationality in human experience and 
social institutions education being a crossroads of all these 
considerations. In this section I ,..,i.sh to outline various 
philosophical frame1vorks which have contributed to the development of 
contrasting orient~tions, attitudes and values found in curriculum 
theory; it is my intention to depict these paradigms in light of the 
human interests they reflect and their currency among the conceptual 
frameworks employed by educational theorists. 
In their "Introduction" to Understanding and Social Inguiry, 
Dallmayr and McCarthy (1977) state that: 
While man's empirical kno1vledge in our century has 
expanded at an exponential rate, however, his sense of 
purpose or direction seems to have atrophied; although more 
knowledgeable about the world than any of his forebears, 
man today is more ignorant or at a loss as to what he and 
his accumulated knowledge are all about. Confronted with a 
rationally functioning but ultimately silent universe, he 
asks the question: what is the point? Viewed in this 
context contemporary methodological issues reveal their 
salience and underlying agony: the concern with 
"understanding" as a type of inquiry results from a crisis 
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of human understanding ( p.l). 
This crisis, metaphorically represented, can be seen as the 
turmoil human beings have entered in a post-Copernican era. Human 
beings, no longer represented as the occupants of the center of a 
divinely ordered universe, have been faced with the need to reconstruct 
teleological and ontological claims. The eclipsed order which had been 
protected and defended through the authority of the Church, became 
secularized and subject to an emerging scientific rationality which 
viewed with scepticism the cosmological model of the universe situating 
rli.vine intelligence at the center of all relationships and the the 
earth as the center of God's attention. The introduction of scientific 
rationality into the descriptions and depictions of the world 
precipitated a crisis of authority and control. The full force of this 
conflict between scienti fie knowledge and religious authority can be 
witnessed in the Codex of 1616 drawn up by the College of Cardinals in 
Rome; the translation of which, in part reads: 
The 
Propositions to be forbidden: 
that the sun is immovable at the center of 
the heav~n; 
that the earth is not at the centre of the 
heaven, and is not im;novable, but moves by 
a double motion (in Bronowski, 1973, p.207). 
Church of Rome's response to De Revolutionibus Orbium ·-----
Coelestium, (The Revolution of the Heavenly Orbs), by Copernicus 1vas 
unequivocal and direct such a "revolutionary" dep::~rture from 
Church-sanctioned cosmology was to be treated as heretical. The 
emergence of scientific rationality may he seen as a challenge to 
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"conventional • . ,risdom,' to an institutionalized 1vorld view, and the 
authority which enforced them. We shall see 
crisis of understanding results from the 
rationality, and how this development which 
how the contemporary 
triumph of scientific 
took ~ore than three 
centuries, created and supported a pedagogy of individualis~. 
From the earliest roots of Western pedagogical thought we are 
offered a paradigm of educational activity which separates and 
potentially alienates the knowledgeable from the ignorant or 
uninitiated. In P,lato's "Allegory of the Cave," the individual 
separates hi:nself from his fellow men, attains enlightenment, returns 
to the unenlightened who are unable to comprehend his vision, is 
ostracized, and is left (as in The Republic) to find solace in his 
belief that not all men are capable of such knowledge. Some, due to 
individual talent, breeding, and innate ability, were destined to 
become philosopher-kings; others 1vill serve the state as befits their 
autonomous potentials. The "1.Vheel of Fate," harkening back to 
Indo-European cosmology and graphically represented in the writings of 
Boethius for example, offered a cyclical representation of human 
endeavors which served to situate the individual and his or her 
suffering within a defined pattern of occurrence and justification. 
The medieval motif of "The Great Chain of Being," whi l.e linking all 
creatures to a divine order, was perhaps more importantly, a concept 
which justified hierarchical social arrangements and privilege, the 
status quo, as both ordained by God and necessarily reconstructed by 
human social and religious institutions. Medieval ~onastic pedagogy 
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(as the term derived from the Greek means the teaching of children) 
was, indeed, directed toward the training of young boys who were to 
become the scribes, the guardians of the Word which was complete and 
true prior to their membership in a monastic order. The Mi~dle Ages 
and the grlm office of the Inquisition reflected the powerful struggle 
between intellectual and political communities. During the Age of 
Enlightenment and the Protestant Reformation dissent and resistance to 
authoritarian cant rol flourished, gained support and political pmver 
(or escaped by geographic distance), and offered alternative 
conceptions of human agency and intellectual inquiry. The Protestant 
Reformation brought about a new conception of the individual, a 
conception IVhich combined individual conscience and personal agency 
through the offices of faith and good works, and placed personal 
salvation not at the divine threshold of grace, but faith and action. 
It might be said that the Reformation and Age of Enlightenment ushered 
in some of the earliest evidence of modernism: intellectual traditions 
were viewd as problematic, power and authority were seen in a political 
and historical light, and hermeneutics v1as developed as an interpretive 
methodology to recover or reconstruct the meaning of religious texts of 
previous eras. Becker (1967) suggests that: 
Hith social mobility running rampant, with knowledge 
proceeding under its own momentum, religion as a common 
value could not maintain its hold. The Enlightenment that 
began around 1680 shattered the last pretense of social 
cement, and a new type of man was born out of the 
Renaissance: harder, sharper, more incisively rational and 
skeptical, devoted no longer to God and society, but to 
kno~Vledge and discovery. By and odd coincidence, the same 
kind of man emerged after the American Renaissance, 
beginning in the 1880's (p.S). 
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The Novum Organum, (New System), of Francis Bacon, a system of 
"narrow inductionism" which situated experimentalism, systematic 
observation, and the accurmlation of "facts" over- subjective reason, 
intuition and tradition, launched a major assault ag~inst metaphysical 
thou_ght. The scientific method of induction 1vas described by Bacon in 
his Novum Organum as follows: 
But then and then only, may we hope well of the 
sciences, 1vhen in a just scale of ascent, and by successive 
steps not interrupted or broker,, we rise from particulars 
to lesser axioms; and then to middle axioms, one above the 
other; and last of all to the most general (in Harris, 
1979, p.6). 
Through this process of induction, then, theory was to emerge from the 
empirical evidence gathered by disciplined observation. Thus the roots 
of empiricism and the confusion between h01v theories and 
methodologies affect observations -- can be traced certainly to Bacon's 
influential work. 
Somewhat diametrically opposed to the inductionism of 13acon was 
the deductive rationality of Descartes. \vhile Bacon foreshadowed the 
empiricists and positivists, Descartes gave rise to the counterpoint of 
rationalism such as that of Leibnitz and Spinoza. The balance of these 
alternate methodological orientations, accor-ding to ~lichael Harris 
(1979) is critical to one's understanding of scientific inquiry: 
Science has always consisted of an interplay between 
induction and deduction, between emp~r~c~sm and 
rationalism; any attempt to dral>' the line on one side or 
the other conflicts with actual scientific practice. The 
main function of these alternatives -- besides giving jobs 
to philosophers has been to provide ammunition for 
shooting down someone's theories or buildin5 up one's own. 
One's rivals have overindulged themselves with speculative, 
metaphysical assumptions or they have been obsessed with 
superficial empirical appearances, depending on 1vhich 
particular moment in the interplay one chooses to emphasize 
(p.8). 
33 
Harris's comment regarding the actual practice of scientific inquiry 
vis a vis the orientations of disparate philosophical and 
epistemological schools intimates the perrenial problem ·v~hich raises 
questions regarding the correspondence or copenetration of theory and 
practice. This problem is most squarely addressed by contemporary 
efforts (which will be soon discussed more fully) of self-reflective 
research methodologies. It is suggested here that educational 
theories, research and practice are just beginning to integrate these 
methodologies. 
The theorizing of Locke represents one attempt to amalgamate 
empiricist and rationalist orientations into one perspective. ~vhile 
Locke sa\v that knmlledge was to be derived from sense data and strove 
to represent this data using formal, mathematical logic, he also 
maintained that it was intuitive reason that enabled scientists to 
arrive at axioms which could explicate the relationships among data. 
Locke 1 s rationalism was severly challenged by the strict empiricism of 
David Hume. Hume maintained that one must make a distinction between 
the relationship between logical propositions and the relationship 
between empirical facts. Formal logic provides meaningful knowledge 
only by reconciling the contradictions contained in propositional 
statements. That is, in formal logic, the opposite of a logical 
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statement is false or nonsense. Among empirical facts, however, no 
such conclusion can be drawn. The formal opposite of a fact may indeed 
be plausible. For example, the empirical statement that "all swans are 
\{hite" may be borne out by repeated and extensive observation. The 
possibility that a black swan exists is neither excluded from 
consideration, nor can be disproved 11i th certainty. It is presumed 
that the possibi.lity always exists in empirical science that 
contradictory data may be found and, for that matter, must be sought. 
Thus, the inductive process employed by Hume and his empiricist 
followers, while emphasizing the necessity of observation and 
experience for understanding non-mathematical facts, cannot produce 
certainty. The advances in mathematical statistics at the turn of the 
19th century served to slightly shift the attention away from the need 
for certainty and allow probability to take its place. With the 
increasing sophistication of both mathematical logic and statistics, 
empirical science strengthened its application to prediction and 
control. Its stridently anti-metaphysical stance gave rise to the 
evolution of positivist scientific rationality. 
This break with metaphysics 1vas advanced by the work of Auguste 
Comte. Comte maintained that "scientific knowledge" supercedes the 
theological and metaphysical eras. Anthony Giddens, (in Bottornore and 
~isbet, 1978) in his article "Positivism and Its Critics, 11 points to 
the normative neutrality which characterizes positivist science: 
Although there 
positivism and the 
Circle, there are 
are obvious contrasts between Comte' s 
"logical positivism" of the Vienna 
equally clear connections both 
:,.istorical and intellectual - between the two. However, 
the term may also be employed more broadly and diffusely to 
refer to the writings of philosophers who have adopted most 
or all of a series of connected perspectives: phenomenalism 
-- the thesis, 1vhich can be expressed in various ways, that 
"reality" consists of sense impressions; and aversion to 
metaphysics, the latter being condemned as sophistry or 
illusion; the representation of philosophy as a method of 
analysis, clearly separable from, yet at the same time 
parasitic upon, the findings of science; the duality of 
fact and value - the thesis that empirical knowledge is 
logically discrepant from the pursuit of moral aims or the 
implementation of ethical standards; and the notion of the 
"unity cif science" -- the idea that the natural and social 
sciences share a common logical and perhaps even 
methodological foundation (p.237). 
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Thus, positivist science can be seen as a precursor of modern 
functionalism which presumed the subservience of society and social 
inquiry to "natural laws" of development. Comte coined the phrase 
"social physics" as the study of society and proceeded from the point 
of view that the study of social interactions 1vould enable scientists 
to construct a theory of social order and progress. 
2. A NEW ORDER, AND VESTIGAL TRACES OF THE OLD 
The French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution as well 
breathed new life into a Iaovement which broke with Plato's Repu~lic:_, 
"The Great Chain of Being," and substituted in their place a new 
democratic social order characterized by u revisioning of human rights, 
and a reconstructed logic of individualism. Out of the ferment of the 
French Revolution came the belief that renson, not custom nor 
tradition, was the avenue along which human beings were to achieve 
responsibility and membership in society. One's status, po~1er a.nd 
authority were made significantly more mutable and problematic during 
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this era. This "revisioning of human rights" placed, i£ only in 
principle and hmvever incompletely protected by the Republic, the 
destiny of the individual in his or her own hands. This breakthrough 
in political and social thought must, however, be juxt>iposed against 
the triumph of positi..vist empiricism in scientific theories. Hhile 
social and political theories presumed that human agency could bring 
about a "ne1v orr!er," the triumph of positivism seemed to usher in an 
immutable logic of the separation of human ideals, values and 
aspirations from the "natural order" of concrete reality. The la;.,s of 
science (that is, "nature's laws") challenged and blunted the idealism 
of social and political thought by redefining (and eviscerating) 
factual knowledge. This assault on the normative dimension of human 
knowledge was to carry through to contemporary times. But the 
"stalling out" of positivist science in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries provides us with a ne1v point of departure for efforts to 
extend the fruits of this revolution. 
N01vhere was the struggle between r:ttionality and "natural order" 
more pronounced than in the discourse emerging from the Scientific 
Revolution. Darwin's theory of "natural selection" and its implications 
for social organization strike at the very foundations of philosophical 
thought and intellectual history, for what, indeed, is human nature and 
its social counterparts? Ho1v are minds and nature interrelated? \.Jhat 
are the "natural constraints" against personal and social 
transformation? These and a host of other considerations continue into 
modernist thought where intellectual and social orier.s are 
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self-consciously rendered problematic. Dallmayr and :-!cCarthy further 
elaborate on the epistemological and philosophical transformations 
occuring ac this time in human history: 
During the Enlightenment, logical calculation and 
empirical analysis began to gain ascendancy over and 
challenge the intrinsic value of cultural traditions; the 
attack was continued on a more pragmatic level by 
utilitarianism with its emphasis on measurable personal 
gain. An initial response to this challenge can be found 
in the writings of Giambattista Vico, whose thesis verum et 
factum convertuntur suggested that history and cult~were 
more readily intelligible than nature since man was (at 
least in a loose sense) their author and thus could 
recapture himself in records of the past. Vico's lead was 
continued, in a speculative vein, by the idealist and 
romanticist movements with their stress on internal or 
spiritual experience; romanticism in particular presented 
the entire world of culture (if not of nature) as an 
emanation of human sensitivity and ingenuity, especially of 
the creative endeavors of leading individuals. Restricted 
from the outset to small philosophical or literary circles, 
however, these movements vanished lvith the rise of the 
industrial era committed to efficient production, By that 
time, utilitarianism has found a major ally in positivism 
a doctrine centering on the proposition that only 
empirical and scientifically useful knowledge deserves the 
title "knowledge" at all and that all competing types of 
cognition or inquiry belong to more primitive stages of 
civilization. Couched at first as a vague formula, 
positivism began to implement its program in the later part 
of the nineteenth century, with the result that all 
disciplines were soon faced with the alternative of either 
embracing scientific method or facing extinction (p.2). 
As Polanyi was to later claim, this era demonstrated the beginning 
of the conquest of scientism over the scientific method. It is against 
this dramatic rise in empirical science and its accor.~panying "culture 
of positivism" that the contempor::1ry crisis in understanding need he 
situated. 
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It is not as though empiricism and positivism was met with 
gracious acceptance in all quarters. The Romantic Movement in Europe 
(especially in Britain with the poets Coleridge, Wordsworth, and 
Shelley as prominent spokespersons) can be seen as a reaction against, 
and as a school apart from scientistic thought. The combination of 
idealism and romanticism grew as a counter proposal to utilitarianism 
and empirical science. (Though it can also be argued that empiricism 
sought to undercut the unabashedly "spiritual" and "metaphysical" 
quality of the Romantic Movement.) The European romanticists maintained 
the Pauline ideal that "truth" was probably best recognized not by the 
sophisticated intellectual or technical scientist, but by children and 
"the common folk." The romantic preoccupation 1vith pastoral life, as 
opposed to urban cosmopolitanism, reflected the mythical union of human 
sensibility and the natural order reflected in nature. Peter Berger 
(1976) underscores the importance of such mythic representations: 
a myth is any set of ideas that infuses 
transcendent meaning into the lives of men -- transcendent 
with regard to the routine and selfish concerns of ordinary 
life. It is through myths that men are lifted above their 
captivity in the ordinary, attain powerful visions of the 
future, and become ~apable of collective actions to realize 
such visions. In this understanding of myth, therefore, 
the old religious exaltation is retained, even if any 
specifically religious contents are discarded. Then as 
now, the figures of myth touch the lives of individuals 
with transforming pmver. Sorel understood socialism as 
such a myth and sharply criticized the Marxists in their 
rationalism, which, he felt, made them incapable of 
grasping the mythic potency of their own ideas. By 
definition, rnyth transcends both pragmatic and theoretical 
rationality, while ':lt the same time it strongly affects 
them. Nen live ~ myth. If their condition is one of 
relative comfort, the :nythic themes are in the background 
of their lives and only become actualized in moments of 
individual crisis. The same is true even for most people 
who live in a misery that is stable and to which no 
alternatives have been imagined. The power of myth is most 
likely to erupt with historic efficacy in situations of 
rapid change, especially when that change puts in question 
what has previously been taken for granted, and brings 1vith 
it, or threatens to do so, a deterioration in the 
circumstances of life. ~.Jith varying intensity, thi.s has 
been the case with all societies undergoing transformations 
brought on in the wake of the industrial revolution ( pp. 
16-17). 
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The lirtk between European and American romanticism is not 
difficult to discern. The distinction between "reason" and 
"understanding" (reason being, in this case, intuitive knowledge and 
insight; understanding being the knowledge gained through direct 
observation, i.e., scientific rationality), and between mystical 
comprehension and empirical evidence was not only expressed by the 
romantic philosophers and artists of Europe, but by American 
philosophers such as Jonathan Ed1vards and later Emerson and Thoreau. 
Edwards maintained that truly human existence was characterized by ·~ 
mystical sense of the heart." The moral ambiguity of scientific 
kn01vledge and practice was anticipated by the romantics because 
scientific rationality discounted the importance of hu;nan sentiment, 
emotion, passion and values. Morals, according to Ed~mrds and later 
reflectect in the thought of Pierce, James and Dewey, were based on 
"sentiment and affection." Both Pierce and James maintained that 
passionate belief was the route to religious truth. Thus, we are 
presented with, in the midst of an accelerating urban and technicH.l 
milieu, a reaction to the one-dimensional depiction of human 
mvareness. The Ror.mntics sought valiantly to r.~aintain a sense of 
1vonder and aesthetic experience, while the Transcendentalists sought 
organizi11g principles that relied heavily on metaphysical 
representatio11s of reality. 
3. BTIMATIO~S OF THF. POST-MODER\! ERA 
At the turn of the century \•lilliam James directly confronted the 
rising interest and preoccupation 1vith rna themalics and forma 1 logic. 
Tn his A Pluralistic Universe (1909), James attacks the "vicious 
intellectualism," the sophistry of conceptual theorists who effect 
"insulating cuts," taxonomic abstractions which, while developing more 
elegant and formal theoretical explanations, fail to adequately 
represent the seamless and "wild" nature of actual experience. James's 
use of the term "radical empiricism" sought to convey his focus on the 
phenomenalistic qualities of not only sensation, but mystical, 
p:~rapsychological and extrasensory perception. >fuch to the dismay of 
those exploring mathematical logic, linguistic analysis and more 
conventional empiricist research, James sought to highlight the 
shallowness of paradigm-hound inquiry, and posed a multidimensional 
approach which, in effect, suggested that reality was best approached 
by examining what various research or:ientations excluded fr:om their 
considerations. James, 
post-modern philosophy, 
I would suggest, represents a major advance, 
to which curriculum theorists may turn for 
sophisticated conceptual frameworks. Despite Dewey's important and 
lasting contri hu tions to cnrricu lar thou;:;ht, I ;;ould suggest th!:l t 
James 1 s philosophical contributions are perhaps more significant, if 
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underrepresented in the field. 
James was intrigued, stimulated (and somewhat puzzled) by the work 
of Henri Bergson. James captures Bergson's iconoclastic perspective 
regarding formal -logic and the "conceptual method" in the follo1ving: 
In the first place, logic, g~v1ng primarily the 
relations between concepts as such, and the relations 
between natural facts only secondarily or so far as the 
facts have been already identified with concepts and 
defined by them, must of course stand or fall with the 
conceptual method. But the conceptual method is a 
transformation which the flux of life undergoes at our 
hands in the interests of practice essentially and only 
subordinately in the interests of theory. \~e live forward, 
we understand backward, said a Danish writer; and to 
understand life by concepts is to arrest its movement, 
cutting it up into bits as if with scissors, and 
immobilizing these in our logical herbarium where, 
comparing them as dried specimens, we can ascertain which 
of them statistically includes or excludes which other. 
This treatment supposes life to have alrer1dy accomplished 
itself, for the concepts, being so many views taken after 
the fact, are retrospective and post mortem. ~evertheless, 
we can draw conclusions from them and project them into the 
future. We cannot learn from them how life made itself go, 
or how it will make itself go; but, on the supposition that 
its ways of making itself go are unchanging, we can 
calculate what positions of imagined arrest it will exhibit 
hereafter under given conditions (1909, 1977, p. 568). 
James appears to anticipate the later development in quantum mechanics 
of the principle of indeterminacy. Additionally, he seems to 
foreshadow the "epistemological anarchism" of Feyerabend. James treats 
as problematic the entire intellectual process of paradigm formation. 
This radical perspective, one hardly appreciated by those seeking 
certainty or prediction, seemed to some to be a noteworthy anomaly in 
the course of philosophical evolution, hut to those who pursuP. 
curriculum theory today, his insights should be welcome, indeed! James 
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called into question the practical _and instrumental bias of conceptual 
(paradigm-bound) thought: 
This is just what we mean by the stream's sensible 
continuity. No element there cuts itself off from any 
other element, as concepts cut themselves off from 
concepts. No part there is so small as not to be a place 
of conflux. No pa~here is not really next to its 
neighbor; which means that there is literally nothing 
between; which means no part absolutely excludes another, 
but that they compenetrate and are cohesive; that if you 
tear out one, its roots bring out more with them; that 
whatever is real is telescoped and diffused into other 
reals; that, in short, every minutest thing is already its 
Hegelian "own other," in the fullest sense of the term. Of 
course this sounds self-contradictory, but as the immediate 
facts don't sound at all, but simply are, until we 
conceptualize and name them vocally, the--contradiction 
results only from the conceptual or discursive form being 
substituted for the real form. But if, as Bergson shows, 
that the form is super- imposed for practical ends only, in 
order to let us jump about over life instead of wading 
through it; and if it cannot even pretend to reveal 
anything of what life's inner nature is or ought to be; why 
then we can turn a deaf ear to its accusations. The 
resolve to turn the deaf ear is the inner crisis or 
"catastrophe" of which ~. Bergson's disciple whom I lately 
quoted spoke. He are so subject to the philosophic 
tradition which treats logos or discursive thought 
generally as the sole avenue to truth, that to fall hack on 
raw unverbalized life as more a revealer, and to think of 
concepts as the merely practical things which Rergson calls 
them, comes very hard. It is putting off our proud 
maturity of mind and becoming again as foolish little 
children in the eyes of reason. Rut difficult as such a 
revolution is, there is no other way, I believe, to the 
possession of reality (p. 580-581). 
James formulated a multi-dimensional representation of belief and 
seems to have integrated three distinct orientations to knowledge into 
his philosophy: one being conceptual analysis, a second being sensory 
perception, and the third being human sentiment or his "will to 
believe." Similar to this Jamesian integration, the naturalistic 
strain in Santayana and Dewey recognized the importance of bot~ 
empirical observation and religious belief and values by splitting the 
representational frames for each. \.Jhile one form of knowledge was 
derived from scientific methods, yet another was to be achieved through 
the "poetic" or "aesthetic" experience. Santayana maintained that 
religion should not be reduced to a "false physics." A similar 
sentiment was expressed by Dewey when he maintained that the quest for 
certainty was as much a distortion of human inquiry as it was a 
clarification. Underlying the romantics, transcendentalists and 
naturalists was an important sentiment: that that which truly needed to 
be reflected in any sense of human progress is the democrati?.ation of 
inquiry and knowledge. This sentiment, clearly a reaction against 
scientism, technocratic and political elitism, was to reverberate 
through modernist social, political and philosophic3l thought. 
James poses exceedingly difficult questions, questions which have 
prompted a reassessment of the very bases of conceptual frameworks used 
in psychology, the social sciences, and philosophy itself. From a 
vantage point that predated by more than fifty years the cultural 
enclosures that spawn our contemporary awareness, James could see the 
spiritual potentialities that were being sur pressed. If there is any 
particular criticism of James that might be noted here, it is that he 
failed to adequately address the issue of social amelioration. James 
has been accused of "idealizing poverty" <'lnd emphasizing hu~>' 
individuals might make sense of their distorted or oppressive social 
realities. James neglects not the intersubjective rlimension of social 
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reality (thereby he seems to be markedly beyond the narrower scope of 
mainstream empiricists), but the very social construction, the 
collectivist nature, of resistance to oppression. James's writing 
reflects "liberal doctrine" values, and while exposing the 
"instrumental rationality" of scientific methodologies, he offered only 
an individualist cultivation of sensibilities as an antidote to 
dehumanizing conditions. For all James contributed to the critique of 
scientism and its epistemological implications, we must turn to more 
pointedly socially conscious orientations in order to find a level of 
analysis beyond individual agency. Today we understand better, 
perhaps, the social and structural repercussions and the action 
imperatives James himself was only dimly aware of. 
4. INTELLECTUAL FERMENT ON THE CONTINENT 
Out of the Age of Enlightenment, utilitarianism and empiricist 
traditions, liberal individualism gained ascendancy as well. It is, 
perhaps, no accident that a dual stream of individualist thought 
emerged at that time: one being the perspective that personal freedom 
and initiative (as witnessed in the bourgeois lionizing of the heroes 
of both scientific rationalism and capitalist growth and expansion) was 
to be rewarded by material wealth and political power -- lending itself 
to the Great Nan conception of leadership -- and the second being a 
dialectical perspective advanced by ~·1arx that human beings 1vere not 
only guided and influenced by material and cultural .:~rtifacts 
(including social institutions) but were capable of designing and 
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constructing new material and cultural configurations. 
It is within this intellectual milieu of empirical science that an 
emerging shift in focus -- a shift to the German "Historical School" 
can be seen as a significant, if only partially successful, 
counterforce to empiricism. The "Historical School," of which Di 1 they 
is a prominent spokesman, while still very much under the influence of 
individualist conceptions of human agency, also adopted the burgeoning 
interest in "psychologism." The split that ensued was again to call 
attention to the different methodologies or techniques that were seen 
to be appropriate to either mental phenomena (and their corresponding 
cultural manifestations) or natural phenomena. This split developed, 
then, into contrasting disciplines usually termed the "cultural 
sciences" and the "natural sciences." But there was no armistice 
between these alternate paradigms; the "cultural sciences" while 
focusing upon how human beings experience phenomena, how the inner 
psychic life of the individual can be better understood (verstehen), 
were confronted by an altered depiction of "mind" as psychology came to 
be explored and characterized through empirical research 
methodologies. 
The empirical scientific paradigm had its efEect on sociological 
th~ory as well. Nax \~eber, for example, translated this empirical 
orientation into a sociological theory emphasizing 
"instrumental-rational action." This orientation portrayeri human 
behavior as a means-enrl relationship. Human action, then, was depicted 
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as an individual's instrumental behavior which sought what tended to be 
a rather unproblematically conceived end the satisfaction of 
individually perceived needs. According to Dallmayr and ~1cCarthy: 
••• the gap between cultural understanding and causal 
analysis was narrowed, and sociology was treated more 
clearly as a general or systematic science. The study 
defined sociology as "a science which attempts the 
interpretive understanding of social action" where the term 
"action" covered "all human behavior when and insofar as 
the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it," 
while "social" implied that the action "takes account of 
the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its 
course." Meaningful action was segregated in the study 
from merely externally induced or "reactive behavior" 
unrelated to an "intended pur posen; but ~veber cautioned 
that the dividing line could not "be sharply drawn 
empirically." .•• Regarding the notion of action, one 
should add that it referred only to "the behavior of one or 
more individual human beings" -- a carry-over of Dilthey' s 
(and Rickert's) individualism. Social aggregates or 
groupings, in Weber's view, could never constitute genuine 
units of analysis: "For the subjective interpretation of 
action in sociological work these collectivities must be 
treated as solely the resultants and modes of organization 
of the particular acts of individual persons, since these 
alone can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively 
understandable action"(this author's emphasis, p.4-S). 
It was not until the theorizing of Marx, Hegel, and Parsons that 
individual behaviors were firmly situated within a concept of an 
underlying "social system." Thus the instrumentality of human behavior 
was explained by Parsons, for example, in terms of its contribution to 
an end (again unproblematically conceived) social stability. 
Behaviors of individuals could then be analysed for their"functional" 
or "disfunctional" qualities. The adaptation of the individual to 
social and cultural institutions, became the focus of sociological 
research. The attention paid to social ~ystems and the further 
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application of systems theory of human activity was to prompt a 
somewhat more reflexive development in philosophy and social inquiry. 
It is not as though the emergence of the German "Historical 
School" neutralized positivist and empiricist theoretical frameworks; 
it did, however, direct attention to the need to develop conceptual, 
linguistic, and intersubjective frameworks that might explicate the 
underlying relational structures of cultural and social forms. This 
attention, still very much under the influence of the positivist and 
empiricist traditions, brought a renewed interest in the formal, 
structural and even "ideal" frameworks of language. The study of 
language, then, constituted a fertile domain within 1~hich individual 
membership within a rule-bound set of interactions could be explored. 
According to Dalmayr and McCarthy (1977), it was most notably Ludwig 
Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus who attempted 
to design a transparent (or "ideal") linguistic 
framework modeled on formal logic, a framework that would 
grant unobstructed access to reality, compl-etely eluding 
the obscure domain of opinions, purposes, and intentions. 
Rigorously construed, the perspective of the Tractatus 
relegated the notions of "subject" and purposive "meaning" 
from the real:n of concrete experience to the stat us of 
external "limits" or linguistic parameters of the world; in 
so doing, the study also eliminated the need for 
intersubjective clarification of meaning (and ultimately 
also the possibility of philosophical reflection) .... The 
aversion to exegesis 1~as continued by semanticists and 
linguistic pluralists dedicated to the construction of 
specialized language frameworks; despite the importance 
attached to meta-languages or meta-linguistic conventions 
for scientific inquiry, such conventions were treated 
either as simple factual premises or as arbitrary fiats of 
experts. The contours of a rapproachement emerged only in 
the writings of later Wittgenstein, especially in his 
emphasis on ordinary language and the notion of "language 
games" embedcted in commonsense conventions; oncP linguistic 
practices were seen as intimately "interwoven" with 
concrete "life-forms" and lvorldviaws, the feasibility of a 
"cultural" interpretation became apparent. Nevertheless, 
Wittgenstein 1 s own attitude in this matter remained 
ambivalent to the end, as he left open (or failed to block) 
the road to an empiricist treatment of language and the 
reduction of meaning to behavior (p.7). 
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Thu.:, despite ~Vittgenstein' s later emphasis on ordinary language 
and his depiction of "language games" which conveyed the sense of 
"family resemblances" among language communities which was even later 
to be picked up by critical theorists (most notably Habermas) as they 
discussed the notion of "communicative competence," Hittgenstein 1 s 1vork 
did little to counter the positivist separation of subject from object 
and the reduction of meaning to linguistic behavior. 
Throughout the 1920s and 30s, the tide of logical positivism 
advanced by the Vienna Circle was at full flow. In his book The 
Illusion of Technique, William Barrett (1979) describes the impact that 
empiricism and positivism had on philosophical discourse: 
\fuat the positivists did was to take over the 
empiricism of David Huma and annex to it the new technique 
of mathematical logic. In their actual philosophizing, 
however, it was the latter that provided the more potent 
and aggressive weapon. It appeared to give them a more 
exact and more "scientific" language in comparison 1-1ith 
their adversaries. Only within the framework of this 
language -- or so it seemed then -- could philosophic 
problems be raised with any degree of precision at all. 
Otherwise you might be deluding yourself about 
pseudoproblems, thin and vaporous as ~ist. And the 
positivists, when they turned this weapon back upon the 
past, lay about with wholesale slaughter. The great 
philosophic problems of the past were to be declared 
pseudoproblems, and the great figures of the past were 
portrayed as men fighting with empty shadows. The 
resulting sc.heme that issued from positivism had at least 
the virtue of overwhelming simplicity. All problems 1vere 
either questions of fact or questions of logic. The former 
were to be dealt with by the sciences, and philosophy 
disappeared without residue into a certain kind of logical 
analysis. Thus when philosophy, which originally was 
supposed to question everything, turns to question itself, 
it finds that it has vanished (p.9-10). 
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Barrett cites the seminal work of Bertrand Russell and Alfred 
North lvhitehead as a refinement of Hume 1 s empiricism. Not only were 
these theorists to focus on the development of the human mind as it 
sensibly responds to the environment, but the task before them, as they 
saw it, was to formulate a symbolic logic which could precisely 
represent the process of cognition. Russell and I.Jhitehead 1 s (1910) 
work Principia Math.ematica attempted even- to "reduce" mathematics to 
logic. This "reductionist" tendency continued, and by 1914 when 
Russell published Our Knowled~ of the Eternal \vorld, he proclaims that 
"Logic is the essence of philosophy." Russell sought to build a bridge 
between the formerly separate worlds of miad and matter, between 
symbolic representation and sensation. By 1921 in his Analysis of 
"'lind, Russell formulated a doctrine he called "neutral monism." 
Barrett describes this doctrine as follows: 
There are now not two worlds, mental and material, but 
one world, which can be viewed alternately as ~1ental or 
material, depending on the way in which we construct it 
from elementary constituents that in themselves are neither 
mental nor material -- therefore, to be called "neutral." 
Russell chose as these basic building blocks the elementary 
data of sensation. The table on which I write, for 
example, is an assemblage of data color, shape, 
hardness, and so on. "fy .nind contemplating it is :~lso 
another such assemblage, but of different data -- namely, 
all those data of sensation that make up the stuff of my 
personal biography. The doctrine is a baroque and 
spectacular effort, though of dubious success. But its 
success or failure is not our question here. \ole nsk 
instead: I.Jhy did Russell choose sense data as the 
elementary building blocks of reality? Did the choice 
follow logically from the new logic, which 1vas supposed to 
be "the essence of philosophy?" If anything was "neutral" 
in this snarled situation, it was the logical technique 
itself, as between two rival views of experience. Thus 
Russell acknowledged his indebtedness to Hhitehead for the 
particular technique, but in \vhitehead' s hands that 
technique issued in an altogether different philosophy. 
And it did so because bach men started from an altogether 
different vision of experience. For Russell, experience 
comes to us partitioned into discrete atoms; for Whitehead, 
every sense perception is an immediate disclosure of the 
world, into which all the details of background enter, 
though in different degrees of relevance. Russell arrived 
at his sense data as the basic building blocks of the world 
through a process of thought - or lack of thought, his 
critics say -- that did not in the least derive from 
mathematical logic. His choice of these elements came out 
of a particular grasp and elaboration of experience - a 
peculiar phenomenology, to use the term of another school--
that was anterior to the application of the technique (pp. 
13-14). 
50 
It was this preoccupation with reductionism, abstraction, and the 
technique of logical method, that typifies the positivist paradigm. It 
was this fascination with technique, method, and factual data that 
fueled the development of scientific management, the Taylorization of 
human behavior (especially when perceived as "labor"), and reinforced 
the still prominent positivist and empiricist doctrines which separate 
subjectivity and objectivity and focus attention on discrete, 
observable, measurable phenomena. Its legacy is still to be found in 
behavioral psychology, management by objectives, and curricular 
orientations in the tradition of Bobbitt, Charters and later Tyler. 
But the quote of Whitehead's cited at the beginning of this 
section, a statement he made shortly before his death, intimates the 
frustration that was engendered by the positivist search. According to 
Barrett: 
Logic had not pt:'ovided the key to tt:"aditional 
philosophical pt:'oblems, like mattet:' and mind, as Russell 
dt:"eamed. It does not liquidate ethics, aesthetics, or 
metaphysics, as the mot:'e aggt:"essive positivists once 
hoped. Its value had turned out once mot:'e limited and yet 
sweeping in its consequences. It is only one of the modet:'n 
sciences that has produced its own critique, in the Kantian 
sense of that wot:"d -- that is to say, it has sho1m its own 
limits. And in showing the limits of its fot:'mal systems, 
it sho1vs the limits of the techniques and the machines that 
man may design. Fot:' the pt:'ospects of a technical 
civilization that is a conclusion of majot:' consequence 
(p.l9). 
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Whitehead, while attempting to unite dispat:'ate "facts" under p•ecise 
and unifom sets of principles, saw the limits of this at:'tificially 
synthetic, integrative process. 
The limits of positivism (and there have been many cited) hinge on 
the supposed "normative neutrality" of scientific method. The 
act:"itical nature of positivist science neither ackn01vledges its own 
ideology nor the relationship between knowledge and social control. 
But there were further developments in philosophical inquiry and 
scientific method lvhich would begin to address the need to situate 
inquiry within a discourse comprised of social, epistemological and 
political contexts. At this stage, language still occupied an 
important place in the critical examination of communication, knmvledge 
and human understanding. 
Peter Hinch (1958) in his The Idea of ~ Social Science reflects 
this burgeoning interest in com;nunica tion and intersubjective 
understandins. According to Winch, social understanding involves 
"grasping the point Ot:' meaning of what is. being done or said" and thus 
52 
an effort "far removed from the ~1orld of statistics and causal laws" 
and "closer to the realm of discourse." Hinch's facus on the 
"different and competing ways of life, each offering a different 
account of the intelligibility of things" brought the very processes, 
methodologies and languages of science and logical analysis under the 
mantle of simply "another way of life." Thus it was in I.Jinch' s 1vork 
that the concept of "the incommensurability" of different language 
communities (or paradigms) was thrust into th2 social and cultural 
analysis. The notion of "incommensurability" of language communities 
lvill be discussed later when referring to the work of Paul Feyerabend. 
The analysis of meaningful statements, following from the 1vork of 
Dilthey, was bolstered by Husserl and other "Continental F..uropean" 
scholars. Husserl' s Logical Investigations, while attempting to 
reinforce the integrity and constancy of logical propositions, remained 
very much under the influence of the empiricists. According to 
Dallmayr and McCarthy, 
Although reformulating and sharpening the insights of 
his predecesors, Husserl at least in one respect remained 
heir to their perspective: in the attachment to 
individualism or to an individual-egological 
"consciousness." The phenomenological method of 
"bracketing," or epoche, in his treatment signified 
basically an attempt to unravel the meaningful core, or 
"essence," of phenomena as disclosed in (or "constituted" 
by) a purified consciousness. At least in this respect his 
approach replicated the solipsistic dilemma of early 
language analysis and of much of traditional philosophy: to 
the extent that consciousness was presented as 
"transcendental limit" of the world, the domain of 
intersubjective understanding and clarification of meaning 
was obliterated. In his later writings Husserl sought to 
overcome this dilemma by introducing the notion of the 
"life-lvorld," or world of :nundane experience, but the 
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relationship between mundanity and consciousness was never 
fully clarified (p.9). 
It was not until the pivotal \vork of Heidegger -- particularly his 
that inoividual-egological consciousness IYaS 
transcended. Heidegger 1 s concepts of "hermeneutical phenomenology" or 
"existential ontology" brought the issue of meaning out of the narrow 
conception of individual consciousness or cognition and configured it 
in humanity 1 s existential condition or Dasein -- "being-in-thc-1vorld." 
"Being-in-the-l>orld," then, situated meaningful activity specifically 
within an intersubjective and cultural milieu. The work of Alfred 
Schutz, one of Husserl's students, further refined the concept of 
Dasein to include the "experiential form of common-sense knowledge of 
human affairs." Schutz saw the search for meaning to be "an 
epistemological problem," a problem requiring a new framework and 
methodology for examining behavior. 
Contemporary ethnomethodology owes its emergence to the pioneering 
of Heidegger, Husserl, Schutz, and later Garfin!de. 
Ethnomethodology, while focusing attention on the practical everyday 
activities of people in society as they make accountable, to themselves 
and others, their everyday affairs, has yet to resolve the debate over 
lvhether ordinary life reflects invariant or transcendental cognitive 
structures or whether cognition itself is shaped by cultural contexts. 
Thus the issues of individualism and intersubjectivity, of historical 
and cultural contingincy against human agency, ren1c1in epistemological 
and philosophical questions unresolverl. The agentic role of the 
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individual -- the individual as being master and in control Jf his or 
her destiny -- remains problematic. 
Equally problematic have competing methodological 
epistemological orientations become. According to Harris: 
The obvious lack of correspondence between the conduct 
of research and Popper's view that science consists or 
should consist of an unremitting attempt to prove one's 01vn 
beliefs false has helped to stimulate a healthy interest 
among historians of science concerning the actual 
psycho-social conditions of scientific discovery. It 
should come as no surprise that many of the most cherished 
scientific discoveries were made as a result of following 
either metaphysical or downright irrational beliefs. Nor 
should it surprise anyone that once made, many of these 
same would have been abandoned had the originators not 
stubbornly clung tJ the conviction that they were right, in 
the teeth of overwhelming evidence to the contrary (p.l9). 
and 
This "healthy interest" was greatly enhanced by the 1vork of Thomas Kuhn 
(1970) in The Structure ~ Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn brought into 
the vernacular the concept of "paradigm" - a universally recognized 
scientific achievement that for a time provided model problems and 
solutions to a community of practitioners'' (p.viii). According to Kuhn, 
paradigms provided "acceptable examples of scientific practice 
examples that include law, theory, application and instrumentation 
together provide models from 1o1hich spring particular coherent 
traditions of sci en ti fie research" ( p. 10) . \</hi le the "coherent 
traditions" may have demonstrated coherence withiJ! a given tradition 
(or as Wittgenstein 1vould have described it--"language games;" ~Iabermas 
o. "communication community"), these traditions fai 1. to provide 
coherence among traditions. According to Kuhn: 
The proponents of competing paradigms are always at 
least slightly at cross-purposes. Neither side will grant 
all the non-empirical assumptions that "the other needs in 
order to make its case... they are bound partly to talk 
through each other. Though each may hope to convert the 
other to his way of seeing his science and its programs, 
neither may hope to prove his case. The competition 
between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be 
resolved by proofs (p~l48). 
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As if to add to the quandary that competing paradigms pose with 
regard to communication and understanding, Kuhn maintains that 
paradigms provide an umbrella framework which helps to explain and 
critique theories within paradigms, but not the emergence of paradi~ 
themselves nor comparisons across paradigm boundaries. Additionally, 
according to Kuhn, the emergence of ne1v paradigms does not reveal a 
progressive or developmental principle per se, rather, one can discern 
a "more recent" theory from an earlier one by way of several criteria: 
increased predictive ability, increasingly esoteric subject matter, and 
the number of problems "solved." Kuhn later (1977) modified his 
references to paradigmatic systems by describing them as "exemplars" or 
a "disciplinary matrix." What then becomes characteristic of the 
coherence within a community of practitioners is the shared pool of 
language, conveui:.ional meanings, and "cognitive styles." The 1vork of 
Lakatos (1970) also contributes to this notion of "cognitive s'tyles." 
According to Lakatos, "the history of science is the history of 
research prc:_grams rather than theories" ( p. 133). He goes on to say 
that: 
Not an isolated theory but only a series of theories 
can be said to be scientific or unscient.ific: to apply the 
terrn "scientific" to one single theory is a categorical 
mistake. 
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The history of science has and should be the history 
of competing research programs (or if you \vish, 
"paradigms") (p.ll9 and p.l55). 
The work of critical theorists, ~ost notably .Jurgen Habermas, 
Karl-Otto Apel and Hans-Georg Gadamer, represe11ts a direct response to 
this problematic consideration of individualism and cultural critique. 
The Frankfurt School sought to juxtapose hermeneutics and scientific 
analysis to help situate the individual and his or her actions 1vithL1 
an historical and critical assessment of cultural institutions and the 
ideological context of epistemological, philosophic and methodological 
traditions. Rather than separate understanding and scientific 
rationality, con temporary phenomenologists such as ~1er leau-Ponty and 
Ricoeur seek to uncover the dialogic qualities of language communities 
and the symbiosis of understanding and scientific explanation. The 
boundaries of this type of critique remain permeable and indistinct. 
The work of critical theorists and phenomenologists, while seeking a 
"critically comprehensive normative rationality" are at the forefront 
of questions of meaningful activity. The emphasis on "comrrmnicati ve 
competence" and "reciprocal dialogue'' have opened the door to a 
r.econceptualization of methodological as l'lell as epistemological 
issues. 
The implications for curriculum theory of this critique and its 
diverse methodological offshoots should not be underestimated. Having 
r-aised the issue of control, p011er distot"tions, language communities, 
intentionality and competence, these paradigms of social science have 
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pr-ecipitated a mor-e penetr-ating, self-r-eflexive analysis of ideology 
and social pr-actices. Speculations about justice and meaningful 
activity continue apace. It is with this outline of the emer-gence of 
the phenomenological, her-meneutic and cr-itical theor-y or-ientations 
against the empiricist and positivist traditions (again, this is not to 
discount the per-vas.' •:c pr-esence of both empiricist and positivist 
fr-ame1vorks among present day educational r:=searchers and theorists!) 
that yet another form of discourse may be portr-ayed. This emer-ging 
frame1vork, IYhich I shall call "The Corrununitarian Counter- Pmposal," 
will be pr-esented in Chapter- IV, It r-emains to be seen ;;hether the 
orientations of critical theory - "the reduction of unnecessary soci.al 
constraints" and reciprocal a1vareness implied within the 
phenomenological tradition, or the process and ends of interpr-etation 
as found within hermeneutics, individually or as a combi:ted set of 
perspectives and "programs" offer a truly liberating or meaningful 
alternative to psychic atomism and alienation. It is my belief that 
philosophical hermeneutics provides conceptual frame1wrks and insights 
IJhich, drawing upon both phenomenology and critical theory, extends 
beyond them and offers to curriculum theory a normative and strategic 
n~sponse to both methodological solipsism and alienation. 
this discussion I now turn. 
It is to 
II. HERMENEUTICS: THE RECOVERY OF MEANING IN HIDIAN SCIENCE 
'fhe object of the understanding poses the 
"endless task" of definition. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer 
Let x x. 
Laurie Anderson 
A. "NO CODE" AS CODE: AN INTERLUDE 
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In order to introduce a philosophical hermeneutics orientation as 
an interpretive science, I wish to recount an incident which seemed to 
"crystalize" for me (just as the conversation with my friend Dan Goetz 
on the subject of "minimum competency tests" seemed to crystalize the 
issue of individualist vs. collective competence) the presence in 
day-to-day living of an hermeneutic process. This recognition -- that 
we each are makers of meaning and that meanings can be traced to 
disparate, sometimes contiguous, sometimes overlapping communities of 
meaning -- was "inspired" by the mundane act of discovering how that 
which is foreign, alien or unknown (in this case, a piece of grafitti) 
becomes understood through a process of "historical consciousness." 
But let us turn to the tale, for it in its playful teasing ~ut of sense 
from nonsense, may afford the reader a glimpse of what is very often a 
transparent human activity and one \~hich is integral to a curricular 
awareness. 
The P01ver Center, a grey concrete and mirrored glass structure 
looms against the trees and dark brick of the Michigan League at the 
northeast corner of the University of ~ichigan at Ann Arbor. While such 
an example of modernist architecture might well be perceived as 
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clashing against the weathered brick, slate roofs and hundred year old 
buildings 1vhich comprise the older sections of the campus, the closest 
building to The Power Center is another "power center" -- a stark, 
industrial physical plant complex complete with billm;ing stacks and 
partially masked steam pipes and grey oil storage tanks. The Power 
Center's anomalous architecture fares rather well given its setting. 
But then again, depending on what 'ile understand to be the "setting," or 
more accurately, whatever context we construct within which both the 
physical plant and The Power Center are to be considered, the 
"anomalous architecture" of The PO\ver Center may or may not "fare well" 
in comparison. For that matter, there are in theory limitless 
possibilities (or as Macdonald has suggested, "contexts") available to 
one who may choose to explore the phenomena of these structures. \\That 
is it about The Power Center that I think might serve as an 
introduction to a discussion of hermeneutic interpretation? Let us 
again consider The Power Center as a phenomenon that offers more than a 
few possibilities for human experience and reflection. We can be 
reasonably certain that The Power Center exists as a physical 
structure. One who has acquired some reasonable, or at least 
convincing, evidence of its existence can assert that The Power Center 
is known to, is real to them (that is, make a propositional statement 
of the truth of its existence). Having encountered this structure, 
been a member of audiences present for various functions, seen it 
represented on maps, in campus directories, had it as a topic of 
conversation among other people, and having an understanding of 1vorld 
views, epistemological and philosophical frame1vorks 1vhich offer more 
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intellectually satisfying orientations than say extreme subjectivism or 
skepticism which suggest that the entire world is actually a 
manifestation of our mind which is as much misinformed as it is 
informed by ra1v sense data and perception, then I can act upon the 
belief that The Power Center is real. You, as reader of this account, 
have perhaps somewhat different evidence to consider as you attempt to 
deter~ine whether to accept, reject, or even withhold judgement (or as 
Coleridge defined "poetic faith" one may achieve a momentary 
"willing suspension of disbelief") as to the reality of The Power 
Center. In this account, you are presented a verbal claim, a text 
comprised of words and therefore subject to linguistic and semantic 
logics, a claim made in the historical context of your knowledge of me, 
and of course, any knowledge you might have of the existence of The 
Power Center from other accounts or personal experience. Following the 
"practical method of research'' variously attributed to Casey Stengel or 
!1uhammed Ali -- "You can look it up." But if the evidence you discern 
from this narrative does not meet with your personal criteria for truth 
or your epistemological conventions, then it is quite likely that The 
Power Center will remain unknown to you and this narrative will be 
discounted for its truth claims. Your doubt of the Center's existence 
signifies that the conversion to belief in the existence of the Center 
has not occurred. For you, the possibility of The Power Center being 
kn01m to you has not yet been realized. Indeed, I :nay have constructed 
a fictive subject -- as Kafka constructed his "Castle" -- for your 
consideration. If you were to have come to the belief that The Power 
Center is real based upon my fictive representation of it in this text, 
then, perhaps, you might be entitled 
without the sarcasm of its original 
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to use the same claim (though 
use) Bogart made in the film 
Casablanca as to why he stated that he had come to Casablanca "for the 
waters"-- "I was misinformed." 
I hav': wished to explore the nature of the process whereby the 
understanding of a phenomenon calls for a rather intricate and often 
almost transparent engagement of our critical faculties and the 
inherently collective nature of meaning. Our "being-in-the-1vorld," to 
use the phrase employed by phenomenologists such as Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty, is reflected in the myriad interactions among our 
physical, preconceptual, conceptual and intersubjective, among other 
dimensions. The process of hermeneutic interpretation has as its 
domain, the constructive process of making meaning and investigating 
how it is that the foreign, strange and alien becomes or does not 
become understood by us. Hermeneutics is an interpretive process which 
is responsive to human desire for and interest in understanding; 
through philosophical hermeneutics, not only is understanding sought, 
but the understanda~ility of those engaged in discourse guided by 
hermeneutic principles and perspectives is likewise enhanced. Of this 
I will say more later. 
But let us return to our earlier consideration of The Power 
Center, for I have yet to disclose a central, precipitating reason why 
it was made a subject for an introduction to hermeneutic inquiry. 
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On an east-facing concrete wall, a wall exposed to two busy lanes 
of west-bound traffic on Huron Boulevard, the words "No Code" were 
spray painted in bright red by some graffiti artist. It was perhaps 
the second or third time that I noticed the graffiti that I began 
trying to surmise the meaning of the expression. Ann Arbor is "graced" 
with various other spray painted slogans: "Harkers Build a Leni:1 
Engine," "End Racism," "No More \.Jar." The meanings of these slogans 
seemed to be more readily graspable. Their referents more distinctly 
discernible from the word choices, semantic content and the pro~inence 
of their themes in the conversations cycling some Ann Arbor 
communities, these graffiti were quickly deciphered for various 
meanings not only the meanings conveyed by the words themselves, but 
the social, political and cultural meanings associated generally with 
graffiti. But "No Code" remained strange, unfathomable, alien. In 
fact, there was an amusing absurdity about the expression that piqued 
my interest and added to the intriguing quality of a search for some 
understanding of the expression's as yet ~inimally disclosed 
possibilities. !-laving already observed that the expression "No Code" 
conformed to various "codes," that is, systematic or formulaic 
regularities such as ~orphological, linguistic and semantic orders, 8nd 
even the "unwritten" proprieties peculiar to graffiti writing, the 
perhaps clever use of "No Code" suggested the propositional statement 
that "There is no code" or even "No code applies here." In either 
case, "No Code" seemed to provide a logical jujitsu inversion of 
meaning and counter meaning. "This is fun," I thought. And to be 
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fair, her~eneutic interpretation can be. 
"No Code" offered few clues to its referent, for I presumed it to 
have one, at least one. This graffiti seemed to fit another more 
arcane form of communication, not unlike the messages scrawled on 
subway cars, walls, and billboards throughout New York City. This form 
of "communication" is understood by a smaller, perhaps less \vi.dely 
known subculture. I assumed (or it was my "prejudice") that the 
sprayer of this message knew its meaning -- :1 meaning which as yet 
alluded me. The abrupt message, in addition to sharing some 
similarities 1vith urban graffiti, also seemed to he of a type of 
guerrilla art which local performance art aficionados plastered, 
painted or carved in public spaces throughout this town. Local fans of 
music groups, video collectives, etc., seemed to also have the knack of 
delivering similar abrupt and pithy messages: "SLK," "Destroy All 
Monsters," "Joe's." Perhaps that was "it," I thought. The name of a 
New ~lave group? Sort of catchy, to the point, nihi listie or at least 
anarchistic. Perfect. Names of groups seem to capture the arresting 
quality of sudden visual or emotional i!llpact: "Black Flag," "The Dead 
Kennedies," "The Thompson Twins" (neither twins, nor Thompsons, 
actually a white male, black male and white female making up the trio 
named "Twins). "No Code," yes, that would "work." 
But it was perhaps a week from the time I first sought to piece 
together this interpretation that an article in the local newspaper 
brought this graffiti and my experience of it into a new light. "No 
Code" it turns out, is the expression used by a dissident student ~roup 
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ivhich is attempting to block the adoption (or imposition as they see 
it) of a code of ethics for University of :-lichigan students. Aha, 
mystery solved! Meaning established ... or so I thought. Further 
reflection on the interplay between my perception of the graffiti and 
the "explanation" provided by the newspaper article was provoked by :ny 
reading of Hans-Georg Gadamer 1 s (1976) Philosophical Ii_ermene~ tics. My 
curiosity about the message 1vas led by my interest to understand what 
was meant by the message. As best I can tell, I had no instrumental 
interest in knowing about the message. But my admittedly playful 
engagement in an attempt to decipher the "code" of aNo Code" may be 
seen as a process of hermeneutical reflection. According to Gadamer, 
"hermeneutic reflection teaches us: that social community, with all its 
tensions and disruptions, ever and ever again leads back to a common 
area of social understanding through which it exists" (p. 42). Having 
learned of the origin of the expression from the newspaper account, I 
was now cognizant of the social net1vork or as Habermas describes it, 
the "communication community" within· IVhich the speech act is 
understood. Gadamer describes this generation of knowledge, this 
expansion of social understanding 8s "a fusion of horizons." By this 
Gadamer refers to \Vittgenstein 1 s sense of socially constructed, bounded 
communities represented as "language games." The expression "No Code" 
was now understood to be a meaningful expression among those lvho knew 
of its historically situated referent; my membership IVithin the social 
group in a sense extends the possibility of the expression 1 s 
significance. Not only have I gained some comprehension of the 
semantic or linguistic meaning of the expression, but I have also come 
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to know something about the issues which prompted its use and those who 
know its meaning. 
Thus, the horizon of :ny understanding is both extended in some 
degree to include the formerly u<J.kno1m and alien communication 
community from lvhich the message emerged. :1oreover, it can al.:;o be 
suggested that the communication community now includes the 
interpretations and possibilities that I assign to not only this single 
expression, but the historical context within which the community for 
1vhom "No Code" is a meaningful expression. The hermeneutic process of 
interpretation leads not to a final, static completion of meaning, nor 
to understanding as an end, but rather interpretation of a "text" leads 
to the recognition of the dynamic and multifaceted historical reality 
which the "text" makes accessible. Thus the meaning of the expression 
"No Code" is not an objective, reified thing, rather, its meanings (for 
there are many associated with it) are distributed among the various 
communication communities (including now those who are reading this 
dissertation) who encounter this expression. The multi-layered 
sediment of meaning -- meanings assigned by people irlterpreting this 
phenomenon from numerous, divergent prejudices and pre-conceptual 
orientations -- for example, maintenance people whose task it is to 
repair this "vandalism" ;nay very well assign rather different meanings 
to the event than, say the victim of an assault by a student in a 
university dormitory or the student whose rese~rch projects are 
"expropriated" or plagerized by a faculty me'llber. The :nc,~aning, then, 
of the graffiti contains all these various standpoints as they, within 
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:1 fusion of their horizons, construct a socially lived experience of 
interpretive action. To repeat Gadamer 1 s phrase, "the object of 
understanding poses the 1 endless task 1 of definition" ( 1977, p. 5.51). 
This "endless task" is nothing more or less than the qui:1tessential 
human activity of making meaning -- a rather ironic task for a human 
being which Neitzsche suggested is itself a "not yet defined ani:nal." 
Having attempted to convey to you the presence of hermeneutic 
interpretation in quotidian matters, I will develop and refine the 
description of philosophical hermeneutics and its implications for 
curriculum theorizing. 
B. PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 
The term "hermeneutics" is derived from the name Hermes, the 
messenger to the gods of Greek mythology. I.Jhile Hermes 1vas indeed a 
messenger, the reader might also 1vish to recall that, as David Pur pel 
brought to :ny attention, Hermes was not above playing tricks, practical 
jokes, even among the gods. So with such a philological nugget in 
mind, let us not become overly preoccupied with either the 
verifiability or the authenticity of messages extended .in his na:ne! 
Harvey Cox (1973) quite simply and directly states that "Hermeneutics 
is the study of messages or, more exactly hO\v one interprets the 
meaning of texts. It is generally used in relation to documents 
stermning from a different historical period" (p.l46). Cox goes on to 
elaborate that hermeneutics in its Dodern conception has broadened its 
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understanding of "text" to include human beings and phenomena not 
restricted to linguistic representation. Hermeneutic interpretation 
allows for the dialectical consideration of the whole and its 
constituent parts. That: is to say, the construction of particular 
objects or "texts" \vhich we choose to examine is guided by our 
preconceptual or prejudicial anticipation of the whole. Gadamer 
maintains that "Understanding always implies a pre-understanding which 
is in turn pre-figured by the deter;ninate tradition in 1vhich the 
interpreter lives and which shapes his prejudice (1979, p.l08). It is 
this grounding in the lived world, in 12_asein or being-in-the-worLi 
according to the seminal work of Heidegger from whom, along with 
Schleiermacher, philosophical hermeneutics was int reduced into modern 
thought, that typifies hermeneutic interpretation. Unlike positivist 
science which separates the kno1ver from what is kno1m, hermeneutic 
philosophy situates the knower through the emergence of historical 
consciousness in a dialectical relationship to the world: we are each 
shaped by the historical conditions in which we live and in turn shape 
these conditions through praxis -- self-reflective action. 
Hermeneutic philosophy, as one might anticipate of any discipline, 
is not without variations of perspectives and emphases. Howard (1982) 
offers a typology of variants of hermeneutic philosophy whi-:h might 
serve to identify a range of orientations. Moreover, Howard's typology 
contributes to a rationale for the approach I have selected for use in 
this rtissertation. In The Three Faces of Hermeneutics: An Introduction ---- ·--- - -- -------
to Current Theories 2..f \I_nd~sta!!'i~~. 1vhich I consider to be '.i valuable 
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historical and critical study of hermeneutic philosophy, Howard 
outlines three distinct 
ontological. Each of these 
branches: analytic, 
three branches shares 
psychosocial and 
the foundational 
concepts of hermeneutics: that understanding is its aim, that human 
purpose and intentionality is interwoven within the concrete 
environment in which we live, and that intersubjectivity is an 
essential prerequisite for communication. Hermeneutic philosophy, 
then, (though each of the branches to a greater or lesser degree) 
extends beyond the orientations in the natural sciences which 
traditionally and some would say rightfully excludes subjectivity from 
its purview; draws upon historical and philological research traditions 
in that events· and the human (though generally not the researchers 1 ) 
interests interwoven within such events are interpreted; and includes, 
most importantly, contemporary social science orientations which 
consider the dialectical relationship bet·..;een the 
subjectivity/interests of the researcher and the object of study. This 
latter development, of course, suggests the interpenetration of f"lct 
and value, knowledge and human interests. 
Of the three orientations Ho1iard identifies within the field of 
hermeneutic philosophy, I locate myself clearly within the ontological 
orientation. This is not to say that the remaining two do not 
contribute insights toward the aim of increasing understanding. The 
analytic branch, typified by the later work of Wittgenstein, Winch and 
von lvright clearly sought to counter the "monomethodological" approach 
of (positivist) natural science and is less concerned with causalist 
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and empiricist orientations to knowledge. Analytical hermeneutics is 
essentially anti-metaphysical, breaks \vith highly psychologized 
accounts of human communication, and while focusing upon mathematical 
logic, semantics and the truth of propositional statements, fails to 
adequately address tha interests of the researcher in such 
interpretations. Analytical hermeneutics focuses upon events and 
language, is firmly rooted in historical and philological traditions, 
and according to HO\vard, reflects technical interests of prediction and 
control. Howard suggests that analytical hermeneutics offers a map but 
not a critique of human knowledge: 
Analytic philosophers... are prone to constructing 
logical maps or "grammars" for a semantical process they 
already find in place. Continental philosophers, in 
contrast, are inclined to ask the genetic question, "How 
did the process coma to be that way?" "I.Jhat are the 
conditions for its occurring?" "Do these conditions 
contain clues to the legitimacy of the subsequent 
process?" This is both a more Kantian and a more 
phenomenological kind of approach. 
Hhy do Continental philosophers have this preference? 
One of the main reasons, I think, is an essentially moral 
one: an impression that a logicizing kind of philosophy 
tends to leave the social landscape just as it was. 
Sometimes it seems to have a vested interest in k2eping the 
landscape as it was. It may appear to be a style of 
philosophizing which is inherently accomodating to the 
status quo, since it does not seem to propose a guide for 
rationally changing the status quo. Even when it is 
mapping the logical network of purposive action in a 
nonpositi vist \vay -- as is the case with von \vright and 
Hinch it makes no judgment of the worth of such 
purposiveness. It seems to be, in short, a philosophy tha~ 
draws a map but cannot offer a critique -- an impressive 
exercise, a Continental philosopher might say, for 
explaining the world but of little help for changing it 
(pp. 86-87). 
Given these shortcomings, the analytical branch is of li:ni~ed 
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usefulness for curriculum theory. 
The psychosocial branch, typified by the work of Haber mas and 
Ricoeur, focuses less on events and more on meanings more 
specifically, this orientation focuses attention on assessing the worth 
of such meanings and is therefore more than descriptive, but 
evaluative. Underlying such an orientation is a view called "universal 
pragmatics" which refers to the inherent human need to conrnunicate. 
Understanding and interpretation, according to Habermas (1971, in 
Howard, 1982), necessarily must address, through self-reflexivity, the 
subject which is internal to experience: 
Hermeneutics must assimilate the dialectic of the 
general and the individual that determines the relation of 
objectivation and experience and comes to expression as 
such in the medium of the "common." If this is so, then 
understanding itself is bound to a situation in '•hich at 
least t1vo subjects communicate in a language that al101vs 
them to share - that is, to make communicable through 
intersubjectively valid symbols what is absolutely 
unsharable and individual. Hermeneutic understanding ties 
the interpreter to the role of a partner in dialogue. Only 
this model ~ participatio~ in communicatio~ learne<!_ in 
interaction can explain the speci fie achj_evements Of 
hermeneutics (p.l08). 
Habermas develops a psychosocial orientation 1•hich reflects his 
structuralist conceptual frameHork of cognitive and moral development. 
Habermas, like Piaget and Kohlberg, suggests in potentia dev~lopmental 
levels of competence. Central to Haberrnas's critique is the reduction 
of distortions in communication, the objective reliability of knowledge 
gained through empirical and comparative scientific methodologies, and 
the corresponding demystification of metaphysical or ontological 
descriptions of knowledge. The aim of Hahermas' s critic-'ll her·rreneutics 
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is, of course, the emancipation of hu:nan beings from unnecessary 
constraints and the development of a self-reflexive methodology which 
is normative and evaluative. \oJhile the critical, psychosocial 
hermeneutics of Habermas shares certain features lvith an ontologically 
oriented approach (Gadamer being a prominent spokesperson) -- namely, 
that a subject-object split is untenable, that a dialectical 
epistemology is developed, that knowledge reflects practical interests, 
and that theory and practice are unified -- there are features which 
are not present in psychosocial herr.teneutics but whose importance is 
recognized in ontological orientations. 
I.Jhile psychosocial hermeneutics relies on a self-reflexive 
methodology for uncovering human interests and distortions in 
communication, ontological hermeneutics leaps beyon~ ~~~tho~ as it 
addresses human consciousness. Whereas psychosocial hermeneutics, 
through the process of self-reflective critique, attempts to construct 
truth by reducing distortions and illusions, ontological herr.teneutics 
suggests that the initiative for finding truth in reality resi:ies in 
our ontological condition of being-in-the-world. That is, truth 
happens to us as 1vell as 1ve make it happen. Gadamer 1 inks to the 
concept of semantic truth, which may be arrived at through 
self-critical reflection, a concept of ontological truth wl-tic'1 is "not 
a side effect of ~Vhat we do." For Gadamer, truth and reality are 
interwoven; the existence of truth preceeds our recognition of it. 
Thus, "truth" in this light is seen as an ontological, transcendent 
reality which is transcendent precisely because it extends into the 
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past as historical reality and into the future as possibility. This 
temporality lends to truth and meaning a transcendent quality which 
links experience to both the immediacy of an event (which Hahermas 
adroitly addresses) but also to its totality. The distinction bein3 
dra1m here can be made analogously to the "meaning" of a text, an 
author 1 s 1vork. Hhile the i;rl!'nediacy of an author 1 s work may disclose 
the intentionality of the author, his or her purpose for a particular 
expression, it is only an appreciation of the totality of the 
expressive act lvhich enables us to grasp its resonance with the past 
and its as yet unknown future possibilities. This ontological view is 
especially germane to curriculum theory for, as Macdonald has 
indicated, the "context" of an educational action implies both its 
immediacy and particularity as well as its expansive, aye, infinite 
reverberations in totality. To deny or be unaware of the specific 
implications of an action for those presently involved is to be 
culpably ignorant of our influence as human agents; to be inattentive 
to the as yet unforseen (the unintended) consequences of curricular 
decisions is to disregard our participation in the essentially 
religious and ontological dimensions of educational activity. 
Ontological hermeneutics can afford educators the possibility of 
considering human relationships and our existence in the world as being 
more than the result of various methodologies and actions. Such a view 
can offer a profound sense of intimacy with the 1vorld and others and 
thereby counter the potential alienation of "methodological 
solipsism." 
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Hermeneutic philosophy offers a means and opportunity for reducing 
alienation alienation as both experienced by those who are 
confronted by the facticity of the world and its attendent determinism 
within materialist or realist conceptions oi. reality, as 1vell as by 
those who fall victim to extreme subjectivism •Jr paradig;n-bound 
interpretation as Dallmayr and !1cCarthy have described it 
"methodological solipsism" of individualist consciousness and 
methodological preoccupation. Hermeneutics offers a transcendent 
possibility of liberating interpreters from their determinate tradition 
and the standpoint or platform upon 1vhich their being-in-the-world is 
grounded. According to Macdonald and Purpel (1981): 
The importance of "platform" has been discussed at 
length by hermeneutic philosophers. The work of Hans 
Gadamer (1976) is especially instructive. Each situation 
represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of 
v1s1on. Thus, the concept of "horizon" is an essential 
part of each situation. The word horizon has been used by 
many thinkers to characterize the way in 1vhich thought is 
tied to a platform. It is this platform which allows us to 
see beyond what is nearest to us. Without such a platform 
we are limited to and overvalue what seems to have a sense 
of immediacy to us (pp. 15-lS). 
Thus, it may be suggested that the traditions which we acknowledge 
and affirm, the world-vie1vs we construct and which enable us to cohere 
the events of our lived experience, at the same time they faciLitate 
our making of meaning, impose limits and restrictions upon our ability 
to discern alternative possibilities. This limited vision is precisely 
the concern of philosophical hermeneutics. Hermeneutics in its 
broadest sense speaks to the interpreters' abilities to 
self-reflectively come to recognize the limits or horizons of their 
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understanding and transcend their present limits by attending to the 
possibilities contained withi~ the present state. 
C. HERMENEUTUCS AND CURRICULUM 
Philip Phenix (1971) referring to transcendence in curriculum 
states that we, drawn through our consciousness of our temporality, 
transcend our present state. This awareness of our temporality and its 
attendent transcendent qualities is similarly discussed -- under the 
rubric of developins a critical historical consciousness -- by such 
theorists as Apple, Freire, Gadamer, Giroux, Greene, Habermas, Huebner 
and Hacdonald. 
A distinction, ho1vever, must be made between "historical 
consciousness" as discussed by critical theorists such as Habermas, 
Apple and Giroux, and those theorists oriented toward a more 
encompassing hermeneutic understanding. Critical theory, according to 
Habermas, operates from a critical cognitive interest in e~ncipation. 
A critical histor-ical consciousness, lvhile 'I tilizing se lf-reflec ti ve 
critique, seeks to overcome causes and redefine means-ends 
relationships. Thus, critical theory may be viewed, as Macdonald 
(1980) i1as suggested, as an instrumental activity, a practical, 
politically motivated praxis which proceeds not unlike the technical 
rationality of empirical science to construct an interpretive 
rationality which seeks to explain historical events and thereby point 
out historically and culturally situated moments 1vhere interventions 
may be made to transform the constituative reality to1vard a pn:!ferred 
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alternative. Hermeneutically oriented interpretation, on the other 
hand, which Habermas describes as being guided by "a practical interest 
in consensus," is, according to Macdonald, less concerned with 
technical rationality associated with explanation, but instead is 
guided by a mytho-poetic interest (including, of course, an aesthetic 
appreciation) which directs hermeneutic interpretation toward a 
contemplation of the possible, an expressiveness valued for its own 
sake (as opposed to its instrumental value), and a desire to understand 
and not explain phenomena. Gadamer and Macdonald point to the central 
value of hermeneutic philosophy it is "a larger interpretive 
endeavor which includes intention and direction toward the recovery of 
meaning and the development of understanding" (Macdonald 1980, p.S). 
It is this recovery of meaning and the development of understanding 
that Macdonald perceived to be the significant contribution and 
transcendental possibility of hermeneutic philosophy to curriculum 
theorizing. The problematics of theory-practice considerations are, 
according to Macdonald, subsumed under the self-reflexive process 
Ricoeur and Gadamer describe as the hermeneutic circle. Since both 
theory and practice are embedded within social and cultural forms, 
hermeneutic interpretation :nay lead to the discovery of the historical 
roots of these forms. 
Once again, it is necessary to depict this process of discovery by 
distinguishing bet·.yeen calculative thinking 1~hich seeks to explain or 
change the process and contemplative thinking "which is experienced as 
a participatory phenomenon, Hhere the person engages in :iialogue with 
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the theory, bringing each person's biography and values to the 
interpretation .•. to reinterpret in order to provide greater grounding 
for understanding 11 (Macdonald, 1980, p.8). But even this process of 
reinterpretation is not without somewhat conflicting ai:ns. Ricoeur 
(1978) distinguishes between two divergent orientations of 
interpretation -- one being focused on the reduction of illusion, the 
second the restoration of meaning. The first, reduction of illusion, 
is typically employed by psychoanalytic and critical theorists. This 
orientation is directed toward reducing illusion, contradiction, 
distortion and mystification. While this aim is in no 1my contrary to 
the hermeneutic quest for understanding, Ricoeur maintains that 
interpretation aimed at demystification is based upon a "rude 
discipline of necessity.'' While the uncovering of illusion, our 
consideration of this illusory quality of our existence, and presumably 
the rejection of illusion, leads to greater understanding, this focus 
on the "givenness" of this illusion fails to achieve the greater 
possibility for understanding offere1 in the second orientation of 
hermeneutic interpretation, that of the restoration of meaning. 
Restoration of meaning relies more, according to Ricoeur, on the 
mytho-poetic core of imagination and a I·Jider consideration of 
transcendent possibility than that achieved through the narrow focus 
upon demystification. Understanding as a restoration of me~ning 
implies a revitalization of meaningful activity lvhich has not only 
encountered distortion and conflicting meanings (for ex~nple, meanings 
conveyed through dominant ideologies and oppressive social and cultural 
forms), but restoration of meaning also implies the generdtive 
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transcendent process whereby meaning is extended into areas of emerging 
human potential. The field of understanding is thus broadened by thi3 
latter orientation. The discovery and restoration of meaning is not 
limited to the reduction of illusion (as for exampl2, the deciphering 
of "No Code" was not pcompted by its illusory quality, but by an 
underlying interest in understanding what was not understood), but 
instead entertains potential meaningful human experience. 
Macdonald (1980) has astutely linked Ricoeur's distinction between 
reduction of illusion and restoration of meaning to Gadamer 1 s (1976) 
discussion of the hermeneutic quest being guided either by a concern 
for mis-understanciing or not understanding. Hermeneutic interpretation 
focusing on clearing up misunderstanding, as with seeking the reduction 
of illusion, distracts one flam the greatest possibility that 
hermeneutic interpretation has to offer - that of reinterpreting the 
situation of the interpreter so that the boundaries or horizons of his 
or her understanding :nay be discovered and transcended. Thus, the 
distinctions Ricoeur and Gadamer offer serve to point out not only 
epistemological and methodological dimensions of hermeneutics, but its 
ontological nature as well. Gadamer (1977) points to this ontological 
quality of hermeneutics 1vhen he states that "The question is r::tther 
1vhat men, with their know-how, want" (p.S43). The full potential of 
hermeneutic activity, while certainly inclu~ing the theoretical 
contributions of scientific rationality and critical theory, extends 
beyond these orientations and sharpens not only our ability to know, to 
generate d':lta, but more fundarnanta.lly enables us to attend to anr! honor 
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the well-spring of our questions from which understanding emerges and 
the process through ivhich one assigns signif~ to both the 
questions and the information one creates. Gadamer (1977) sensitively 
depicts this fundamental concern of hermeneutic iaterpretation lvhen he 
states: 
The concept of information as applied by information 
theory in no way does justice to the process of selection 
through iVhich an item of information becomes significant. 
Even the information upon lvhich the specialist builds up 
his kn01.,r-hmv through the logic of research is achieved 
"hermeneutically." This means that it is already limited to 
what it must answer by its questions. This is a 
hermeneutic structural element of all research (p.SSB). 
One of Gadamer's great contributions to interpretive science is 
his ability to uncover the ubiquitousness and se:ninal qualities of the 
hermeneutic process (however truncated or limited iVithin various 
research programs and epistemologies). The mere fact that a given 
research methodology fails to recognize the presence of hermeneutic 
activity iVithin its venue, does not discount the validity nor reaLity 
of the interpretive process; what does become the challenge facing 
those who apply hermeneutic principles to an understancting of social 
and cultural forms (e.g., research programs), is how this lack of 
understanding, in a sense, this un or minimally achieved possibility oE 
self-reflexivity -- the humanization of inquiry -- r:~ay be :nade !7lore 
prominant and understood. Gadamer (1977) goes on to say: 
The oli differentiation made by the theory of 
knowledge between explanation and understanding or between 
noiJothetic and ideographic methods does not suffice to 
indicate the full dimensions of a science of :nan that is 
self-conscious of its being a human activity. For what is 
manifest in concrete detail and belongs as such to 
historical knowledge is of interr=st, holvevr=r aot as the 
particular but as "the human 11 -- thought m:~y always become 
visible only in particular occurrences. Everything human 
not only means the generally human in the sense of the 
characteristics of the human species in contrast to other 
types of living beings, especially animal, but also 
comprises the broad view of the variety of the human 
essence (pp.559-560). 
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This "human essence" is fundamentally a curricular concern, for as 
Macdonald (1980) has stated: 
Curriculum theory... is a for;n of hermeneutic 
theory. Thus curric:.tlum theory is an ever renewing attempt 
to interpret curricular reality and to develop ~reater 
understanding. Curriculum practice results from 
hermeneutic process 1vhich both lies \vithin the three 
methods (epistemologies [science, critical theory, 
mytho-poetic]) and transcends them (pp. 16-17). 
Curriculum theorists such as Hacdonald, Huebner, Pur pel, Greene, 
and Mooney have spoken eloquently about the transcendental nature of 
curriculum inquiry. These writers have unabashedly suggested, as have 
philosophers such as Gadamer, Berger, James, Polanyi, Barrett, and 
Bronowski, that the quintessential character of human inquiry is 
religious, poetic, aesthetic and social. Knowledge and understanding, 
despite the assault mustered by technical and methodological 
rationalities \vhich through either or both vanity or well-intentioned 
oversimplification, preceeds and guides the concepts we seek to 
construct. 
The hermeneutic possibi l i.ty of curriculum theorizing can lead to a 
more critical and reverent regard for human possibility. Educatio11, 
when seen as a revisioning of human potential, as an activity which 
grounds in personal, social and historical contexts the lived rc~ality 
of each human bei11g (especially as this real i.ty holis 1vithin it the 
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aspirations and hopes however latent or not yet understood), invites 
and expresses the participation of each individual in the "Great 
Conversation" discourse which negates the negation and fuses 
horizons of each understanding within its emancipatory transcendence. 
Curriculum theorizing, then, of such a conception of education, can 
attend to not only the organizing principles and the conceptual 
framelforks from \vhich we come to ask questions; but curriculum 
theorizing seen as part of a broader hermeneutic endeavor should return 
to, as James has suggested, the seamless web of human experience which 
preceeds conceptual and methodological representation. Admittedly, 
this is an ungainly abstract description of the penetration of 
hermeneutics i~to curriculum theorizing. Perhaps if we return to 
previously mentioned comments made by !..Ji lliam James (1909, in 
McDermott, 1977) and Gadamer (1977), this abstraction can at least be 
tolerated more gracefully despite the anticipated press for 
concreteness that, as part of t!1e fabric or modernist thought, 
surrounds us. 
James, when discussing the modern dilemm;1 of conceptual logic 
separating sensibile reality into fragmentary accounts, stated that 
"the contradiction results only from the conceptual or discursive form 
being substituted for the real form" (p.580). The "real form" which 
James refers to he depicted as "raiV unverbalized life" or "the stream's 
sensibile continuity." Like1vise, Gadamer maintains that "so:i=tl 
comr.mnity, with all its tensions and disruptions, ever and ever again 
leads back to a conmon area of social understflnciing through whic 11 Lt 
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exists" (p.42). No doubt the terms "raw unverbalized li.fe," "stream's 
sensible continuity," and· "social understanding" are quite abstract, 
and for many, frustratingly vague. But, perhaps, this frustration and 
pervasive criticism of vagueness need be exarniiled for their genesis. 
This examination, I suggest, is central to hermeneutics and cut·ric-Jlum 
theorizing. Frustration and lack of tol2rance for vagueness may be 
just two signs of not understanding. This does not imply that that 
which frustrates or is considered vague is necessarily, inherently 
good, nor desirable, rather, to refer again to the quote of James: "The 
significance of a thing is more important than its tangibility." All 
too often, modernist thought (and by implication, curriculum theorizing 
under the sway of the hegemony of scientific rationality) substitutes 
tangibility - concreteness and precision, :neasurement and procedure 
for significance. (An example of this substitution might be seen in 
the preoccupation in education research with experimental and 
quasi-experimental designs which, while perhaps disclosin@ 
"statistically significant differences," (that is, tangible ones) r1ay 
contribute little meaningful significance). For James and Gadamer, the 
significance of the 1vholeness and grounc!_ of ~!.E_erienc<:_ were more 
important than their tangibility which, due to modernist conceptual and 
epistemological schema, was overvalued. 
Curriculum theorizing, whe:1 inf orrned by hermeneutic philosophy, 
must, I suppose, face the struggle between log~~ and ontos as it is 
waged in our historical reality. If logo~ or discursive thought as 
James laments is "generally treated as the sole avenue to truth," then 
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the intellectual clinate may be either ambivalent or hosti.le. The 
appeal, however, to ontological concerns may reemarge as the limits of 
the horizon of discourse, explanatory methodology are attained. 
Curriculum theorizing can, in one sense, hasten the recognition of 
these limits. Education can help to both highlight ~;hat is kn-::llm, 
various avenues toward this knov;ledge (e.g., human interests), as well 
as \vhat the limits of this knowledge reveal. \ve now knmv how to 
technically destroy the earth through nuclear means; we are only dimly 
aware of h01v to retreat from this capability and pose other .nore life 
enhancing alternatives for conflict resolution. Perhaps one of the 
ironies of modernist cultures and their technological "pro1vess" is that 
the ability to do outstrips the ability to undo. The ability to 
pollute (its relative l01v cost given current fiscal/profit motive 
accounting equations) outstrips the ability to reclai~ polluted 
environments (the cost of 11 cleaning up" Three Mile L;land is no1v 
estimated to cost more than the initial cost estimates of the reactor's 
construction). The tendency to achieve mobility as Illich has 
suggested (relocating for employment, urban rene1val ("rermval"), speed 
of transportation, etc.) outstrips our ability to cultivate a sense of 
community and membership and an ecological intimacy ·.vith thG ~~arth. 
~.Jhile curriculum theorizing may help to construct conceptual :naps 
or "landscapes for learning" as Maxine Greene ( 1973) has termed thern, 
it is hermeneutic interpretation which helps us to compare und contrast 
these various representations of experience and histJry. More 
importantly, curriculum theorizing in a hermeneutic light, may again 
urse us to return to the topography which each c~rtograp~ic urientation 
represents only partially. The poet Gary Snyder (1969) who seeks '1 
mythic, geo-political deep structure, the structure of time and e~rth 
and consciousness states: 
Almost had it last night: [!Q_i:ientity. One thinlcs, "I 
emerged from some general, non-differentiated thin3, I 
return to it." One has in reality never left it; there is 
no return (p.lO). 
Thus, a hermeneutics of curriculum and a curriculum of herrnen~ut:ics 
neither le3ds nor escapes, neither projects nor withdr:nvs, b:Jt by 
~ing, by attending (French: "attendre" to •.v3i t) , p rotn·J t es the 
possibility of finding meaning not in method nor fully extant, but in 
imagination, creation and existence instead. 
D. REPRESENTATION Or HERMENEUTICS 
So 11any are the for::~s 1-rhich emanate from the Furm. I ref~r not to 
Platonic ideals, nor the archetypes, icons, sy~bols and signs we crdft 
to capture or solidify/make tangible that which 1vould otherwise elucte 
us. But each representation (mi:nesis according to the ancient Grec!~s) 
is seen to be a mediation. He begin if!. ii!_e_d_ia ;~ -- in the mi id l ::- of 
things. The continuity begins not 1vith our birth, ends not ,,;ith our 
death, but courses through us as once did ancient elarnents of Earth, 
\vater, Fire and Air. A modern biochemist or physicist or thcJl..ogian 
might each describe different elements, but the course they tend to 
converge upon. Curriculum is but onr:~ attempt to un:i.fy t~ase :iisc ;rdant 
discourses 1vithin a co•:~prehension of a c_o~, or as Bateson ~,.1,:; 
described it, "the pattern which conne<:ts." The conventional tJse of 
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the term "a course of study" seems to o Efer a slightly different 
implication than a specific content area being described as ~ "course" 
which in its Jamesian sense 1vould be yet another fragfilentary account of 
our being. 
So holY is it that hermeneutic philosophy escapes this 
artificiality, this fragmentary erosion of the 11hole, this alienation? 
As was previously mentioned, hermeneutics seeks not a reinforcement of 
the status quo, a stable state or finality. But neither rnay nuclear 
physics nor physical education. Hhile Bateson suggests that we 
perceive according to differences we detect, and IVhile these 
differences help us to chart "vectors" of change, hermeneutics invites 
us to examine not only the diff•:rences, but the commonality, the 
pre-differentiated starting point from which difference is discerned. 
Ah, this is quite the trick! Einstein stated that "the last thing the 
fish sees is the water." By implication, the first thing we see is the 
difference. But instead of being seduced into believing that it is the 
difference (because of its tangibility or perceptability) that is alone 
significant, her~eneutics offers instead an orientation which takes the 
socially and historically situated standpoint: fro1J .v!lich this 
difference is ,iiscerned as its area of examinatio11. It is this 
precursive, preunderstanding from which perception and meaning emerges 
that her.neneutics orients our awareness. Polanyi (1958) has si:nilarly 
oriented our attention in his discussion of personal kno,fledge. 
Personal knowledge, according th Polanyi, refers ~ot to a solipsistic, 
egoistic form of knoiVing, but instead suggests that: 
1. no knowledge exists without knowers (that is, 
knowledge isn't a reified thing). 
2. knowledge emerges from personally experienced, 
historically grounded realities of the knower. 
3. knowledge is understood to be multifaceted and 
virtually incapable of being fully expressed. 
("we know more than we can say.") 
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This third point is not meant to be a coy way of saying that "I 
could have said this better." Rather, that the truth of this statement 
is contained in the idea that we cannot fully explain or express all we 
know. Once ag=tin, this is not meant to excuse sloppy thinking nor 
verbal obtuseness, rather, Polanyi suggests that the grounding of our 
expression is more vast than any representational mode there is to 
represent it. The extent of Isadora Duncan's kn01dedge can only be 
intimated by her reply to a question about 1vhat she meant to say in a 
certain dance -- she replied (as have artists when asked the meaning of 
their artistic expressions): "If I could have s=tid it in words, I need 
not have danced it." 
So it is \ve are faced lvith the challenge of representing, in a 
variety of forms (but admittedly, given the verbal nature of t~is form 
of discourse, in written .form), the kn01dedge we have of a hermeneutic 
approach to curriculum theorizing. 
He have earlier referred to the representation of interpretation 
as being part of a "hermeneutic circle." The circle has ·1c.my 
archetypal associations, many occurrences in mythology and symbol i.e 
discourse. Life has been almost universally represented at c)ne ti:ne oc 
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other in circular form, the egg is circular, the· path of seasons is 
circular, day and night and the solar system's orbits are circul~r (or 
at least eliptical). The television series "Ben Casey" opened each 
segment with Salll Jaffe's narrative (while he was scribing on a 
chalkboard the respective symbols) "Man, lvoman, Birth, Death, Infinity" 
where infinity is represented by two circles joined at a point. Narx's 
conception of dialectical materialism proceeds in a circular path -- we 
are shaped by our material culture which we in turn shape through our 
praxis. Contrast these against the one-dimensionality of behaviorism's 
S-R model, and we may see the tremendous evocative symbolism of 
circular representations. 
Hermeneutic interpretation begins with the understood (or even the 
primordial pre-understood) reality of our being embedded in the 
activity of the world. This being is essentially un-reflective. Fro1:1 
action in the world, we proceed to the quintessentially human endeavor 
of self-reflection coming to kno11 our existence as 
being-in-the-1mrld. The third phase of this circle j_s the movelilent 
through this self-reflexive knowledge and understanding t01vard the 
application of this consciousness to not .~'!.lY-. ~ur act:,~~llt. but our 
self-l:!?_Ht?_ct:i.:_~!l· This is a critically important point of r:10dern 
hermeneutic phtlosophy. Unlike earlier Platonic representations of 
action, reflection and application in circular but unidirectional 
movement, modern hermeneutics su8gests that each phase of the circle 
:lialectically influences its pre~~ed~ and ~~bs~cl~~~J:_ stage. \Vhi.le 
Platonic self-reflexivity can be depicted as: 
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FIGURE 1~ Platonic Self-Reflexivity 
the modern hermeneutic circle (sharing elements of the yin-yang 
representation of Eastern mysticism, but this time configured to 
represent three modes), can be represented as: 
FIGURE 2: The Modern Hermeneutic Circle 
Each mode penetrates and is penetrated by its previous and succeeding 
moment. Luckily, this "representation" can, in this case, be made in 
some graphic form. The success of this representation is tenuous. But 
if it could not have been represented graphically, would it be any less 
significant? This question remains one of the haunting questions 
confronting any intellectual or theoretic activity. Those who 
subscribe to hermeneutic principles strive to locate themselves at 
those very interstices bet1veen communities of understanding. 
Hermeneutics and curriculum theorizing, I suggest, stand not on the 
fence, but across the boundaries which separate communication 
commun~ties. This is, in essence, an act of faith. For the attempt is 
not to find familiarity or security within what is certain and kn01vn, 
but to venture out to the limits of understanding, where uncertainty 
and ambiguity invite leaps of creativity, imagination and transcendence 
and where this synthetic process works upstream against entropy and 
dissolution. 
In the Old Testament, Babel was the result of transgression. In 
some ironic (or profound) redemptive spirit, hermeneutic philosophy and 
curriculum theorizing allied with it, seek not a return to original 
obedience, but the reestablishment of the process of communication and 
the affiliation within a community which has been lost. The loss of 
this community is not taken lightly... nor is the pregnance of its 
return. 
Yet another graphic representation of the hermeneutic circle is 
offered by Mehan and Wood (1975). This representation helps, as 
Heidegger has suggested, to distinguish between understanding and 
interpretation. As w::J.s mentione i earlier, understanding refers to the 
undifferentiated, primordial ground from which human beings make 
meaning of their being-in-the-world. This concept may be compared 
favorably with Polanyi's sense of the "t::J.cit" domain of personnl 
knowledge. It is from this primordial aspect that hermeneutics derives 
89 
its ontological import. Interpretation, on the other hand, refers to 
one's response to new events and phenomena as this resr0~~P is affected 
by one's tacit or prior understanding. The movement from understanding 
to interpretation and from interpretation to understanding may be 
represented by two transitional moments: indexicality a~d reflexivity, 
respectively. Indexicality refers to the application of prior 
understanding to specific events or phenomena; reflexivity considers 
specific events or phenomena as they reflect back on prior 
understanding. 
The hermeneutic circle (or it is sometimes referred to as a 
spiral, that is, an uncoiling circle) thus contains the two moments of 
understanding and interpretation and the connecting, transitional 
processes of indexicality and reflexivity. The evocative symbolism of 
the coursing of night into day and day into night lends additional 
mytho-poetic expressiveness to this depiction. ~1ehan and \vood divide 
the circle into two hemispheres: the one representing understanding is 
depicted as "night," the second symbolizing interpretation as "day:" 
People's meaningful lives spiral to1vard the unkn01m 
like the cycle of nights and days. Any particular day has 
an existence independent of the previous night. But ::1t 
once it is dependent upon the substance of that previous 
night, and upon the totality of nights and days before the 
most recent night... interpretation has its independent 
meaning. It is an activity and stands apart from the 
stillness that preceeded it. Simultaneously, h01vever, lt 
is dependent upon the understood horizon that provided it 
with the here and now upon which the activity arose 
(p.l93). 
REFLEXIVITY 
(DUSK) 
INTERPRETATION 
(DAY) 
UNDERSTANDING 
(NIGHT) 
'\ 
\ INDEXICALITY 
- - '"i (DAWN) 
) 
/ 
.:/ 
I 
/ 
FIGURE 3: Reflexivity and Indexicality in Hermeneutics 
90 
Just as night provides a horizon - dawn which represents the 
process of indexicality where prior understanding is carried over into 
the process of interpretation - so does day provide a horizon - dusk 
which in turn represents the process of reflexivity where the 
phenomenal world is brought to reflective action which preceeds 
understanding. This cyclical representation of day and night then 
conveys the ever-widening, constructive and reconstructive process of 
understanding and interpretation: from primordial understanding we 
encounter the events and actions in the world which are shaped and 
influenced by our weltanschauung and, upon reflective activity, the 
interpretation of these events and the meanings we assign return to 
subtly alter our world view which, by implication, reemerges as we 
encounter the world anew. 
This circular process of hermeneutic inquiry is particularly 
useful for curriculum theorizing. It helps us to not only consider the 
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"events" and "texts" 1vhich reveal themselves to us, hut additionally, 
it helps us uncover (in the name of "effective historical 
consciousness"), the ground within which these "events" and "texts" are 
situated. This ground includes the social and cultural traditions 
which are carried on through them, and our pre-understandings or, as 
Gadamer terms them, our "prejudices" which are the tacitly understood 
whole against which events and texts are juxtaposed in the process of 
interpretation. And this is precisely the circular process which I 
shall apply to a critique of significant texts which have appeared to 
me during my study of the curriculum field. This is not to suggest 
that these selections are the most important works in the field, 
rather, I can say that these selections have provoked a resonance with 
my own prejudices in ways that others have not. They have been, and 
are important to me ••• but why they are so remains a task of 
hermeneutic exploration. Chapter III will trace my encounter with the 
works of several curriculum theorists IVhich have, for reasons IVhich 
will be discussed in in the chapter, have expanded my understanding of 
alienation, the hegemony of individualist conceptual frameHorks, and 
the call for new ways of forming communities of me.~~ing. 
III. CURRICULUtvl THEORIZING: 
PURPOSES AND PRAXIS 
SELECTED TEXTS 
REFLECTIO~IS ON AIMS I 
A HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION OF 
\ve shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
T. S. Eliot, "Little Gidding." 
A. INTRODUCTION 
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When James B. Macdonald suggested many years ago that one of the 
characteristics of human experience is that it is composed of "multiple 
realities," I wondered whether he meant that our lives (both in an 
individual and collective sense) must necessarily be fragmented, full 
of contradictions and cross-purposes, unresolvable conflicts and 
disjointedness. I wondered whether he meant that these "multiple 
realities" were what others described as cultural pluralism, 
idiosyncratic approaches to the world, etc. Over time -- or through 
time -- Jim ~1acdonald 's exploration of human experience as it is 
disclosed in diverse experiences -- the lived reality of everyday life, 
the literature of philosophical speculation, aesthetics, mysticism, and 
theology -- was guided by a dual concern: 
Looking back I can see that two major value themes 
have appeared and reappeared over the years. One has been 
expressed in a desire to construct intellectually 
satisfying conceptual maps of the human condition which 
were educationally meaningful and personally satisfying. 
The second has been expressed in a utopian hope that 
someh01v people could improve the qual i.ty of their 
existence, specifically through educational processes and 
generally through broader social policy (in Pinar, 1975, 
p.3. 
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~1acdonald goes on to say, in retrospect, that his own career 
contained periods of time which he characterized as reflecting 
differing interests -- cognitive professional development, empirical 
research, and technical developmental work. Those periods, he 
suggests, addressed specific educational needs he felt were compelling 
at the time. Hhile it may be an oversimplification, wishful thi:lking 
or vanity to say that "we stand on the shoulders of those who came 
before us," there is a poignancy in Macdonald's retrospection which, 
like other erudite, synoptic visions derived from full lives of mindful 
activity, accordians or telescopes decades of experience so that others 
may, if they are so inclined, trace the emergence and development of 
consciousness. This "inclination," I am suggesting, is the very stance 
or hermeneutic attentiveness one can take in relation to the 1vorld. 
Macdonald in his later years informed by the phenomenology of 
Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty, the ontological concerns of Heidegger, the 
speculative philosophy of William James and Henri Bergson, the critical 
theory of Habermas and Gramsci, and the philosophical hermeneutics of 
Gadamer, depicted this educational inclination in ter,ns of a 
trnnscendental developmental pedagogy and cu•·ciculum the0~izing as an 
hermeneutic activity. I can think of no mo':"G resonant, concise and 
articulate statement of the role of curricular thought -- and no more 
fitting text to begin a mapping of my horizon of understanding of the 
curriculum field than that expressed by ~lacdonald in the following 
quotation: 
. life seems to move in circles and somewhere from 
my past the utopian impulse, perhaps best experienced and 
later expressed in terms of justice, equality, fairness, 
etc., pressed into my professional consciousness. At this 
point education became a moral enterprise rather than 
simply a set of technical problems to be solved withia a 
satisfying conceptual scheme. And with this shift a 
concern for quality became a dimension that was not the 
same as, though still related to, the quantity of problems 
"solved," or outputs measured. 
It is· clear to me now that when we speak of education 
we speak in the context of a microscopic paradigm of a 
macroscopic human condition, a paradigm that holis all of 
the complexities in microcosm of the larger condition. 
Thus, the struggle for personal integration, 
educational integrity, and social justice go on, 
necessitating the constant reevaluation of oneself, one's 
work and one's world with the hope that whatever 
creative talent one may possess 1.;ill lead toward something 
better that we may all share, each in ~is own way (in 
Pinar, 1975, p. 4). 
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Following Macdonald's example, this examination of curriculum 
texts is guided by a concern for moral, ethical and aesthetic 
dimensions of curricular thought - a concern 1•hich likewise has sl01.;ly 
emerged from prior interests and needs which must be situated within 
personal biography and the social history of my lived experience and 
IVhich, no1.; understood as an hermeneutic interpretation of our 
being-in-the-world, apprehends and describes meaningful experience in 
characteristically and qualitatively different ways than were possible 
at the outset of this dissertation. 
In a sense, this is the "apology" one must make for change and 
revisioned commitment; this is the renegotiated outline of a social 
contract among those who collaborate to bring about a project which can 
at best be only partially defined -- for the limit situations ::ire 
disclosed only in process and the possibi l Hies for new questions and 
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insights are only entertainable as these limit situations (or to use 
the hermeneutic term "horizons" are encountered' struggled with and 
played with in order to be transcended. Just as Macdonald in his 
retrospective writing has pointed to the developmental emergence of 
a1vareness (and the circular path which abandons neither our 
embeddedness in the world nor our utopian hope for yet continuing the 
self-reflexivity and recycling of experience), so this sketch of 
curricular topography attempts to describe not only the shifting 
intellectual and social landscapes, but also to identify the newly 
discovered features of the terrain which previously were unrecognized, 
devoid of meaning, and/ or masked by mayC!_ of ine:<perience. 
The "preunderstanding" from which this project emerged can be seen 
if we return to a statement made at the early stages of this research: 
In a sense I am inqu~r~ng into the ideological 
hegemony which situates the individual being at the center 
of a Ptolemaic universe of educational activity . a 
universe which is quintessentially conceptual and 
metaphoric, ami is as such yet another "useful fiction" to 
convey a sense of place in the world. 
That I juxtaposed the concepts of "ideological hegemony" and "useful 
fiction" may no1v be seen as a rather fortuitous "accident." The term 
"ideological hegemony" -- derived from the critical theory of Habermas, 
Harcuse and Gramsci and currently employed by curriculum ·.-;riters such 
as Apple, Giroux, and Popkewitz -- 1vas an initial attempt to describe 
an outline of limit situations 1vhich our being-in-the-worlrl 
encounters. Perhaps more accurately, the use of the concept of 
ideological hegemony indicated a particular mode of analysis and 
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discourse which was embraced for its ostensive explanatory power; 
critical rationality was employed to unmask (as was its potential 
anticipated at that time) the unprobler.mtically conceived notion that 
the conceptual and metaphorical renderings of individualism •vere l i.mit 
situations which unnecessarily constrained human possibi tity. That our 
use of metaphor, conceptual frameworks and the language through which 
they were depicted might somehow he "explained" through the analysis 
provided within a critical rationality is part of this 
preunderstanding. The juxtaposition against "useful fiction," however, 
now points to an understanding which 1vas not present at the time the 
passage was first composed. Viewed hermeneutically, the passage no1v is 
understood to offer a possible interpretation that collapses the 
concept of "ideological hegemony" itself into the category of "useful 
fie tion." That is to say, at the time the passage was writ ten, the 
concept of ideological hegemony was itself not viewed problematically, 
not viewed as yet another expression of s critical ideology. Now, 
however, it is understood that "ideologicsl hegemony" may be seen as 
yet another useful fiction. 
This "insight" has only recently been arrived at; .:tnd it was 
comments made by Richard Rorty (1982) and ~acdonald (1981) that helped 
make this perspective clear. Rorty, in his provocative wodc Tl-te 
Consequences of Pragmatism comments that: 
The tradition 1ve call "modern philosophy" asked itself 
"How is it that science has had so much success? \vhat is 
the secret of this success?" The various bad ans1vers to 
these bad questions have been variations on a single 
charming but uncasha ble meta ph or: viz., the ~e·..; Science 
discovered the L1nguage lvhich nature itself uses. \Vhen 
Ga lileo said that the Book of Nature 1vas written in the 
language of mathematics, he meant that n1s ne·.v 
reductionistic, mathematical vocabulary didn't just happen 
to 1vork, but that it 1vorked because that was the 1vay things 
real!.Y, we£_~. He meant that the vocabulary 1vorked because 
it fitted the universe as a key fits a loc!<. Ever since, 
philosophers have been trying, and failing, to give sense 
to these notions of "working because, 11 and "things as they 
really are." 
They have done this because they thought that the iiea 
that we can explain scientific success in terms of 
discovering Nature's Own Language must, somehow, be right 
-- even if the metaphor could not be cashed, even if 
neither realism nor idealism courr-explain just what the 
imagined "correspondence" between nature's l3.nguage and 
current scientific jargon could consist in. Very few 
thinkers have suggested that maybe science doesn 1 t have a 
secret of success -- that there is no metaphysical or 
epistemological or transcendental explanation of 1vhy 
Galilee 1 s vocabulary has worked so 1vell so far, any more 
than there is an explanation of why the vocabulary of 
liberal democracy has 1vorked so well so far. Very few have 
been willing to abjure the notions that "the .11ind" or 
"reason" has a nature of its ovm, that discovery of this 
nature will give us a "method," and that following th:1t 
method will enable us to penetrate beneath the appearances 
and see nature "in its 01vn terms" (pp.l91-192). 
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As I originally used them, the terms "ideology hegemony" and "the 
language of critical theory" were seen to be a set of keys for 
unlocking problems which l i.beral reform ideology and extreme 
subjectivism posed for educational discourse (see, \.Jeingarten, 1979). 
In a sense it was not until the very bases of epistemology and 
discourse might be questioned (as ontological phenomenology and 
philosophical hermeneutics aid) that the "fit" between language, 
metaphor, conceptual frameworks and our being-in-the-world might be 
examined for its contrivance nnd/or limit situations. Just as critical 
theory drawing upon a Marxist dialectic helped to paint out the limits 
of positivist science and the bL.1rred distinction between "natllro:il 
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science" and human sciences, so may ontological phenomenology and 
philosophical hermeneutics help to poi::1t out the limits of critical 
theory. 
In this chapter I shall interpret and critique selected 1vritings 
of five curriculum theorists who have profoundly influenc.ed :ny o1m 
understanding of the range of issues one might include in a 
consideration of the field. The theorists included in this chapter ~re 
Henry Giroux, Maxine Greene, James B. i'1acdonald, D1vayne Huebner. and 
1di lliam Pinar. Each has had, and continues to have, a major influence 
in the scope and emphases found in contemporary curriculum discourse. 
Given their current prominence and, it is my judgment, their continued 
importance among curriculum theorists, their work should be carefully 
and critically examined. Each of the theorists included in this study 
has, in his or her o1m way, openned new frontiers for curriculum 
theorizing. I shall examine their contributions in light of my concern 
for increasing understanding and directing attention to a 
counter-alienating possibility for education. It is my hope that my 
interpretation of their work, gui:ied by an hermeneutic orientation, 
will both honor their contributions to the field and extend and ope11 
the dialogue to additional communities of mean.in3. 
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B. HENRY GIROUX: A CURRICULUH OF CONTESTATION 
1. DJTRODUCTION 
In recent years Henry Giroux has emerged as an articulate, 
passionate and perhaps even visionary critic of curriculum and 
especially political theory. As a perceptive scholar of political 
thought, Giroux prolifically contributed penetrating analyses of 
ideology, pedagogy, resistance and cultural politics (1979, 1981a, 
1981b, 1982, 1983a, 1983b, 1984). Giroux's 1vork, along with that of 
Freire, 1970, 1973, forthco111ing; Apple and King, 1977; Apple, 1979, 
1982; Anyon, 1979; Cherryholmes, 1980; Popkewitz, 1980; Shapiro, 1980a, 
1980b, 1982; and Wexler, 1983; represent significant contributions from 
the Left to the analysis of ideology and inequalities of power as they 
affect educational theories, practices and institutions. ~.Jhile 
Giroux's earlier work demonstrates his competence and thoughtfulness as 
a critical historian of leftist political theory, his more recent 
publications (particularly Theory and Resistance in Education: A -----
Ped<ill9_gy for: the Opposition, 1983; and "~1arxism and Schooling: The 
Limits of Radical Discourse," 1984) represent courageous and insightful 
contributions to advancing the field. It is with this ::~.cknowledgment 
of his important work and with a full respect for his personal courage, 
commitment to human liberatio11, and his scope and sensitivity of 
political analysis that my critique of his work proceeds. Giroux, 
perhaps more than any other critical curriculum theorist, has 
influenced and informed my understanding of the political dimensions of 
curriculum theory, and for this I owe ~im a debt of gratitude. 
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Moreover, while he has challenged all of us in the field to consider 
the importance of critical consciousness and cultural politics, he has 
often done so in a manner which inrites and remains open to dialogue. 
It is my hope that this critique reflects both my hi~h regard for his 
work and a thoughtful reply in t~is expanding dialogue. 
2. A CRITIQUE OF t·1ARXIST CATEGORIES 
Critical theory, with its emphasis on an epistemology based upon 
competing human interests (as, for exampl·2, Haberrnas' (1971) 
delineation of technical, practical and critical interests), views the 
production of knowledge as situated within arenas of contestation 
characterized by distortions in communication based primarily upon 
inequalities in po1ver and authority relationships. Harxist and 
nee-marxist critiques of schooling (Katz, 1968; Greer, 1972; Feinberg, 
1975; Bowles and Gintis, 1976, Apple, 1979; Shapiro, 1982; Giroux, 
1983) seek to uncover the stratified social relations in schools which 
serve to reproduce "cultural capital" and its attendant class syster.Js, 
status differentials, privi.lege and power concentrations. Issues of 
control and domination are at the forefront of such critiques and have 
made a significant contribution to the understanding of curricular 
design and the human interests, cultural and social for1ns, and p0112r 
r·2lations'lips 1vhich may have been unproblematically considered in. such 
designs. 
But as I have mentioned earlier, the limitations of critical 
theoretical analysis of curriculum and schooling are just beginning to 
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receive attention. Macdonald and Purpel (1931) for example, have 
astutely outlined some important limitations of f·1arxist i:inalysis as it 
is focused on curricular issues: 
The Marxist critique makes a decidedly deep cut in 
ordinary views of schooling. Nevertheless, it is not clear 
either historically as one views ~1arxist politics or 
critically as one revie\vS Marxist critiques \vhether the 
rejection of a Tyler-like model is based upon its essential 
character or upon the fact that it serves the '.vrong 
master. Historical examples and the materialistic basis of 
Marxist philosophy leads us to think that it is the 
latter. Marxism, we suspect, is embedded in the same 
general culture as Capitalism and the assumptive base of 
each allows them to use Tyler or Skinner's behaviorism with 
equal facility. He find the Marxist critique flawed on 
this basis, its acceptance of materialistic opportunism in 
the service of different ends. It is surely clear that 
~1arx, like Machiavelli, searched for a base other than 
values for human action. U human b·:ings are a random 
accidental occurrence in the cosmos, and create themselves 
and their own destiny through the obtaining and 
justification of power by small groups of elites, then the 
Tyler model is a useful control mechanism to bring about 
desired ends. It seems clear that both Capitalistic and 
Communistic ideology is embedded in the co:nmon dominant 
technological, materialistic culture (p. 8). 
I11 a somewhat similar vein, a recent article by Henry Giroux (1984) 
draws upon Stanley Aronowitz's (1981) critique of ~arxism's economistic 
and class analysis features and suggests what I believe are significant 
departures from classical ~arxist analyses of curriculum. According to 
\mat I am suggesting is that while the crisis in 
Narxism is not new, it is now confronted by a series of 
social, political, and economic events that not only indict 
its orthodox l)r classical strs.ins that have al1vays been 
dominated by a rigid economism, but also reveal the 
limitations of 1:1ore recent Marxist developments that have 
produced a critical assessment of the original theory. The 
failure of the wor!<ing ·:lass to assume the role of the 
historical agent of revol~tion, the failure of existing 
socialisms in Eastern Europe and other parts of the 1torld 
to provide and demonstrate an .emancipatory VlSlon, and the 
appearance of new social ~ovements that have redefined the 
meaning of doillination and emancipation appear to have dealt 
~arxism ia all of its forms a mortal blow. Not only do the 
fundamental Marxist categories of class, hi~~~· and 
ecof!_Q_f!!Y. fail to address or change the ne1v social 
antagonisms that exist in society, they also fail to 
interrogate critically Marxism's own implication with the 
rationality of domiaation. The task of radical theory, 
especially in the case of radical educational theory, is to 
see Harxism not as a doctrine valid for all times under all 
historical conditions, but as a critical 11 1Yay of seeing." 
In this case, the primacy of universal categories is 
replaced by a discourse linked to the spirit of critical 
inquiry. Thi.s suggests creating a new discourse, one that 
is informed by the Harxist project of self- and social 
emancipation but not 1 imited by its most fundamental 
categories. It is the legacy of this need to r:Jove beyond 
Marx, rather than rescue him from !"lis cdtics and 
followers, that haunts the American left, and the radical 
educational American left in particular (p.114). 
102 
Giroux, I think, has recognized a threshold, a horizon, which 
Aronowitz has pointed to. (It should be noted here that this recent 
criticism of the narro1mess of economistic and class analysis is not 
without historical precedent: Bode (1927) has 1vritten eloquently on 
this subject, as have Dewey (1937), Huebner (1966), Gramsci (1971), 
Berger (1976), Wirth (1977), Feyerabenrl (1973), Macdonald (1973), Pinar 
(1978), and Riegel (1978). \Vhat, perhaps, is rr~ost noteworthy of t~is 
recent re-exa~ination of Harxist analysis is th'.it i.s is occurLing ar!lo~g_ 
theorists who have relied upon orthodox Marxist c::J.tegories in their 
previous important work. If indeed the "fundament'.il \1arxist categories 
of class, history and economy fail to address or fail to provide a 
meaningful account of the new social antagonisms that exist in 
society'" is Giroux suggesting thilt new C::J.tegories wi. n do this? 1 
believe that he does but before examining the new categories he 
suggests, I believe it is useful to exa:nine the emer,sing rationale 
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employed by a select group of leftist c•itics to reject the categories 
of class. history and economy in favor of ones possessing greater 
explanatory or illuminative power. 
Giroux highlights Aronowitz's thesis that 
Marxism has been held captive by the formulation of 
theoretical and philosophical presuppositions developed 
almost entirely within a discourse that stresses the 
primacy of the economic sphere in shaping society, on the 
one hand, and the primacy of class as the ex~lusive 
n:ferent for understanding history and the dynami·:s of 
domination and struggle, on the other. One consequence has 
been the devaluing of politics, ideology, and culture in 
both theoretical and practical terms. Another problem has 
centered on the inability of ~arxist theory to free itself 
from forms of class and ~istorical reductionism. Aronowitz 
argues that any approach to developi~g a critical theory of 
emancipation demands that the Marxist theory of class and 
history be discarded and that the theoretical terrain of 
culture and ideology be given primary importance 'lS a 
constitutive force in the shaping of consciousness and 
historical agency (p. 115). 
Aronowitz's (and Giroux's 1vhich elaborates upon Aronowitz's) claim 
that orthodox Harxism suffers from manifest reductionism is 
well-taken. That the etiology of control can be traced from its origin 
specifically in the relations between labor and capital configured 
\vi thin the context of work, poi:1ts to a :_Jecul iar and convoluted 
ontological order. T!-tis order is reflectei in Giroux's reference to 
t~e writing of Catherine \facKinnon (1982): " ••. Harxist theory is 
wedded to the notion that work is the central 'activity by which people 
become what they are. Class is its structure, production its 
consequence, capital its congealed ftJrrn, and control its issue"' (p. 
11 ')). Giroux :nentions that hot!"! Arono;Jitz and Lukacs (1971) poi:l.t to 
how, in orthodox ~1arxism, the 1vorking :lass had "occupied a privileged 
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position :3.S an a priori historical agent." That th:= logic of ~1drxism 
st;o.rts from this somewhat unproblematically conceived notion, 
introduces a flaw ag3.inst which Giroux marshals a devastating critique, 
the basis of which is a reconceptualized problematic which focuses ~ot 
on the flawed interpretation that the working class need be the 
historical accident of economic determinants from l'lhich resistance and 
contestation amerge, but instead that 11 v10rking-class existence had to 
be seen as being produced not only in the economic s~here, but also on 
the terrains of culture and ideology" (p. 116). Thus, Giroux hastens 
the dethroning of economic determinism as an origin of domination and 
the "cause" of spheres of resistance and suggests that "classical 
~arxism has never taken seriously the categories of culture, ideol·Jgy, 
and the lived experiences of every day life" (p. 120). 
3. FROH ECONOHISM TO CUL'I1JRE 
In place of class as a unit of analysis, Giroux suggests that 
hegemony provides a category \vhich better explains the var:i_ous spheres 
of resistance (e.g., race, ecology, feminism) which are not ans·..,erable 
to a reductionist, classist analysis. !3y examining the heger.~ony of 
Marxist ideology -- its technical and instrumental rationality (as 
pointed to by Macdonald and Purpel), its positivist epistemology, its 
economist and classist conceptual categories, and its eviscerated 
::1esthetic sensibility -- Giroux identifies severe limitations ~l':lrxism 
offers as an interpretive framework. 
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f>..s a critically-framed alternative to the limitations described 
ahove, Giroux suggests 
• three major theoretical tasks that have to be 
add res sed in the reconstruction of a radical theory .Jf 
schooling. First, it is necessary to articulate a ne~ 
critical view which recognizes the political and strategic 
relevance of distinguishing between education and 
schooling. Second, it is imperative to develop a discourse 
and set of concepts around 1•hich this distinction becomes 
theoretically operational for developing 1nore viable forms 
of political pedagogy, Third, theoretical ;..rork \vhi.:h 
focuses on social and cultural reproduction has to be 
developed in conjunction with analyses of social and 
cultural production, particularly in relation to historical 
studies of oppositional public spheres and the emergence of 
critical social movements (pp. 130-131). 
I wish not to respond to each of the three "theoretical tasks" 
Giroux outlines, rather, I wish to exa.nine how these tasks which 
ostensibly point beyond orthodox Marxist analysis fail to reach escape 
velocity from the Marxist corpus of theorizing and how, while a 
courageous and scholarly effort to plot new directions for criticism 
and theorizing, Giroux's position remains firmly fixed within an 
aggressive, instrumental ~pistemol~gy. I might 'idd here, that thes;: 
reactions to this ne~..r left analysis are quite tentative and groping 
'in attempt to approach the horizon of Giroux's understanding, and will 
constitute only a first round of interpretation. 
Giroux candidly admits that 
Jean Anyon, Michael Apple, :nyself, and others too 
often have viewed school knowledge either ~s a 
representation of specific class interests or as fulfilling 
t~e productive needs of the economic sector. Moreover, the 
tr'insition from radical ~ritiques of schooling to the 
development of radical educational strate~ies has often 
been marred by a sLni Lar for:n of class reductionism. For 
example, the extremely iiTlportant question of .,.hat 
constitutes "really useful 'mowledge" in radical pedagogy 
for :nany on the left is often reduced to \.,rhat is useful 
exclusively in terms of lvorking-class i::1terests and 
culture. The notion that other social practices and forms 
of kn01.,rledge may prevail in constituting the li.ved 
experiences and cultural forms of both do~inant and 
oppressed groups is often neglected in many '1arxist 
accounts of schooling (p. 128). 
This admission points to one encompassing criticism of :1arxist 
analysis that I suggest helps one understand Giroux's latest piece as a 
historical ~oment. It is, then, against curriculum theory in a Marxist 
tradition that this particular text is situated. The ''l.rhole" of the 
text is not simply this piece, but the tradition and stream of writing 
from which it emerges. 
Giroux's criticism of classical ~arxist categories can and should 
be situated within his understanding of "social education." Giroux 
(1982) has stated that 
... social education... is quite different from the 
1.,ray it appears in traditional liter::J.ture on the subject. 
That is, traditionally socia 1 education takes as its 
primary concerns issues of citizens~ip education, mural 
education, global education, etc. with the express (sic) 
purpose of simplifying the social sciences for 
instructional use.... In my view, this perspective fails 
because of its atheoretical and apolitical stance toward 
the rob that schools play as political but relatively 
autonornous institutions that serv•:! in a somewhat 
contradictory fashion as agencies of social and cultural 
reproduction. Social education... points to the rnacro-
and micro-isSL!es that tie schools to the larger social 
order and affect their role as ideological institutions 
involved in the reproduction of class :J.nd gender (and 
racial) based relations (p.l9). 
Giroux has astutely broadened and focused a conception of 
edncation and cultural f<Jrmation to include .3. larger unit, a "social 
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totality, 11 considerably more comple;{ and encompassing than class, 
gender or ethnicity: 
Class formation is now viewed as an effect of various 
relations that are economic, ideological, and political in 
nature.... class formation is linked to the larger social 
totality with its many-faceted r.~lations and practices. 
That is, social agents are forilled through their activities 
in neighborhoods, reli~ious institutions, various political 
organizations, and other cultural associations ( 1984, 
!J.l21). 
Giroux 1 s recognition of the iinportance of social :md cultural c<Ntexts 
has provoked his incisive criticism of the relative failure of radical 
educators to generate an effective political opposition or alliance: 
••. radical educators have largely failed to develop an 
organic connection either to corn:nunity people or to 
critical social movements. This is evident in both the 
theoretical work that characterizes educational theorizing 
and in the absence of major alliances between radical 
educators and other progressive social groups (p.l29). 
Giroux's analysis includes an understanding of two issues that rlirectly 
speak to counter-alienating pedagogy: first, that education is a 
collectively produced set of experiencr::s and then:for.e must attend to 
larger units of analysis and practice than. individuals; .:md second, 
that the behavioral ecology of personal change l.inks the individual 
inextricably to his or her social and cultural contexts. Pedagogy in 
this sense gives a collective voice to specific individuals, political 
and cultural groups, attends to social units of analysis, and has as 
its aim both self- and social empowerment: 
••. critical literacy interrogates the cultural capital 
of the oppressed in order to learn from it; it functions to 
confirm rather that (sic) disconfirm the presence and 
voices of the oppressed in institutions that are gen8rally 
alienating and hostile to the;il. But the call to take the 
cultural capital of the oppressed and oppositional groups 
seriously should not be mistaken for the traditional 
liberal argament for- educational relevance. Th·= latter-
makes an appeal to a pedagogy responsive to the individual 
interests of the student in order to motivate him or her. 
Critical literacy responds to the cultural capital Jf a 
specific group or class and looks at the 1{3Y in 1vhich H 
can be confirmed and also at the way the dominant society 
disconfirms students by either ignoring or denigrating the 
knowledge and experiences that characterize their everyday 
lives. The unit of analysis here is social, and the key 
concern is not with individual h'tterests but with 
individual and collective empowerment (p.l32). 
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In this sense, Giroux identifies the organic connection of individuals 
to social, political and cultural affiliations. But despite this 
positive and important recognition of affiliation and membership, 
Giroux tends to sketch this collective identity in reactive terms 
against oppression and domination, and overlooks, I think, the 
proactive and affirmative possibilities of affiliation and co~nunity as 
ends in themselves (see, Wolff, 1968). It is to a critical examination 
of Giroux 1 3 some1{hat one-sided viaw of the eti;)logy of collective 
interests I now turn. 
4. CRITICISM MD AGGRESSION: TO\'JARD 
A NE\.J STANCE 
My reaction to Marxist analysis and critical theory has been 
significantly influenced by the theorizing of Huebner, Pinar, and 
Macdonald and Purpel. Recently, the work of Gadamer, Rorty, Feyerabenct, 
Bernstein and Revel have called into question the tnethodological and 
epi.:;ternobgical ;)rienta.tions of ~arxist analysis and critical theory. 
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I wish to C.\)JliiUent on Giroux's c1-:i. tique by di-awing upon 
Jean-Francais Revel's (1970) Wi~~~ Marx ~ Je~; Revel, in 
discussing the \lay uprisings in Paris in 1968 and the stri~e at the 
Renault automobile plant in !"ranee, introduces flis account wi.th a quote 
of Bernard Plossu, a French social historian: 
Plossu says of those who were involved in these events 
that "their ideas of revolt were, in the long run, chains," 
and their "attempt at liberation, only a form of slavery." 
Such 1vords as Plossu 1 s are guaranteed to stri~e a sour 
note among lovers of the revolutionary praxis. 
Nonetheless, this rejection of solutions that are too 
immediate and too concrete originates in a basic intuition 
that one-of the foundations of revolution that we :nost need 
today is the elimination of pathological aggression. 
Unless that elimination is achieved, no revolution can do 
anything but lead to a new forr:1 of oppression. \ve do not 
need a political revolution so ruuch as an antipolitical 
revolution; otherwise, the only result will be the creation 
of new police states. Human aggression is a determining 
factor in human behavior; and it is accepted even more 
gratuitously, and is ev(~n more murderous, than all of the 
sacred causes by which it justifies itself and on which it 
bases itself (p. 211). 
Revel points to what I curiously sec is a characteristic of 
critique in the Mdrxist tradition that being a t~inly veiled 
"pathological g,ggression," This is a serious charge to 1-:v.:l against 
Giroux, to <vhom I owe considerable emotional and i11tellectnal support 
and fol.· whom I feel great empathy for hi.s personal struggla ii1 
academe. But despite these personal agendas, and in the spirit ::>f 
constructive criticism and dialogue, I feel I must poi~t out a r~ther 
troubling rhetorical tor1e and choice Jf metaphor. Giroux and several 
of his mal-= Marxist r:urdculum theorist counterparts (e.g., Appl-=, 
Aronowitz, Popkewitz,) seem to be preoccupied wit'! issues of power, 
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authority, contestation, struggle, opposition and reststance. A 
concordance of his (and their) writings 1vould, I think, bear out this 
observation. This is not to deny that Giroux's most recent writing has 
shifted somewhat from its earlier strident confrontational rhetoric; 
this criticism is offered because I fear that, if Giroux is indeed 
searching for a new language of possibility, he is carrying with hi.n 
the vestigal traces of an orthodoxy 1vhich describes personal and social 
transformation in almost exclusively quasi or subli~inally violent 
metaphors. Giroux describes social reality as being characterized by 
"the terrain of power and struggle" "excluded majorities," "new social 
antagonisms," "the rationality of domination," "human struggle," "forl!ls 
of resistance," "oppositional groups," "the emergence of oppositional 
cultures and spheres," and "autonomous social moments." The "calculus" 
which appears to operate in Giroux's descriptive categories is one of 
pow'=.~ and c;:_<?._nfl_~<:_l:_. I •,,rish to raise two issues regarding this calculus: 
first, that in trying to develop a renewed appreciation for and use of 
"a language of possibility," Giroux jettisons the orthodox Marxist 
categories of class, economy ·:~.nd history but not its "pathol::>gical 
agsressi veness." That is to say, while I an not denying the existence 
of conflict and oppression, I find Giroux's adherence to a language of 
"physicalism" to be unfortunate, severely l.imited, and problr:!matic as a 
language of possibility diverging from a ~arxist equation of po•.ver 
er.~ancipation. Second, I take issue with not only Giroux's, but also 
other leftist curriculum theorists', use of "po1v2r" as a unifying 
conception vlhich links domination and empowerment as t1vo moments in 
human history. Gregory Bateson (1979) j)Oi:J.ts to ~,rhat I beli·::ve is a 
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convincing clarification of the flawed logic that selects power (as 
manifested in hegemony as 1vell as critical self-reflectivity) as '> 
focus of analysis: 
adversarial systems are notoriously subject to 
irrelevant deter:ninisrn. The relative "strength" of the 
adversaries is likely to rule the decision re8ardless of 
the relative strength of their arguments. 
It is not so ouch "power" that corrupts as the :!!J.th of 
"power." It was noted above that "power," like "energy," 
"tension," and the rest of the quasi-physical metaphors are 
to he distrusted and, arnong them, "power" is one of the 
most dangerous. He who covets a mythical ahstn1ction must 
al1vays be insatiable! As teachers '"e should not promote 
that myth. 
It is difficult for an adversary to see further than 
the dichotomy between winning and losing in the adversarial 
combat. Like a chess player, he is always tempted to make 
a tricky move, to get a quick victory. The discipline, 
always to l::>ok for the best move on the board, is hard to 
attain and hard to maintain. The player must have his eye 
always on a longer view, a larger gestalt (p. 223). 
Prom the argument that Bateson has raised, Macdonald's critique of 
the ii'lstrumental rationality of '1arxist analysis, Ricoeur 's depiction 
of hermeneutic· interpretations as baing a demythologizing of human 
discourse, I believe it is possible to suggest that the li:nitations of 
post-Marxist analysis provid•? ample U1US•2 for examiains •Jth~r \f::J.j'S of 
not only describias the human co11dition, but also to anticipate ;:md 
help brins into conscious apprehensi·on non-adversarial, transformati ve 
possibilities. P~i.losophical hermeneutics - p::~rticularly that genre 
of hermeneutics lvhj ch aligns itself 1vi th ontological conceras 
focuses attention on "=t longer view, a L:~rgl:!r gestalt" withio1 ~rhich 
instrur~ental rationality and preoccupations 1vith hegemonic po•.1:c2r 
·iisi:ortions dre seen ::lS one of a number of perspectives 1V:1ich :1ay be 
112 
applied to the analysis of human experience. That the new left's 
critique may contribute to the reification of conflict and an 
instrumental logic are serious limitations. As descriptions of the 
world, critical theory and neo-Marxist accounts do not exhaust the 
possible descriptions nor do they describe th~ 1vorld, but a >.vorld -
one of many realities. Others 1;hose <:laps trace other features of the 
topography remain to be exami~ed for their curricular implications. I 
turn rlow to Maxine Greene for quite a different depiction of ::1 1wrld of 
possibility. 
C. MAXI:"JE GREENE: THE FA~1ILIAR MADE STRANGE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A man said to the Universe: 
"Sir, I exist!" 
"However," replied the universe, 
"The fact has r.ot created in me 
A sense of obligation." 
Stephen Crane 
H01; ~ one act on one's corn:nitrnent 
and at once set others free to be? 
This seems to us to be one of the crucial 
questions confronting the self-conscious teacher; 
it is the crucial question confronting the writer. 
Perhaps the responsibility, after all, belongs 
to the reader. He must launch 'l.imself on his 01m 
journey; he must choose to see through his own eyes. 
Maxine Greene, Teac:_l!..~~ ~ ~'=.':.~~g_~r:_ 
:1axine Greene has, through the years, represented to rne -- ::md I 
a~ sure many others a scholar steeped in the liberal arts 
tradition. Her encyclopaedic knowledge, her penetrating criticism of 
classical as well as popular cultures, and her breadth of ftistorical, 
philosoph L:.al, ::tnd aesthetic sources is stagger-ing. She e1ppears to r:Je 
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to be "an intellectual's intellectual." Her contributions to 
curriculum discourse has enriched the fielct immensely. If '-laxine 
Greene rlid not exist, perhaps the field of curriculum would have to 
have invented her. Hhile it is not my intention to deify Professor 
Greene, given my own background in the liberal arts, I feel compelled 
to pay homage to her erudition and sensitivity. 
Greene describes herself as "a phenomenological existentialist 
with considerable sympathy for aspects of pragmatism" (1973, Preface). 
That she 1vas elected president of AERA in this era of "hard-nosed 
science" is remarkable for two reasons: first, that her philosophical 
inquiry has been recognized as a legitimate mode of research in an 
otherwise empirical science dominated institution is noteworthy; and 
second, that her leadership in the field of education attests to the 
possibility of multiple interpretive communities informing educational 
theory. 
My first exposure to Maxine Greene's writing occurred in 1974. At 
that time 1 \vas awestruck hy her penetrating thought and, to 'nention it 
again, the breadth of her sources. Virtually no expressive art or 
cultural phenomenon 1vas outside the scope of her consideration; she 
possesses a rare talent to link practically any human expression in any 
medium to a discussion of emerging consciousr1ess. This she did, and 
continues to do 1vith grace and no hint of contrivance. That James B. 
Macdonald, whose own powerfully synoptic vision of human experience 
attracted me to the study of curriculum, suggestecl that we expl·Jre 
:vtaxine (;reene 1 s work seemed to add a'irlitional resonance to the texts 
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under consideration. It appeared that ·.vinrlow after window, horizon 
after horizon were opened and disclosed for our consideration. Having 
recently completed a seminar on Philosophy and Literature (including 
the writing of Sartre and Camus), and trying to find some 
"legitimation" or at least intellectual support for my 60's fueled 
iconoclasm and rebelliousness (having protested against mand'ltory ROTC 
at the undergraduate school I attended, the Viet Nam War, and 
autocratic authority figures in intercollegiate athletic programs), 
~!axine Greene's existentialism was a welcome articulation of the 
responsibility of the individual to choose his or her o1m project: 
"Each person is 'the author' of the situation in which he lives; he 
gives meaning to his world, but through action, through his project, 
not by well-meaning thought" (1973, p.280). 
Professor Greene has long expressed that her interest is in 
"arousing individuals to wirle-awakeness, to 'thinking' in Arendt's 
sense about their own commitments and actions wherever they work and 
:nake their lives" (1973, p. 6). Greene has sought to counter, through 
her work, not "false-consciousness" per se, but "thoughtlessness" to 
again use Arendt's term; her preoccupation, throughout her varied 
career, has been to study and disclose the emergence of consciousness; 
her focus has been on looking at the inrlividual actor and exploring how 
self-transcendence "going beyond where he has been" can be 
encouraged and facilitated. Greene's great contribution to the 
discourse of curriculum theory has been her integration of existential 
and phenomenological perspectives and interpretive frameworks. 
115 
\vhile there are a myriad of themes and r.Jotifs within Greene's 
extensive writing which speak directly to a theory of curriculum, I 
wish to focus upon her examination of the individual as agent, the 
phenomenal world within which the individual is situated, her 
assessment of the decline of the public realm, and her advocacy of a 
restoration of "public space." \~hi le it is my perception that Greene 
continues in the existential and phenomenological traditions, I believe 
that a shift has occurred in her more recent thinking '.lnd 1vriting -- a 
shift which directly speaks to my interest in affiliation and community 
and a counter-alienating pedagogy. 
2. THE PHEN0~1ENAL \VORLD AND AN EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVE 
According to Greene, "The indiv:i.dual must continually struggle to 
clarify, to pattern (without losing sight of 'the chaos against which 
that pattern was conceived')" (1973, p. 21). The plight of human 
beings, from Greene's perspective, is that of meaning-maker and 
action-taker in essentially a chaotic universe: 
We take the term chaos to signify not only the 
remembered inchoateness of what has seemed incomprehensible 
in earlier days, not only the teacher's uncertainty 
respecting who he is and what he can do. We take it also 
to mean the huge disorder of our day where values, beliefs, 
aspirations, and ideals are concerned (1973, p.S). 
Greene describes the individual consciousness situated within the 
phenomenal world in terms of a figure-ground relationship -- the ground 
being the prereflective human a1vareness, awareness which is prior to 
codification; the figure being the inch vidual project which helps to 
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establish :neaning and identify patterns within lived reality in 
fact, according to Greene, human consciousness is the so'.lrce of order 
and meaning. For Greene, meanings, truths, facts, ideals, objective 
reality, do not exist "out there" as they might be construed in 
positivist thought. Instead, Greene suggests that knowledge of the 
world is to be arrived at through quite a different process than 
scientific rationality. Citing Merleau-Ponty, Greene points to a 
characteristically different starting point for the generation of human 
knowledge: 
Psychology, like physics and the other sciences of 
nature, uses the method of induction, which starts from 
facts and then assembles them. But it is very evident that 
this induction will remain blind if we do not know in some 
other way, and indeed from the inside of consciousness 
itself, what this induction is dealing with (1973, p.304). 
Thus, for Greene, an existential phenomenological orientation to the 
world begins within the awareness of the individual knower. It is this 
"inside view" which serves as the figure against, as Freire terms it, 
"background awareness." The existential project of a 11 those \vho seek 
to educate and be educated is to return to each person's uni1ue 
emergence from primordial consciousness, from unreflective background 
awareness: 
There is no solace today in being told that man is a 
rational being or the son of God, for the person lashing 
out against invisibility, for the person suffering from 
feelings of powerlessness, for the person feeling 
obliterated by institutions or city crowds. Such a person 
must ask, '\vho am I? \Vhat am I? \vhat can I rna!<e of 
myself?' If he grants the existence of the free will Vico 
spoke of, he may find it as much a burden as a blessing 
because he knows that his world has no encompassing design, 
no Plan, no guarantees (1973, p.44). 
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Greene depicts the world as chaotic, not fully formed nor 
realized, full of contradiction, paradox and confusion. Faced with 
this chaos, this "given" 1vorld, existential human beings are "condemner! 
to give meaning to life." The quintessential project for each human 
being is to struggle against an entropic tendency of this 1vorld -- a 
tendency which reduces the individual to a cipher, a tendency 
exacerbated by abstraction (as was discussed in the section on 
Conceptual Logic), the "givenness" of conventional associations, and 
the "blindness" of everyday existence. 
Greene counters this entropic tendency by stressing that we must 
make sense of this inchoate world; '-"e must create new 1vays of seeing 
reality: 
Preoccupied with priorities, purposes, programs of 
'intended learning' and intended (or unintended) 
manipulation, we pay too little attention to the individual 
in quest of his o1vn future, bent on surpassing what is 
merely 'given,' on breaking through the everyday. \•le are 
still too prone to dichotomize: to think of 'disciplines' 
or 1 public traditions 1 or 'accumulated wisdom 1 or 1 common 
culture' (individualization despite) as objectively 
existent, external to the knower -- there to be discovered, 
mastered, learned (in Pinar 1975, p.299). 
Greene's response to the "givenness" of the world is char':l.cteristica1ly 
existential: "To develop a fundamental project, to go beyond the 
situations one confronts and refuse reality as given in the name of a 
reality to be produced" (p. 7). For Greene, this refusal. is a great 
affirmation an affirmation which "takes action to p':l.ttern the world" 
in 1vays not yet kno1vn. This ne1v knowledge is a "moment of praxis," and 
ns Sartre has stated, a moment of praxis opening into ''what hns not yet 
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been." This refusal is a form of self-transcendence as Phenix (1964) 
has described it; it is a moment when the individual feels a sense of 
agency, feels that he or she is a knower. This self-transcendence 
appears to be one significant aim of meaningful activity. 
\.Jhile the selections so far from Greene 1 s extensive writing have 
focused primarily on her concern for an individual's existential 
project, she suggests that meaningful existence is not to be confused 
with solipsistic or egocentric absorption: 
To speak of existential meaning is to relate the 
attainment of meaning to an individual's particular project 
and standpoint, to conceive it in terms of concrete, human 
relations to others and to the world (1973, p. 173). 
Greene is well aware of the self as a social self, and this 
awareness prompts her to recognize and describe the interconnectedness 
of individuals to others. Citing Merleau-Ponty again, Greene states 
that he "points out that we witness at every moment 'the miracles of 
related experiences, and yet nobody knows better than we do how this 
miracle is worked, for we are ourselves this network of relationships"' 
(1975, pp. 314-315). While recognizing "this net1vork of relationships" 
as integral to human existence, Greene is careful not to simply reify 
them; these relationships are to be disclosed, reconstructed and 
generated through social praxis praxis 1vhich 'wlps to bring about 
the freedom to form these relationships. Thus, relationships are to be 
existentially viewed as choices one makes to help fulfill one's project 
and liberate others so they can do likewise. 
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Greene further elaborates upon t~is notion of interrelatedness by 
calling upon Dewey's description of the continuun of experience: 
According to Dewey, the individual exists within a 
continuum of experience, a vital matrix in \vhich all things 
are interrelated -- the individual and society; mind and 
matter; thought and the phenomena of the 1vorld. 
'Experience is of as well as in nature. It is not 
experience which experienced, but nature. Things 
interacting in certain ways are experience.' Caught up in 
these relationships, man moves from one transactional 
situation to another as he pursues his fulfillments and 
tries to bring elements of his environment under human 
control (1973, p. 127). 
Meaningful experience, then, is not something we seek to find (as 
if it were "out there" to be found), but it is a condition 1vhich we 
bring into being through praxis. The interrelatedness of the "natural 
world" as well as the world of socially constructed realities such as 
belief systems, conventions, traditions, etc., is rendered problematic 
1vithin an existential perspective. That is, the "givenness" of these 
interrelationships is to be struggled against so that each human actor, 
caught within a weh of relationships, chooses a meaningful course which 
discloses the relationships, reconstructs these relationships in the 
interest of freedom, and generates through social praxis a reality 
which hitherto 1vas unrealized. The role of the conscious actor/agent 
is not to be underestimate:! in Greene 1 s depiction of transformative 
action. But given Greene's emphasis on the agentic potential of the 
individual, we must examine how individual agency escapes the trap of 
narcissism, alienation and privatism. 
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3. AUTONOMY, fREEDOM AND SOCIAL PRAXIS 
Maxine Greene's existential orientation to the role of the teacher 
is clearly conveyed when she states that 
As aware of his students' incompleteness as he must be 
of his own, the teacher can only strain to encounter his 
students without objectifying them; he can only act to help 
them, as autonomous beings, to choose (1973, p.275). 
Greene believes not in teaching to an aggregate of students, to some 
least common denominator, but instead to each person as an authentic 
self. By honoring the autonomy of the individual, Greene believes that 
each individual is therefore encouraged to take action against 
constraints on his or her freedom. The conscious teacher, then, takes 
care not to i~pose unnecessary constraints. upon students, not to 
depersonalize or objectify them by separating mere behaviors from their 
integrative thread which is their project or existential choice. To 
debase the "other" to a mere respondent or subordinate is, for Greene, 
a heinous offense against the dignity of the individual. Moreover, 
Greene has forcefully commented upon this reductionism to behavior (as 
opposed to action) which is so prominent in "competency-based" 
educational programs: 
I am quite aware that this is at odds 1vith prevalent 
notions of what we are about. Behavior is the 
preoccupation today, not action in the sense implied. 
Behavior, unlike action, conforms to certain statistical 
la1vs. Considering it, we think in terms of tendencies, of 
probabilities; we aggregate; we compute, measure, and 
predict. We focus attention on end points, on quantifiable 
objectives, because these are what the influential ones 
appear to demand. We are compelled, we say pragmatically, 
to respond to expectations; and present expectations are 
for measurable achievement, for efficiency, for discipline, 
not for risks and process and open possi bil i. ty. So we 
orient ourselves to outputs; we concentrate on 
productivity, on market demand. It is no wonder that the 
matter of freedom so seldom arises. Freedom interrupts 
determinisms and orderly cause and effect sequences, as 
choosing cuts across necessity. But, once again, without 
the thought of such interruption, there can be no polity. 
There can be no consideration of what is common, of 
something audible and visible that is in between (1973, 
pp. 16-17). 
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This is an exceedingly important point in Greene's logic, and one 
which must be understood in order to see how agency and freedom are 
necessary preconditions for civic responsibility and social praxis. 
Just as freedom to choose "cuts across necessity," so is freedom 
necessary in order for an individual to achieve a sense of agency. As 
David Purpel has suggested, a sense of agency is required if one is to 
act morally. Without this sense of agency, the individual is reduced 
to a functionnaire, a servant of whatever dominant ideology or 
institution under which the individual is subordinated. Without this 
freedom, there can be no real sense of responsibility, no "o1mership" 
of the consequences of one's actions, no standpoint from ·.vhich v::~lues 
are to be projected into the world: 
To realize values or to bring them into beirrg, the 
individual must not allmv himself to he dominated by his 
group or community or give up his subjective 'need' for 
wholeness and completion. For Martirr Heidegger, values 
seem to be fragments of Being, disintegrated through human 
forgetfulness. As remains or residues, they are evocative 
of oneness or unity; and men yearn after them, finding them 
to he desirable objects of choice. Fundamental to this is 
the notion of 'care,' of concern, the realization that the 
individual is the source of meaning and that, for all his 
finitude and consequent 'nothingness, ' he is 1vholly 
responsible for introducing values in the world (1973, p. 
262). 
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That the individual achieves autonomy enables, in Greene's logic, 
the individual to freely choose the associations 1vhich are an integral 
part of social praxis. The individual escapes privatism and alienation 
through his or her choice to ally with others in action: "[an] 
individual can choose ~imself and authenticate· 'Jimself (without 'good 
reasons'), even 1vhen he is one among many, when he affirms his 
engagement with humanity" (1973, p.257). Greene is critical (as is 
Sennett (1977)) of an individual seeking membership b exclusive and 
"private" groups; private, personal relationships do not constitute 
true civic responsibility, rather, they imply an escape from engagement 
in its fullest sense: 
;.Jhen 1ve consider the unlikelihood of a modern 
individual's spending most of his life in small, 1varm 
groups of people, we see th~ implicit problems. What 
implications for education do we find in the privatism of 
young radicals, in their refusal to play the culture's 
'game'? How can we reconcile this idea of private personal 
relationships with such views as John Dewey 1 s -- of the 
individual ::ts a basically social organism becoming a full 
and responsible self as he participates more and more fully 
in social life? (1973, p. SO). 
For Greene, civic courage is to be seen not in relationships 1vithin a 
homogeneous or consensual group, but rather in the individual's 
involvement in the arenas of contestation and struggle among 
heterogeneous interests and values. The important work of 
interpretation and menning making rnust, by its very nature of 
contending with alternative choices and values, be conducted within t'Je 
public, not private or exclusive realm. 
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Given Greene's understanding of the phenomenal world, the importance oE 
existential choi:::e and a pragmatic orientation to social li.fe, it is no 
surprise that she recognizes the influence of one's "sedimented 
history" on one's perspective. Interpretation and knowledge (as 
Polanyi and Schutz have articulately described) is not only of the 
world in which we live, but fro~ our standpoint within this 1vorld: 
I want to emphasize the fact, holfever, that what we 
conceive to be real is interpreted experience; we can be 
sure of nothing beyond the grasp of human consciousness, 
beyond what some human consciousness intends. Too many 
disciplinary specialists and teachers, like the media and 
government agencies, obscure (either through neglect or by 
design) the contingency of what is thought to be real. 
Minimal attention is paid to the significance of standpoint 
and perspective, to the influence (say) of class membership 
on perspective, or to the effect of work or project on what 
is seen (1973, p. 13). 
Thus, despite Greene's overall emphasis on individual choice and 
autonomy, she is cognizant of the influence of the social realities one 
confronts. 
Nowhere is this "sedimented history" more apparent (and 
pernicious) than in the configuration of power and authority associated 
with diverse ii'lterpretive communities within the university. Greene, 
citing Edward Said, maintains that the struggle for ne•JI v:1lues and 
perspectives is ill-served by research as it is predominantly carried 
out in rliscipline and paradigm-bound communities within the university: 
The privatization, the alienation are coupled lvith a 
separation of intellectual guilds within the university, 
the kind of separation that has heen encouraging patterns 
of exclusive solidarity within a numher oE fields. Edward 
Said, focusing on literature and on 'the politics of 
interpretation,' wri.t2s about ho1.; what is happening 
'atomizes, privatizes, and reiELes the untirly real~ of 
secular history and creates a peculiar configuration of 
constituencies and interpretive communities ••.. ' He is 
concerned, as others are, about affiliation and about 
'noninterference.' He talks about the need to break out of 
'the disciplinary ghettos in which as intellectuals we have 
been confined, to reopen the blocked social processes 
ceding objective representation (hence power) of the world 
to a small coterie of experts and their clients, to 
consider that the audience for literacy is not a ::lased 
circle of three thousand professional critics but the 
community of human beings 1 i ving in society • • . . ' T~is 
does not mean that interpretive approaches are by 
definition anti-social or indifferent; it is simply a call 
to connect interpretation to social praxis (1973, pp. 
9-10). 
124 
Interpretation then, as has been suggested in the earlier review of the 
principles of hermeneutic inquiry, seeks not conformism to "accepted 
canons" of research communities, but instead should stru15gle against 
this givenness and work to bring about new orientations and language to 
transcend these private real~s. To move from private concerns to 
social praxis requires a shift not only in individual project, but a 
restructuring of arenas of discourse. It is this shift to a 
reexamination of the "public space" to v1hich we now tur'1. 
4. TYE PUBLIC SPACE: FRON AT.U:NATION TO CO~IHUNITY 
As mentioned earlier, there appears to be a shift in Professor 
Greene's later writing -- a shift which, while consonant with her 
existential and phenomenological orientations, hegins to offer a 
renewed interest in the public domain. As if to counter the 
"sedimented history" of private interests, the "n::J.rcissism" of the 
70's, and the "peculiar configurations nf constituencies and 
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interpretive communities, 11 Greene returns (as had Ser1net, Aronowitz, 
Arendt, Langer, Marin, and Slater) to the notion of a public space -- a 
space where civic responsibility is coupled with social meaning. 
Greene attributes much of the alienation and stasis of present social 
life to an evisceration of the issues and discourse which :nay be sr~en 
as constituting a public interest. Part of this problem c~n be 
attributed to a form of cultural imperialism on the part of technical 
"experts;" part may be due to a 1dthdra1•al of individuals from arenas 
of contestation; part may be attributed to "the public's" exclusion 
from the political and economic centers of power: 
The problem of constituting a public space today is of 
a different order, and not solely because of increased 
fragmentation. Richard Sennet (1976), li!-::e a number of 
other social scientists, is convincing when he points to 
the deadness and emptiness in the public domain, and when 
he speaks of today's pursuit of intimacy as a sign of 
narcissism and escape. To cherish close community for its 
own sake, Sennet suggests, is to be a refugee. People are 
withdrawing from a public culture perceived as meaningless; 
they are building barricades around their private spaces 
rather than engaging in the expanding associated 
relationships Dewey described. If this is the case, it is 
exacerbated by the distance from the centers of power 
people experience in these times, by their alienation from 
the context-free, technical language presently in use. 
Ordinary, contextual language the language of 
face-to-face interchange -- no1v sounds ineffectual against 
the clicking of simulation games and the whirring of 
computerized projections. Many persons find themse 1 ves in 
a strange, Blmost unrecognizable new world. This has 
intensified the alien quality, the perceived impersonality 
of what lies outside the private reabl. It has drained 
ordinary meanings from the public domain (1973, p.S). 
This withering of the public space is not unexpected, given the 
shrinking of a sense of a locus of control one fac:2s in a technological 
society. This shrinking of a sens2 of a locus of control is certainly 
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reflected in bureaucratized and test-driven schools. As 
"accountability" becomes more and more defined by behavioral measures, 
hierarchical governance and "standardized," unif.')rm practices, 
individual autonomy and social responsibility are eroded: 
Alienation and fixity come to mind again, along with 
the essence of a public space. There is no space where 
human beings, speaking and acting in their. plurality, can 
appear before one another aad realize the pO\ver they have 
simply in beiag together. And there surely is no such 
space in most of the schools. Nor is there the freedom 
experienced when young persons discover that they have the 
capacity to reach out and attain feelings, thoug~ts, and 
ways of being, hitherto unimagined -- and even, perhaps, 
ways of acting on what they b?.lieve to be deficient, ways 
of transcending and going beyond (1973, p.6). 
Teachers and students, as \vell as the vast majority of workers in 
workplaces, are continually placed in reactive positions vis-a-vis the 
authorities who exert control over their behavior. Greene points to 
the pervasiveness of this manipulation when she states that "\~e are all 
a\fare of a cacophony of demands, most of them focusing on individual 
achievement and on an assumed connection between achievement and 
mobility, acceptable performance and success" (1973, p.4). As I have 
previously ~entioned, emphasis o~ individual behavior change, and 
achi·:vement is, at best, a form of equal opportunity; what is moot, 
however, is \fhether this form of "equality" is an appropriate or 
adequate response to structural inequalities lvhich have been 
empirically shown to be minimally affected by such "interventions." 
\fuen the individual is taken as the sole unit of analysis for 
achievement and performance, we are not ~s likely to attend to broader 
issues such as distributive justice or the social 3ood. Only rarely is 
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individual achievement, as it is reinforced by liberal reform ideology 
and technocratic management, linked to the perpetuation of social 
inequalities (see, Weingarten, 1979). It is against such a thoughtless 
agenda that Greene calls us to consider a more encompassing level of 
analysis: 
The opposite of freedom is a type of alienation; it is 
stasis, petrification, fixity. It 1vould seem to me that 
educators, on principle, would want to take a stand against 
what threatens our way of being in the world; yet the 
matter seldom enters educational discourse today. And 1vith 
rare exceptions, nor does any notion of the social good 
(1973, p.4). 
Greene's shift in her level of analysis calls attention to, ::ts 
Dewey had many years ago, the importance of a mature individual 
broadening his or her involvement in social life. It is not 
privatistic achievement nor self-actualization that is the mark of a 
progressive society, rather, it is high regard for and participation in 
the public sphere that reflects democratic values. Greene challenges 
us to consider this when she asks: 
Almost never is there an expressed concern about the 
public realm; there is silence about renewing the common 
lvor1d and about what that common 1vorld shoul:l be. What is 
it that lies in between, that holds us together, that we 
can cherish and try to keep alive? \vhere, 1vhen we ponder 
it, are we to turn? (1973, p.4). 
Against this silence, ~Iaxine Greene has raised an articulate:, 
cmnpassionate voice. Despite her repeated call for increased personal 
freedom and autonomy, she does not abandon the issue of affiliation and 
collective endeavor: "Private and subjective as existential choosing 
is, however, it does not entail the rejection of human brotherhood" 
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(1973, p. 257). Greene unequivocally states that her struggle against 
all forms of oppression and dehumanization must be seen in light of its 
aim: "I want to see alienation and fixity give 1;ay to participation and 
movement, the free play of movement, the free play of thought, all for 
the sake of the common 1..orld" (1973, p. 9). Greene's existential 
approach to a rejuvenation of the public space and the social life 
which is attainable only within it, does no violence to either the 
dignity or uniqueness of the individual. In fact, it is precisely 
through her championing the freedom of the individual that the 
viability and value of such a public realm are protected: 
As Arendt put it, 1 the reality of the public realm 
relies on the simultaneous perception of innumerable 
perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents 
itself and for which no common measurement or denominator 
can ever be devised (pp.57-58)' (1973, p.7). 
Perhaps some aspects of Greene 1 s more recent attention to the 
public space can be traced to her recognition of an analysis Dewey made 
regarding our entry i11to what he calls "the modern era." Dewey 
suggested that the modern era lacked suitable symbolism to represent an 
advanced quality of life. Surely "the perfect machine," or insulating 
suburban residences, or technologically mediated cornnunication lack the 
expressive quality of earlier symbols of advanced civilization. 
Gr8ene, citing Dewey, maintains that with regard to the symbolism used 
to represent modern civilization: 
There was a dissonance bet1veen them and existing 
socio-economic conditions, as then~ is a dissonance today 
between the privatist, voluntarist, laissez-faire ideas 
that now have such official sanction and the realities of a 
troubled mass society. , .. Dewey's remedy was the 'search 
for the g rei-it community, 1 something he sa1v as 1 a life of 
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free and enriching communion' (1973, p.S). 
It is this "life of free and enriching communion" whic!1 need be 
rescued from the grasp of profit-motivated entrepreneurs, self-serving 
politicians and managers, and the bankers of cultural capital. If 
education is to address this struggle, how might it interpret its 
mandate? 
5. EDUCATORS AS CRITICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
Drawing upon her background in the liberal arts and its rich 
traditions of literary criticism, Maxine Greene applies a 
characteristically liternry critical approach to the examination of 
human consciousness. Just as any work of art reflects imagination and 
intelligence, each human consciousness may be approached as an analogue 
of a creative intelligence. The critic, whether he or she is exa:nining 
an art object or the lucid reality of another human being attempts, 
according to Greene, to place him or herself "withia the interior 
space" of the creator -- to attend to the experience of aesthetic 
appreciation: 
For the critic of consciousness, literature is viewed 
as a genesis, a conscious effort on the part of an 
individual artist. to understand his own experience by 
fra~ing it in language. The reader who encounters the work 
must recreate it in terms of his consciousness. In order 
to penetrate it, to experience it existentially and 
empathetically, he must try to place hi:nself lvithin the 
'interior space' of the writer's mind as it is slowly 
revealed in the course of his 1vork. Clearly, the rr~ader 
requires a variety of clues if he is to situate himself in 
this Hay; and these are ostensibly provided by ::.he 
expressions and attitudes he finds in the book, devices 
which he must accept as orientations and indications --
'norms,' perhaps, to govern his reaction. His subjectivity 
is t&e substance of literary object; but if he is to 
perceive the identity emerging through the enactments of 
the book, he must subordinate his own personality as he 
brackets out his everyday, 'natural' world. Bis objective 
in doing so, hm.,rever, is not to analyze or explicate or 
evaluate; it is to extract the experience made manifest by 
means of the work (1973, pp.300-301). 
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It is, perhaps, this search for "orientations and indications" 
which characterizes the type of inquiry Maxine Greene best represents. 
Unlike the American "new critics" of the 50's '.vho, not unlike the 
logical positivists and philosophers of language before them, 
preoccupied themselves with a decontextualized examination of a 
literary work (that is, promoted a view of a literary work as an 
art:!:_fact with its own coherence, internal order and structure, a vie1v 
which deemphasized the biographic and cultural situation of the 
author), the "continental critics" with whom Haxine Greene allies 
herself preferred to examine a 1vork as a unique expression embedded 
within an historical, cultural and biographic contexts. Continental 
criticism, while acknowledging the structural properties of a work, 
recognizes wider frames of reference frames of reference which 
include both artist and critic in the "disclosure, reconstruction and 
generation" of new experience and meanings. This compact between 
critic and subject calls for a "continual decentering" without which 
the individual subject cannot become free from his or her intellectual 
egocentricity. 'It is this deeper penetration into the intersubjective 
"content" of criticism that serves t1vo major functions: the first being 
that the intentionality of the creative act (both the act of ~rtistic 
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expression and the act of artistic criticism) is examined as a project 
"thrown" outward into the world; .and the second being that the critic 
attending to this intentionality as expressed through both the artist's 
and critics' "orientations and indications" seeks to become mvare of 
the patterns and meanings being generated at a given moment -- to focus 
on this "figure" against the ground of background awareness. This is 
the essence of critical consciousness in Greene's generative schema. 
In her po1verfully written book Teacher us Stranger: Educational 
Philosop!lY_ for the Modern Age ( 1973), Maxine Greene points to the 
connection she makes between art and teaching: 
There is a sense in which this book ought to 
as art functions: to confront the individual with 
to stimulate a personal search for patterning and 
to open perspectives beyond the everyday 
particularly where teaching is concerned (Preface). 
function 
himself; 
meaning; 
most 
Art and criticism, then, are to be viewed as a confrontation against 
the given, against complacency, against thoughtlessness. As Mentioned 
earlier, the critic's objective "is not to analyze or explicate or 
evaluate; it is to extract the experience made manifest hy means of the 
1vork." Greene goes on to say that 
Therefore, more expl i.citly than the analytically 
inc lined teacher, the existential educator would underline 
the inescapabili ty of responsi0i.lity. Each person i.s 'the 
author' of the situation in which he lives; he gives 
meaning to hi.s world, but through action, through his 
project, not by well~neaning thought (1973, p.280). 
\Vhile Greene's championiilg of an existential perspective and its 
reliance upon the responsibi.li ty of each person to become "the <luthor 
of the situation in w·hich he lives" has been linked to her more recent 
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rliscussion of the public realm, I believe that there remain some, as 
yet, unexamined questions regarding the fundamental logic within which 
she operates. It is to these questions I wish to turn at this time. 
6. A CRITICISM OF CRITICIS~1 
!·1axine Greene has struggled valiantly to restore a sens2 of 
respect for individual autonomy, responsible action. and a democratic 
promise. That I have tried to trace her interest in. restoring the 
public space to a more vital place in human affairs is consonant with 
my bias against prescriptions for pedagogical change focusing on. the 
individual as a unit of analysis. Greene has contributed much to 
calling to the attention of curriculum theorists the issues of 
responsibility and action. Her weakness, if we can call it that, is 
that, despite her phenomenological grounding, she fails, I believe to 
adequately address the behavioral ecology within which the individual 
is found. 
Greene recognizes the risk she has chosen in selecting the 
humanities as a source for human edification: 
I have been concerned 1vith finding ways of arousing 
students from submergence, awakening then to critical 
consciousness and to the possibility of praxis in a world 
they share. There can be no guarantees that the humanities 
will 'improve' those who engage in them; nor can there be 
guarantees that wide-awakeness will increase. But there is 
an obligation, I think, on the part of all who educate to 
address themselves, as great artists do, to the freedom of 
their students, to r:1ake deraands on them to for;n the 
pedagogy of their o1vn liberation and to do so 
rigorously, passionately, and in good faith (1973, p.29). 
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That each individual is invited and, yes, demanded to "for:n a pedagogy 
of their mvn liberation" is noble, but questionabl·2 as either a 
strategy for change or as an accurate reflection of counter-hegemonic 
pedagogy. There is a normative and moral ambiguity in Greene's 
preoccupation which is not easily resolved if we pursue her logic to 
its conclusions. Partly, this is an ontological question; partly it is 
a strategic one. 
Greene depicts the world as chaotic, "benignly indifferent" at 
best, more frequently depicted as malevolent. As the quote from 
Stephen Crane at the beginning of this section indicated, the Universe 
feEo:!.s no "sense of obligation" to its human inhabitants. hThile it is a 
"pathetic fallacy" to ascribe to the non-human human qualities, it is a 
different ontological fallacy that I believe Maxine Greene falls victim 
to, a fallacy I might call the fallacy of randomizing extant patterns. 
Greene falls victim to a seductive form of hubris \ihich places the 
human pattern-making faculty on the taxonomic throne. This is less her 
personal fault, more a fault of the existential ontology to ~1hich she 
subscribes. Within an existential perspective of the world, all 
patterns are devalued and gathered under the category of "the given." 
There is a peculiar sense of disrespect in this devaluation. Just as 
the human intellect is inflated to occupy the premier place in naming 
the patterns, so is the ecological order deflated to occupy a 
subordinate, subservient role in sustaining this critical 
intelligence. \oJhile I am not about to paste here a bui:lper sticker 
saying "Save the \~hales," I do ask us to pause and consider the 
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particular cosmos within which ~axine Greene asks us to reside. I ask 
us to reconsider the qualitative dimensions of "the given" -- and even 
to question whether we should presume that we are recipients at all. 
~1axine Greene appears to describe the "stuff:" of the world as 
though it were a material (not evP.n to give it the honor of calling it 
a "resource") to be acted upon, reconstructed into some more suitable 
form -- some cosmic version of 11anifest Destiny. ~ife each, through our 
individual projects are to leave our thumb print on the clay. Greene, 
I believe, confuses the role of the cartographer and the cosmos; she is 
not creating "Landscapes for Learning," but 1:1aps for our 
consideration. lifhile we may be wise to come to recognize 1vhat !'lction 
we may take to i:nprove the world (e.g., reduce human suf Eering, learn 
to live ecologically), we must also, I believe, learn to recognize the 
"given" as infinitely valuable and worthy of profound respect. I would 
counter (and I refer the reader back to the ·iiscussion on Conceptual 
Logic in which the writings of Bergson, Fechner, James and Bateson, are 
•iiscussed) that while the universe m9.y not have an "obligation" to 
sustain us, the universe does offer landscapes for learning, patterns 
which are at least as instructive as those bearing the human 
thumbprint, and an order which human intt:!rventionism has only crudely 
and often grotesquely mimicked (e.g., nuclear energy, technological 
pollution and exploitation of the weak). \Vhi le these criticisms ::tre 
directed most at Greene's ontological understanciing, there are a few 
other observations about her normative and strategic su3gestions that I 
wish t~ oake in conclusion. 
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~faxine Greene 1 s call for a "restoration of public discourse" 
brings with it an anarchistic relativism. On one hand, she points to a 
need to open and expand the public space so that many rnore voices can 
participate: 
Nmv I want to make clear, if I have not already done 
so, that I am not talking about politicizing the univ~rsity 
in the old unhappy sense. Nor am I suggesting that the 
social and economic pro hlems of our society can be solved 
by discussions on the campus and outside. I am saying, 
though, we have the capacity to tap what has been called 
the 'heteroglossia' or the multiple voices in the culture 
(women's voices, minority voices, critics' voices, 
teachers' voices, managers' voices and make them audible in 
an open space. I am saying that we might be able to make 
possible again dialogue about freedom and justice, human 
rights, social responsibility, public planning, welfare, 
health, the significance of the arts, and (centrally) 
education. Without the restoration of public discourse, I 
am saying, there is no hope of doing anything about what 
Wolin calls the 'structure of power, inequality, 
hopelessness, and growing repression' (1973, pp.l5-16). 
On the other hand, she implies that all voices are equal -- a radical 
democratic or anarchic ideal. The voice of battered women, or the 
T:1ird \vorld are to share this space with the voices of autocrats, and 
fascists. "Public discourse," while on the surface an attractive 
concept, is normatively ambivalent. Of course, Greene suggests a hoped 
for agenda for such discourse, but the strategy is questionable and the 
agenda implies values beyond mere openness to mul':ipl·~ voices. 
Perhaps Greene's lack of understanding about "extant pHtterns" .and 
normatively guided strategies of practice can best he seen in her 
t;Juting "individualized community services": 
In the areas of health, mental illness, ret':lrdation, 
correction, and rehabil i.tation, for exarnple, large 
institutions, challenged for their i1npersona lity and 
inhumanity, are g1v1ng way to more individualized com~unity 
services. Seldom has so much attention been paid to 
individual needs and demands; seldom has so r.mch onus been 
placed on the system and the crowd (1973, p.61). 
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Given Greene's orientation to the individual as agent and unit of 
analysis, it is not surprising that programs focusing on "individual 
needs and demands" are seen to be appropriate. Greene falls victim, as 
did the very health professionals who developed such individually 
directed programs, to a rather ill-informed understanding of behavioral 
ecology. Recent literature in the areas of "health, rnent.'ll illness, 
etc." (see Steuart, 1975; Hamburg and Killilea, 1979; Gottlieb, 1981; 
Israel, 1982; Broadhead et Rl., 1983) have pointed to the importance of 
the relationship between social support and social networks and health 
and well-being. Programs designed to "treat the individual" met with 
marginal success and had unintended consequences that are, for this 
discussion, extremely important. \Vhen programs 1vere designed to 
provide interventions looking only at the individual, many individuals 
failed to respond "sppropriately" to the intervention. Failure to 
comply with medical regimens, recitivism, and "revolving door ::lients," 
were more the rule than the exception. Programs are embedded wit~in 
the social and interpersonal network of the individual. The factors o£ 
social support which could have been (and is no1v being) engagei in the 
intervention were often overlooked. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the unintended consequences of 
individual change-oriented programs must be examined. A program such 
as ~1eals on \Vheels, while clearly assisting those who are shut in 
receive food from some agency, often rtid two things which are of 
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doubtful benefit (even while "feecling" the individuals): first, thos: 
•.vho r:~ay have been providing food and companionship to the shut-in are 
no longer "needed" and often cease to visit; second, the loss of t11is 
interpersonal social support brings 1vith it an unintended depent0nce 
upon the agency to provide for the individual. 
It is somewhat consistent with Greene 1 s logic to likewise pl::tce 
the onus on "the system and the crmvd." Seen frorn an existential 
perspective, the social network within which the individual is situated 
often appears to be full of constraints against individual autonomy; 
from a behavioral,- ~cological perspective, these systems and groupi!l.gs 
while they may indeed constrain one, also offer facilitative and 
supportive qualities. To jettison this network, or even to disregard 
its importance is both a strategic and nonnative mistake. As I have 
expressed earlier, the competence of the individual (read: autonomy) is 
contingent upon the competence of the hu;nan and ecological community 
within which he or she resides. The synergistic effect of collective 
competence is rarely addressed by currie ulum theorists; ~1axine Greene 
is no exception here. 
One last criticism I wish to ma~ce refer:~ to Greene's latent 
elitism. In her Teacher as -~~£<;l!!_3_er, Greene refers l:o Plato's 
"Allegory of the Cave" to depict the evolution of "a philosopher": 
To contempbte it (the sun . • that is reality and 
not appearance) is to be wholly fulfilled as a human being, 
to have achieved the highest degree of education. To 
contemplate it (as only a privileged few can do) is to be 
wise -- to be a philosopher (1973, 9.28). 
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If I read Greene's comment correctly, she sc~ems to be stating that 
"only a privileged few" can be ;dse. On a bad day, I tend to agree; 
but generally, I operate on the faith that each person, not only 
privileged few, not only have the potential for wisdom, but may indeed 
exhibit wisdom, strength, courage and compassion at any given moment. 
Furthermore, it is only the most depraved 1vho L1ck any hint of this 
human and spiritual quality; and it is against these we must protect 
the fragile advances human civilization has been able to achieve. 
l-1axine Greene states that: 
I ~ave suggested that the individual, in our case the 
student, will only be in a position to le~rn when he is 
committed to act upon his world. If he is content to 
admire it or simply accept it as given, if he is incapable 
of breaking with egocentrism, he will remain alienated fro.n 
~imself and his own possibilities; he will 1vander lost and 
victimized upon the road; he will be unable to learn (1973, 
pp.312-313). 
\Vhi le it is indeed true that we may wander lost and become 
victimized upon the road, w< may also be a~le to find exquisite 
journeys and hospitality upon u, \Vhi le caution is prudent, par':lnoia 
is unca llerl for and destructive to the germ of trust 1vhich we may, and 
I maintain should, carry along wit& us. 
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D. JAMES B. MACDONALD: CURRICULUM AND HUHAN UNDERSTANDING 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We live as species and as individuals on 
a delicate balance point. Neither survival, 
holocaust, or poisoned death are assured or 
impossible -- we may ascend to the angels or 
descend to the apes, foxes, or crocadiles. 
It is all possible. It is a balance that 
takes all our concerted moral energy and 
will to maintain. 
James 13. Macdon.ald 
As was mentioned in the "Introduction" to this chapter on the 
hermeneutic interpretation of selected curriculum texts, James B. 
Macdonald represents an influential figure in the theoretical 
development of the field. Like the previously examined theorists, 
t1acdonald had developed a distinctive voice and perspective; unlike the 
previously examined theorists, Macdonald has contributed significantly 
to the expansion of curriculum disourse to include sensitive analysis 
of social, political, epistemological, axiological, theological and 
practical concerns as they inform curriculum theorizing. Macdonald has 
pointed to many sources of intellectual speculation, sources which have 
only rarely if ever been drawn into a conceptualization of curriculum 
by one individual. He has avoided the trap of parochialism, of 
specialist preoccupation 1vith any one perspective or orientation. I 
believe it is fair to say that James Macdonald has done as much to 
broaden the speculative possibilities of curriculum theorizin-s as any 
figure in the field. Ry situating curriculum theorizing within a 
broader scope of intellectual activity, bv aligning hi~self with those 
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who explored the horizons of their ~isciplines whether these 
disciplines be philosophy, social theory, aesthetics, mysticism, or 
political science, -- he has enriched and ennobled the quest for 
systematic thought and helped to provide a context within which present 
curriculum issues could be framed: 
It is important to note that although we have always 
had our own special set of complexities and problems, we 
also share a broader social and intellectual context that 
can be said to be experiencing considerable 
disillusionment, anxiety, and confusion (1977, p.l). 
Hacdonald 's later theorizing frequently addressed 1-1ha::: he termed 
"the Faustian overdrive of science," that is, to echo Neitzsche, the 
conquest of scientism over scientific method. For Macdonald, this led 
to an analysis of ideological and ontological questions. Just as the 
previously discussed theorists each contributed to a framing of a 
language of possibility, Macdonald's work likewise ~~as concerned 1~ith 
how curriculum theory continued and developed conceptions of human 
nature: 11 \Vhat we can expect to achieve is grounded in our conceptions 
of the nature of human nature and the nature of change in society and 
culture" ( 1977, p. 2). ~lac donald approached this task of examining the 
"ground" of curriculum theorizing in ways not unlike (and it might be 
sairl, Hith a debt of gratitude to) Dwayne Huebner's 1vork. Like 
fluebner, Macdonalrl pursued curriculum inquiry through the analysis of 
language and metaphor used in curdculum rliscourse; like r~uehner, he 
focused on the important role of human interests in the formation of 
ne·.v kn01~lerlge; and like Huebner, he sought ne1~ 1vays of describi.;1g 
curricular thought so that a vigilant openness to ne1.; possibiLities, 
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new meanings, might be achieved: " ..• human beings are animals suspended 
in 1vebs of significance of their o1vn spinning. Curriculum theory is 
one such web" (1980, p.lS). 
Macdonald directly countered the dominant ideology of scientific 
rationality, of scientism, by advocating that we turn to normative 
considerations of lived experience. That is to say, he turned his 
attention to the quality of our everyday life experiences as they 
revealed personal and collective interests, the orienting perspectives 
that human beings bring to their making sense of their lives, and the 
multiple realities (meanings) that we assign to everyday encounters: 
The quality of lived experience resides in the 
relationships that exist in our lives. Thus, the way we 
relate to other people, the way we organize and administer 
power, the relationship of our work to our self esteem, how 
we feel about what we are doing, and what meaning our lives 
have in concrete contexts are all ways of thinking about 
the quality of our experience (1977, p.6). 
~1acdonald stated that curriculum theorizing reflects "the basic 
impulse to search for ultimate meaning and purpose that is common to us 
all." By 1 inking the experience of the individual lvith the social 'lnd 
epistemological contexts within which he or she lives, :v!acdonald sought 
to not only explain the generation of knowledge as a hur.w.n activity, 
but express how this generation need be considered as a creative, 
religious and moral enterprise. F.:ducation, according to ~1acdonaLi "is 
first and foremost a moral enterprise." Drawing upon the work of Davirl 
Hume, Macdonald suggested that a significant problem inherent in 
so-called objective science approaches to educational problems (e.g., 
behavioral objectives, social engineering, quantitative measurement) is 
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that "You can't make an ought out of an is!" Being able to 
"objectively describe" human behaviors, according to ~·1acdonald, does 
not inform us of the (normatively derived) directions toward which 
human action should be encouraged. Moreover, preoccupations with 
"objectivity" in themselves often evade the normative framel;orks \vhich 
operate in such practices. 
vlhile recognizing the various historical traditions from ·which 
curriculum theorizing emerges, Macdonald seemed to focus his energies 
upon integrating and systematizing (in non-:nechanical ways) diverse 
points of view. He 1vas never complacent, never satisfied with either 
his own understanding nor with the progress made in the field of 
theorizing. He candidly admitted "I, personally, have not yet lost my 
passion for continuing the quest for improvement." This passion 1vas 
reflected in his continually pushing the frontiers of conceptualization 
and description of curricular issues. From Dewey, t-lacdonald understood 
curriculum to be "the study of how to have a world." l~hile this 
exceedingly broad orientation points to a utopian quality of his 
theorizing (a topic which will he addressed in the next section), 
~1acdonald believed that this utopian aim must he couched in terms of 
our "passion, our values and our justifications." ~1acdonald concisely 
outlines his passion, values and justifactions when he stated that "To 
be moral in our own actions must mean among other things to he just, to 
be of service, to he authentic, to be vital, and to strive to create 
beauty in students' lives" (n.d.a, p.20). Macdonald unequivocally 
emphasized his "continuing commitment to education as an em;;wcipatory 
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process." But he 1ms quick tn poirrt out that, as important it is to 
make our interttions dear, we must rtot be deluded into thinking that 
our intentions are the sole criterion for assessing whether our actions 
are educative or miseducative. By continually focusing upon the 
relatiortship of our actions to those we encounter -- that is, how 
others experience our interactions 1vith them -- Macdonald helped to 
bring to our attention the "myth of helpfulness" that is so pervasive 
in educational activities. In a sense, our "good intentions" !!lay 
indeed be experienced as controling and dehumanizing to those whom 1ve 
"intend to help." This ethical and pedagogical problem is best seen in 
the situation where the ends of educational programs are presumed to 
justify their means. Macdonald sa1v this situation to be both dangerous 
and of questionable moral value. Like Huebner, Macdonald preferred to 
view educational encounters in ethical terms. The person must be 
treated as the end, not the "object" against whom our means are 
directed. ~1acdonalcl sought to continually make problematic the 
relationships and the roles that educators enter into. For him, " 
there is no 'natural' teaching, like rocks or rainbows, only socially 
created contrivances inherited historically" (n.d.b, p.l). By ;naking 
problematic these "socially created contrivances," he was able to focus 
upon the principles that guide such contrivances. For him, "The aim of 
education should be a centering of the person in the world" (in Gress 
and Purpel, 1978, p.l12). ~1acdonald had a very special wisdom and 
humility which he brought to his discussion of this centering process. 
In discussing his seminal role in curriculum theorizing I wish to focus 
upon four specific areas he addressed: 1vhat he saw as the task of 
curriculum theorizing, his discussion of knowledge and human interests, 
his conception of curriculum theorizing as an hermeneutic activity and 
his important work regarding curriculum and transcendence. It is to 
these concerns I now turn. 
2. THE TASK OF CURRICULill1 THEORIZING 
It may be fair to say that in the making of social and 
intellectual histories there is an embedded rlrive to establish order 
and a seamless quality to such historical development. 
Rationalizations are offered to account for changes and shifts in 
perspective and conceptual frameworks resolutions are sought for 
contradictions, paradoxes are sometimes glossed over or forcibly united 
within some interpretive artifice. James Macdonald cannot be charged 
with such an indictment. Much to the chagrin of those who sought some 
linear progression from one stage of curricular development to another, 
~acdonalrl relates quite a different view of curricular evolution: 
The development of the curriculum in the American 
public schools has been primarily a historical accident. 
Any description or statement of what the curriculum 
consists of is essentially a political and/or ethical 
document rather than a scientj fie or technical one. It is 
a statment which indicates the outcome of a very complex 
interaction of groups, pressures, and events which are most 
often socio-political in motivation and which result in 
decisions about what ought to be (n.d.c, p.l). 
~1acdonald goes on to say that the myth that curriculum development 
occurred as a scientific or technical endeavor, as "a result of some 
carefully engineered process," is one that dies hard. Thus, the 
tremendous infusion of resourc~"s into mathematics anrl science 
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curriculum projects in the early 60s was not so much the result of 
demonstrated advances in scientific or mathematical curriculum theory, 
but must be seen as an "historical accident" \vhich we nO\v recognize as 
having been triggered by nationalistic rivalry between the Soviet Union 
and the United States in the arena of space exploration. He might also 
point to the significant role that high tech corporations played in 
fueling the "space race" and the resulting "response" of educational 
institutions to this strongly articulated value pb.ced on "science 
education." Macdonald points out that "Curriculum designs are value 
oriented statements" and that these designs "project a theoretically 
based pattern of experiences as desirable" (1971, in Gress and Purpel, 
1973, p.SO). Thus, the new math and science curricula which emerged in 
the 60s were the result of a turbulent and heated contest of political 
and cultural idelogies. With Sputnik I as a graphic symbol of Soviet 
technical achievement and the cultural beliefs that American 
intellectual leadership was erroding, curriculum designs mirrored 
rather than led these changes. According to Macdonald, 
The process of curriculum development is oriented 
tO\vard the goal of a systematic organization of 3vailable 
cultural beliefs, expressive symbols, and values. It 
includes selection from the total culture and the creation 
of a pattern of encounter which \vill ma:nm1.ze the 
authenticity of the material and the probability of its 
being internalized by learners (n.d.c, p.2). 
That the values of competition, science as highly valued cultural 
capital, and nationalism were reflected in curriculum designs is 
certainly no surprise given Macdonald 1 s depiction of their emergence. 
Rut ~1acdonalrl 1 s perspective on curriculum theorizing (as opposed to 
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simply curriculum design) lead us to quite a rlifferent orientation to 
the nature of curriculum. ~acdonald's concern regarding cu~riculum 
theory is that it is not only an instrumental activity, an activity 
attempting to solve problems and define clearer objectives, but that 
curriculum theorizing is basically an expressive activity, an activity 
which participates in a dialectical process "which leads to the 
expression and interpretation of meaning; and the development of 
greater understanding" (1980, p.l9). Macdonald's juxtaposition of 
instrumental and expressive curriculum orientations points to two 
qualitatively and epistemologically divergent ways of envisioning 
curriculum practice: on one hand we have the linking of instrumental 
concerns to calculative and quintessentially political practice; on the 
other, we have expressive orientations linked to "meditative" and 
speculative interests. According to ~1acdonald, "It is through theory 
that we see, think, know" (1980, p.l7). Calculative thinking, 
according to Macdonald, is concerned more with strategies of action, 
explanation, and is usually guided by an interest in prediction and 
control. However, 
Curriculum theory as a search for understanding, a 
meditative thinking, is an attempt to deal with unity 
rather than bits and parts additively. It is a theory 
1vhich is experienced as a participatory phenomena, lvhere 
the person engages in dialogue with the theory, bringing 
each person 1 s biography and values to the interpretation. 
The intention is not to explain (flatten out) for control 
purposes, but to reinterpret in order to provide greater 
grounding for understanding (1980, p.8). 
Drawing upon the work of Jurgen Habermas (1971), Macdonald clearly 
distinguishes between three basic intentions guiding human action: 
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control, understanding, or liberation. It is safe to say that 
Macdonald's theorizing directly countered the strong presence of 
controling interests in educational theory and practice; lvhat i.s less 
clear, however, is whether he consistently emphasized an orientation to 
understanding or emancipation. This issue will be discussed more fully 
in the next section dealing with Hacdonalct 's examination of knowledge 
and leading human interests. It can be said, however, that he 
attempted to link the interests of emancipation and understanding to 
the development of new perspectives and educational opportunities. 
Thus, lvhen he states that 
The test of "good" theory in practice is thus, not 
centrally that it works (i.e. that we can control 
practice), but that in the engagement of theory and 
practice we are emancipated from previous misunderstandings 
and are then freed to reinterpret situations and reach 
greater understandings (1980, p.lO). 
he is indicating his dual concern for both understanding and human 
liberation. It is through theory guided by the interest in 
emancipation that understanding achieves its transcendent possibility, 
that is, helps to bring into reality some quality of existence that 
previously was unrealized. 
Macdonald believed that the a central activity of curriculum 
theorizing was the generation of "new 1vays of talking II 
educational experience: 
So to talk about curriculum theory or theorizing means 
to organize it metaphorically. Out of the ordinary 
experience of our field we must project (spark) the 
imaginati0n in the creation of an ordering pattern (1980, 
p.15). 
about 
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Macdonald goes on to say that "we shall b'e talking about mediating 
symbols, not correspondence 1vith reality. Theories do not correspond 
to anything, theories mediate human thought and experience (1980, p. 
16). If we view curriculum theorizing, then, as a creative, expressive 
activity which generates metaphors for increasing our understanding .of 
how thought and experience are organized, we :nay be able to escape the 
"trap" of linear and causal analysis: "It is, in other words, an 
interest in overcoming causes and (redefining means-ends relationships) 
as social conventions in the service of persons" (in Pinar, 1975, 
p.288). Thus, Macdonald adopts an ethical stance to his encounter with 
others; the fact that he sought to express his valuing of curriculum 
theorizing in terms of meditative vs. calculative orientations does 
not mean that he discounted the dialectical relationship between 
contemplation and praxis: 
Concern for the nature of human "being," value theory, 
and the nature of knowledge ar·~ intricately int~nvoven in 
action contexts. But in many ways curriculum theorizing 
can be conveniently categorized as oriented toward 
statements about knowledge, statements about the curriculum 
realities, and statements about valued Cictivity (1971, in 
Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.47). 
Macdonald indicated that the central unit of curriculum theory is 
that of "action." It was clear to him that our actions - including 
contemplative, speculative, creative -- m·u:;L be seen as constituative 
of human cultural content. It was not Macdonald's intention to 
withdraw from action in social and political dimensions; he approached 
this issue of social and political action, however, in 
characteristically and qualitatively different ways than 311 
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instrumental orientation. l{e categorically stated that" '-'e both can 
and should attempt to 1 change 1 society." He stated that to change 
society "He begin with the need to choose those socio-cultural forces 
now operating in our society that we desire to maximize of perpetuate" 
(1973, p.4). For Macdonald, as with Huebner and Purpel, curriculum 
theorizing addresses the question "What is to be left to chance?" An 
analytical orientation does not necessarily go beyond the mapping ·Jf 
trends and relationships; an ethical, rel i.gious and aesthetic 
orientation concerns itself more with projecting normatively framed 
possibilities and preferences. 
Macdonald has referred to an orientation i.n curriculum theorizing, 
reconceptualist theorizing, lvhich neither focuses on theories as 
guiding frameworks r.or on the scientific empirical validation of 
theorietical constructs. He describes this reconceptualist group as: 
... individuals [who] look upon the task of theorizing 
as a creative intellectual task which they maintain should 
be neither used as a basis for prescription or as an 
empirically testable set of principles and relationships. 
The purpose of these persons is to develop and criticize 
the conceptual schema in the hope that new ways of talking 
about curriculum, which may in the future be far more 
fruitful than present orientations, will be forthcoming. 
At the present time, they maintain that a much more 
playful, free floating, process is called for by the state 
of the art (1971, in Gress and Purple, 1978, p.45). 
Macdonald has made a connection between the 1vork of P·Jlanyi and 
Gramsci as it points to the double dialectic between personal knowledge 
and praxis. In many ways, reconceptualism operates within this dou!Jle 
dialectic. Macdonald states that: 
The importance I ,,.ish to attach to these vie1vs may he 
summarized quickly. First, the existence of a separate 
entity called human consciousness is apparent; and next, 
change in human social consciousness is necessary and a 
precondition of later political change. And, it is 
precisely in the realm of changing consciousness that I 
believe our expectations should reside (1977, p.S). 
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The double dialectic operates between the tacit dimension as described 
by Polanyi and the formation of new knowledge, and the structural 
conditions of everyday social reality as they contain the ideological 
content of human knowledge in all i.ts myriad forms. As the above 
mentioned t1vo quotations indicate, reconceptualists tend to focus on 
the emergence of consciousness and seek to diversify rather than 
homogenize perception and meaningful associations. Reconceptualism 
examines multiple ways of knowing in the world; Macdonald has 
attempted, and I believe that his attempt has significantly encouraged 
openness and curiosity, to expand our consideration of and 
participation in cultural transformation -- transformation that is both 
normatively guided (by the combined interests in emancipation and 
understanding) and receptive to as yet not understood possibilities ~or 
improving our quality of life. 
The task of curriculum theorizing is to engage in praxis. 
Macdonald points out why this orientation is so critical to curriculum 
theorizing when he states: 
The concept of praxis is a valuabl2 one, especially 
when used as Paulo Freire does to mean action with 
reflection, in distinction from 2ither reflection ivi.thout 
action (intellectualism) or action without reflection 
(activism). Thus, curriculum development is seen as pr:1xis 
or action with reflection (in Pinar, 1975, p.291). 
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\vhen Macdonald draws the distinction between contemplative and 
cnlculative thinkings, he does not suggest that contemplative thinking 
has no practical intent. His emphasis on emancipatory interests should 
dismiss such a charge. What he does suggest, I believe, is that 
contemplative thinking is one moment in the circular process of action 
and reflection, a moment that is sorely lacking within instrumentally 
oriented curriculu~ theories. It is a moment in which individuals 
examine preconceptions, horizons of understanding, attitudes and values 
for the purpose of making problematic their participation in a broader 
cultural context so that they come to "sense the potential ·.vithin 
themselves for change and growth, from powerlessness to ~ower, and from 
alienation t01~ard relationship and commitment" (1977, p.lO). It is 
this essential recognition of human potential that Macdonald has long 
advocated. This search for human potential is a "search for 11eaning 
and a sense of unity and well being" (1980, p.l2). As 1~as ~entioned 
earlier, Macdonald has championed the rights and responsibilities of 
individuals in their growth and change to "develop self-governance, 
autonomy, i=ind independence." At the same time, he tries to strike a 
balance between personal change and social change orientations, always 
maintaining that it is through changing consciousness that social 
change is to be most morally and ethically brought about. He discusses 
this connection between personal and social change in the following 
manner: 
I do not believe that there is any fundamental 
contradiction in the long run between those theorists who 
advocate a personal change position and those who advocate 
a social change orientation in terms of changing 
consciousness toward a liberating praxis. This assumes 
that the social change approach does not involve a highly 
structured set of "new" meanings, 11or the personal growth 
approach being restructured to a highly individualistic 
orientation 1Yithout meaning for communal living. Neither 
approach need be exaggerated to the point of exclusion of 
the other (1977, p.lO). 
This is much the same point that Pinar makes in his discussion of 
"The Abstract and Concrete in Curriculum Theorizing. 11 But ~acdonald 1.;as 
aware of the difficulty of :naintaini1.g this balance. He anticipated 
that this balance was to be achieved within a community (albeit small) 
of reflective individuals who "prize such attributes as participation, 
pluralism, openness, seeking, searching, testing, experimenting, 
challenging, critiquing, controversy, commitment to people, and 
critical thinking" (1981, p.2). He strongly valued a sense of 
commitment, a sense he saw only narrowly developed within "neutral" 
research and scholarship. For him, 
The act of theorizing is a act of faith, a religious 
act. It is the expression of belief, as William James 
(1917) clearly expounds in The Will to Believe, belief 
necessitates an act of the ITIOralwi.flbased on faith. 
Curriculum theorizing is a prayerful act. It is an 
expression of the humanistic vision of life (1980, p.l7). 
Similar ideas have been expressed by theorists such as Purpel and 
Huebner. While Purpel and Huebner draw lflore directly from the 
literature and thought of religious com:nunities of faith, 'lacclonald 
takes a somewhat different stance and drm.;s upon a different tradition, 
••. that of the mytho-poetic i•nagination, particularly 
related to the use of insight, visualiiation and 
imagination, which is essentially separate from science and 
praxis. Its practical method is surely similar to 
Polanyi's (1972) indwelling, and most probably what Steiner 
(1979) credits Heidegger's life work to be -- that is, a 
process of "radical astonishment." The rnytho-poe tic deals 
l~ith "why there is being rather than 11othing," at !~he awe, 
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wonder, and anxiety of this puzzle (1980, p.l2). 
This "puzzle," then, is made up of pieces ;vhich are cut by the 
categories, the theories and conceptual frameworks, th roug~ 1..,h ich we 
come to view the world. It is the task of curriculJm theorizing to 
examine the pieces of the puzzles we each carry with us in our 
consciousness .•. and to marvel at the pictures we create as the pieces 
are brought together, rearranged and fittecl into a patter:-t we have 
helped to create, but which are ontologically prior to our creation. 
James Macdonald loved these puzzles; but it appears that while he loved 
the shape of the pieces, he was dra1m to the visions they revealed as 
the pieces were brought together by creative intelligence. Since the 
pieces are cut by our categories and conceptual frameworks, it remains 
unclear whether we could assemble another's puzzle; and, if we were to 
assemble the. puzzle whether we would be able to see the same picture 
another would have seen if he or she assembled it. Macdonald points to 
this dilemma when he writes: 
It would appear then, that one central concern of 
theorists is identifying the fundamental unit of curriculum 
with which to build conceptual systems. V/hether this be 
rational decisions, action proceses, language pat terns, or 
any other potential unit has not been agreed upon by the 
theorizers (1971, in Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.SO). 
~facdonalrl suggested that "actions" might he considered the 
fundamental unit of curriculum theory. But how we describe these 
actions and their interrelatedness rnay best be approached through how 
we come to know. Macdonald included in the curricular task the need to 
describe the creation of ~nowledge. He also concerned hi~self with the 
task of relating ho·.v lmowledge is made meaningful. And finally, he 
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devoted his later years to exploring how another's meaningful 
experiences could be understood by another and why this transcendent 
possibility is so important. We will turn first to Macdonald's 
description of knowledge and human interests and the iillportance of this 
categorization for curriculum theorizing. 
3. KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 
In his important article entitled "Potential Relationships of 
lfuman Interests, Language, and Orientations to Curriculum 
T~inking" (1973), Macdonald outlines in a remarkably concise and 
synoptic manner problems that plague curriculum theorizing A.nd some 
potential avenues through which these problems might be addressed. 
~acdonald begins his discussion by stating: 
The first problem I would like to call (after the work 
of Jurgen Habermas) a problem of clearly identifying the 
human interest base from which we construct curricular 
models and generate prescriptions. The second problem 
(related to the lack of clarity in the first) is a 
confusion of ter;ninology which arises from a naive use of 
what we call mixed metaphors in curricalum talk. There is 
an assumption here that consistency in the use of a model 
is necessary, and that this consistency involved 1) 
identifying clearly the interests we wish to serve and 
promote; 2) selecting and using concepts and terms which 
are consistent with that interest; and 3) basing 
prescriptions upon those interests and expressing them in 
appropriate terminology (1973, p.l). 
Habermas (1971) identifies three human interest bases from which 
kno~tledge forms derive: technical cognitive interests, practical 
cognitive interests, and critical cognitive interests. t·lacdonald 
points out that technical interests are most often associated with an 
interest in control and prediction, pr::~ctical inter<~sts 'lim at 
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consensus, and critical interests aim at emancipation. Hacdonald 
believed, from the work of Habermas, that kno1vledge is constructed in 
the service of these interests and that each interest leads to 
char~cteristicly different forms of knowledge and practice 
implications. . Technical interests lead to linear-expert models of 
action; practical interests lead to circular-consensus models of 
action; and critical interests lead to dialogic models of action. 
Since Macdonald's orientation to curriculum theorizing focus2d on 
actions as units of analysis, his making the connection between human 
interest bases and action implications was extremely important. Thus, 
~1acdonald 's analysis of curriculum practice and the descriptions of 
such practice does not merely examine the language employed; he was 
quite cognizant of the discrepancy between curricular language and the 
design and implementation of these designs. It was clear to him that 
just because a curriculum "rhetoric" seemed to reflect a particular 
human interest there was no certainty that such an interest would be 
evident in practice. ~is focus, then, was on the interest reflected in 
prescriptions and practices: 
One problem is the existence of a liberation rhetoric 
with a fundamental control interest. This is a common 
occurence when curriculum persons are indoctrinated "Lnto a 
very person oriented and/ or p rogress"L ve ideology but 
fundamentally accept the technological ethos of our 
culture. Confusion then arises where prescriptions do not 
seem to follow from the rhetoric given (1973, p.6). 
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Given ~1acdonald' s cri tici-?m of technical rationality and its dominant 
interest in predication and control, and given his expressed view that 
education should be guided by an emancipatory interest, it should come 
as no surprise that he very carefully scrutinized those curricular 
designs and theories that employed emancipatory rhetoric for imbedded 
interests in control. One telling characteristic 6f truly emancipatory 
curriculum theorizing and practice rested in the "levels of concerns" 
addressed by such activity. He indicates the shift in concern he 
experienced as he moved from technical to a humanistic-liberating 
stance: 
In rejecting the implicit value position of the 
behavioral objectives approach (technical control) and 
explicating instead a humanistic-liberating stance, we 
found we had to deal with a different level of concerns. 
In addition to asking "\.Jhat educational purposes should the 
school seek to attain?" we asked: "Hhat are the value 
commitments, and what is our view of the nature of man?" 
(1973, p.3). 
These are indeed quite different questions than one might ask if 
he or she were primarily interested in equating what is learned to what 
various tests reveal. In like manner, a preoccupation 1vith m·:Jre 
precise predictive measures of student "outcomes" in no IV3.Y directly 
addresses 1vhether such "outcomes" are morally or ethically correct. 
Moral, ethical and aesthetic concerns, as Huebner has pointed out, call 
·£or a different attentiveness to human being. Macdonald sumna rizes 
this attentiveness when he alludes to the fact that sometimes 1ve are 
abl•.:! to come to the conclusion that "what works is not :-J.lways good." 
Thus, a different "rationality" and human interest is pn~sent \o/hen 
technical criteria are made problematic. 
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Hacdonald has pointed out in h.is paper entitled "~·1yths about 
Schooling" (n.d.a) that a pervasive myth is the one t!1at states that 
"the most efficient way is necessarily the best 1vay." That he was able 
to counter the myth of efficiency by examining the human i:J.terest base 
from which such a preoccupation emerges is a great contribution to 
curriculum thought. So it may be said that ~1acdonalrl adopted the 
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conceptual frame1vorks Huebner applied to the analysis of curricular 
language, and allied to these frameworks an additional concern for 
leading human interests which he found developed in the 1vork of 
Habermas. Thus, he was able to develop a platform from ·.vhich to 
interpret curriculum discourse which transcended language analysis and 
focused instead first on epistemological and later ontological issues. 
As mentioned earlier, Macdonald found Polanyi's discussion of 
"personal knO\vledge" to be an illuminating concept. From it he derived 
an understanding of the importance of the "tacit dimension" and ho1v 1ve 
move from this preconceptual, preunderstood experiential base to 
knowled3c all knowledge being, according to Polanyi, personal 
kn01vledge, that is requiring a knower. Polanyi 's co•1cept fit rather 
ilicely lvith Macdonald's understanriing of leading human interests, value 
theory, and phenomenology. He explicates this set of relationships 
1vhen he states: 
Values I would submit, as with kn01vledge, are 
personal, developed from a dual dialectical process that 
represents development in a hierarchical structure that 
surpasses one's biology, culture, or society. 
Psychological theory, if there must be such an adjunct to 
educational ideology, must also be seen as a focus upon the 
question of human being. That is, narro~t e:apirical or 
developmental views lead us away from our ontological 
ground of being rather than causing us to cooe to grips 
with human nature. They must also be grounded in something 
beyond their own conceptions. Thus, psychological theory 
must be grounded in existence and utilize the methods of 
phenomenology if it hopes to cope with being (1974, in 
Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.106-107). 
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It is precisely here that Macdonald makes a "leap of faith" (and a 
concommitant conceptual leap) to consider not only explicit curricular 
intentions and designs, but the implicit and tacit dimensions as well. 
Just as all kno~ledge emerges from a tacit rlimension and is experienced 
personally, all curriculum stances emerge from a "tacit platform" and 
are framed in terms of language (which is public and exists in meaning 
communi ties), human interests (which are normatively oriented) and are 
transformable through praxis ("the collective practice of creating an 
environment"). By suggesting that we attend to the tacit dimension, 
Macdonald grounds emancipatory possibility not upon the "extant" 
conceived in terms of observable behavior, but on our ontological 
condition that of our being-in-the-world and hov! this being is not 
yet completed: "hlithout such a platform, we are limited to and 
overvalue 1vhat seems to have a sense of immediacy to us" (1981, p.16). 
He goes on to say that "It is in the realm of tacit knowledge that one 
provides for harmony and balance for decisions" (In Macdonald and 
Clark, 1973, p.2). It is from this recognition of the tacit dimension 
that the creative and moral agency of the person is honored. As 
Macdonald has indicated, "Most individualization is ic1 the interest of 
control" (1973, p.5). If curriculum theorists are to serve the 
interests of emancipation and not control, then quite a different ;.lim 
than individualism (and its attendent alienating sepamtion) is to be 
cultivated: 
Liberation interest oriented prografT!s talk more about 
ranges of alternative experiences from which emerging 
purposes which reflect and develop needs and interests are 
continually emerging. Student choice is central to these 
proposals. The organization of time, space, and resources 
is considered fluid and flexible with considerable emphasis 
upon self direction and self evaluation. The adults ::1re 
talked about as guides, helpers and resource persons. 
Human relationships are seen as A with B rather than the 
more authority oriented A/B relationships in the other two 
[technical and practical]. This kind of prGgram is often 
referred to as personalized (in comparison to group or 
individualized). The basic distinction between 
personalized and individualized is the recognition of the 
student as a moral agent (i.e., chooser of goals and means 
to achieve them) (this author's emphasis, 1973, p.S). 
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In his now classic article "A Transcendental Developmental 
Ideology of Ecl~\.:ation," (1974, in Gress and Purpel, 1978) ~·1acdonald 
proposes two ideological orientations beyond the romantic, 
developmental and cultural transmission ideologies identified by 
Kohlberg and 11ayer (1972). Hacdonald states that "It is clear to r:Je 
that there are at least two other potential ideologies that I am 
Crllling radical and transcendental developmental" (p.95). The 
importance of these t1vo additional ideologies for educational thought 
and what they have to say about conceptions of human interests and 
knowledge may be seen if we examine 1vhat is left out if we confine 
ourselves to the three. Briefly, romantic ideology reflects a concen1 
for human nature and the unfolding maturation of the individual; its 
emphasis can be ei:her phenomeno~ogical or existential for emphasis is 
placed upon the inner experience of the individual. Er.1hedded •.vit'1in 
this ideolagy is the tacit assumption (::1 la ~oussenu) that persons, 
when free, are essentially good "unless society makes ther!l othenlisP.." 
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The cultural transmission orientation employs a behavioral 
psychology approach and maintains that the individual is shaped largely 
by environmental factors. Knowledge is primarily viewed 
positivistically. At best, values are ethically neutral or reflect 
social relativism. 
A developmental ideology reflects a dialectical understanding of 
inner and outer experience. The relationship between inner experience 
and outer phenomena becomes the source of kn01vledge. Ethical values 
are derived from philosophic principles and are rationally dev·=loped. 
Values are assumed to be universal, and individual and cultural values 
are situated within this universal framework as they are in Kohlberg's 
hierarchical framework of moral development. 
The radical ideology is concisely indicated when Nacdonald 
contrasts it against the developmental model: 
The developmental and radical models look identical 
only on the surface, for the radical model is weighted on 
the side of social realities. The developmental model is 
\veighted on the side of inner cognitive structures. The 
progressive position assumed that democracy was the ideal 
social reality and continued its analysis of the 
interaction process with that assumption in mind. The 
radical model, on the other hand, is essentially based upon 
the analysis of why democratic ideas are not realized, thus 
emphasizing environmental structures (p.96). 
A radical ideology, then, emphasizes the social construction of 
reality and makes problematic the status quo ( •,.,rhich is assumed to be 
democratic and progressively motivated in the developmental model): 
The radical critique of this paradigm has come not 
because the values inherent in the liberal para:iiglfl ':lre not 
necessarily progressive and potentially liberating. On the 
contrary the critique arises because the separation of 
private and public interest functionally fosters the 
development of private interests which make public policy; 
and the facilitation of private elites who do so (p.3). 
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The radical ideology serves to highlight the socially constructed 
constraints against personal freedom and possibility. 
critical perspective contributes greatly to our understanding of 
environraental constrai11ts (and perhaps somewhat to our understanding of 
the necessity for collective praxis), it remains, according to 
Hacdonald (and as was discussed in the section pertaining to the 1vork 
of Giroux), prone to be "embedded in the com:non dominant technological, 
materia listie culture" (1981, p. 8). Hhile radical ideology and its 
emphasis on critical rationality has helped us become m.;are "that 
constituative rules [must] be made cognitively accessible to all 
through analysis and discussion" (1977, p.l3), it has inadequately 
developed an analysis of its 01m tacit cultural dimension and the 
implications fer establishing a conceptual framework for analyzing the 
"preference rules" that are supposed to supercede constraining 
constituative rules. It is precisely Macdonald's attentiveness to 
cultural phenomena that prompts his critique of radical ideology: 
Culture, then, in its anthropological sense is the 
basis of all educational endeavors. It is the tradition 
and creative inheritance of society that is conserved, 
transmitted and developed through the agency of schooling 
(1980 ' p • 21 ) • 
Macdonald quite pointedly indicates that radical ideology as a 
curricular perspective need be transcended if we are to address 
multiple cultural realities in the formation of hurnan interests and 
!mmvledge: 
The radical-political perspective as a base for 
curriculum thinking does not adequately allow for the tacit 
di~ension of culture: it is a hierarchical historical view 
that has outlived its usefulness both in ter~s of the 
emerging structure of the environment and of the psyches of 
people today (1974, In Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.99). 
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Macdonald proposes a transcendental developmental perspective 
because all four of the ideological orientations listed above are 
"unclear in their ontological and phenomenological grounding" (1974, in 
Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.103). Macdonald's combined emphasis on 
personalizing educational activity with the goal of "centering" the 
person wit~in the world, and ~is suggestion that ethical and aesthetic 
interests in knowledge be called to our attention, prompts quite a 
different view of ontology and experience. Through a transcendental 
developmental perspective, Madconald acknowledges that understanding 
proceeds from a dual dialectic: one being the encounter one has with 
the world, the other being a reflective transaction that occurs within 
the consciousness of the individual. Thus, Hacdonald suggests that 
this "inward journey" is an indispensi)le part of the dialectical 
process of knowledge formation and understanding. It is through this 
centering process of the individual in the world, and in hi~ or 
herself, that the utilitarianism and instrumentalism of these other 
ideologies ~ay be transcended. By referring the curriculum person to 
ethically and aesthetically grounded sources of knowledge, Macdonald 
demonstrates his commitment to education as a liberative and religious 
act. The picture he portrays is edged with infinit;; openness, while 
t~e central figure, the person, is tn sharp relief. From his 
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perspective which places personal knowledge as the point around whicll. 
reflection and and action circle, Macdonald 1 ikewise situates human 
consciousness in the realm of tacit knowledge: 
Thus, the realm called tacit kno .. dedge could be the 
avenue through which "God 11 is known and enters human 
beings; or it could be what is called the source of our 
11 collective consciousness; 11 or it could be the source of 
our creative ideas and insights; and where our early 
personality and temperment patterns reside. It could, of 
course be all of these things and much more (In t1acdonald 
and Clark, 1973, p.2). 
Macdonald does not presume to name the source of our ultimate 
values; but what he does do eloquently, is indicate how our 
internalized and engaged orientations, perspectives and values open or 
close us to transcendent possibilities. By recognizing and making more 
understandable the connections between human interests, kno1vledge, 
perspectives and experience, Macdonald conserves traditions of inquiry 
which have contributed to human (in its 1videst sense) achievement. In 
his later theorizing, Nacdonald revisioned this process of centering 
and transcendental possibility by integrating technical, critical and 
ernancipatory interests ·.vithin a broader and more incisive process of 
inquiry -- ::1 search not for human knm;ledge, per se, but a senrch for 
understanding. Each of the human interest bases are important because: 
These methods provide us 1vith technical and 
utilitarian control through technique, with emancipatury 
praxis through critical reflection, and with aesthetic, 
monl and metaphysical meaning through poetics. Hhat has 
been missing, and what has caused antagonism in curriculum 
theory, is a failure to realize that all three 
methodologies participate in the larger hermeneutic circle 
(1980, p.l8). 
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The importance of hermeneutic philosophy for curriculum theorizing 
is currently evident in contemporary writing. But it was Nacdonald who 
brought this orientation prominently into the field, and sorne mention 
of his adopting this stance is noteworthy. It is to thi3 discussion I 
now turn. 
4. CURRICULill1 THEORIZING AS AN HERt·1E~!EUTIC ACTIVITY 
Given that a discussion of hermeneutics has already been pr~sented 
in Chapter II, this section 1vill explore specific implications f·:Jr an 
hermeneutic orientation to curriculum theorizing that Macdonald has 
identified. It is my intention to avoid unnecessary reiteration of 
hermeneutic principles or methodological issues and concentrate on 1vhy 
l1acdonald came to advocate an her:neneutic orientation for curriculum 
theorizing. 
James B. Macdonald was not one to gloss over differences or duck a 
conflict when one 1vas worth confronting, but he 1vas also (as the last 
quotation in the previous section indicates) committed to confronting 
divisiveness and antagonism 1vhen they were spa1vned by lack of 
understanding and/or sectarian rivalry. I believe that he played, in 
the best sense of the term, the role of "elder statesman" within the 
curriculum ,novement in the late seventies and early eighties. His 
later exploration of hermeneutic philosophy 1vas one such 'ittempt to 
come to an orientation and methodology which wouln directly address the 
"sihling rivalries" and .niscommunication that he saw occurring in the 
field. It is also fair to say that Macdonald saw that an hermeneutic 
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orientation might also be an approprilite stance to take beyond 
disciplinary matters. 
Given his long expressed interest in the quality of our everyday 
lives, Hac donald directed his energies toward mapping existing and 
advocating for the formation of new meanings one could assign to social 
realities. He came to recognize that human beings do indeed function 
within everyday affairs 1vith some sense of organizing principl:=s. 
Hermeneutics enabled him to dialogue with others and himself about 1vhat 
t~ese principles are, ho1v they come to be, <~.nd how our very existence 
in the world is affected by our understanding of social reality: 
The consciousness of everyday life is more tacit or 
pre-theoretical. It is as Berger says, "the web of 
meanings that allow the individual to navigate his way 
through the ordinary events and encounters of his life with 
others." In toto, they malce up his social life-world (In 
Macdonald and Zaret, 1975, p.79). 
Hacdonald believed that even our everyday encounters with the 
1vorld are characterized by the human capacity and proclivity to make 
sense of these encounters: 
The fundamental human quest is the search for :neaning 
and the basic human capacity for this search is experienced 
in the hermeneutic process, the process of interpretation 
of the text (lvhether artifact, natural world or human 
action). This is the search (or research) for greater 
understanding that motivates and satisfies us (1980, p.7). 
Macdonald 1•as able to expl::>re hmv various human interests and 
epistemologies· developed and shaped human interactions in the world. 
But from this exploration he came to also recognize that instrumental, 
practical and emancipatory ideologies shared a basic human activity 
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that 1vas not really identified nor described within these ideologies. 
Moreover, curriculum theorizing, he suggests 1vas in a sense a closed 
system if any or even all of these human interests were viewed as the 
basis for human inquiry. What linked these interests was a tacit 
orientation toward increasing human understanding in and of tha world. 
Each methodology, even the most positivistic or critical, sought ways 
of describing, explaining and understanding phenomena. \-lith this 
realization in mind, Macdonald reconceptualized the role of curriculum 
theorizing to more closely reflect his interest in increasing 
understanding and transcending the limits i~plicit in previously 
articulated orientations: 
Curriculum theory, it is sucigested here is a form of 
hermeneutic theory. Thus curriculum theory is an ever 
rene1ving attempt to interpret curricular reality and to 
develop greater understanding. Curricular practice results 
from hermeneutic process which both lies within the three 
methods (epistemologies) and transcends t~em (1980, ~.16). 
~1acdonald goes on to say that: 
Essentially, I shall propose that the problema tics of 
theory-practice must be viewed in a larger framework. In a 
process which Paul Ricoeur and Hans Gadamer call the 
hermeneutic circle. Thus theory and practice are not only 
integrated through action and reflection, but are a part of 
a larger interpretive endeavor which includes intention and 
direction toward the recovery of ~eaning and development of 
understanding (1980, p.8) 
For ~·1acdonald, this "larger interpretive endeavor" is nothing less 
than the ontological platform from which all human beings attempt to 
ma!ce sense of the world. Whether we adopt a particular ideol·::>gy, 
methodology, or culture, the essential ground of our being is that 1ve 
attempt to organize our experience and define reality even if thLs 
.. , 
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attempt is preconscious or pretheoreti~al. Macdonald sought to bring 
to the attention of curriculum theorists the thesis that understanding 
is our central concern because he believed that neither the ideologies 
of control nor emancipation had accurately realized the importance of 
this issue: 
I have introduced this thesis because we, in 
curriculum, have experienced a heavy input of control 
and/or emancipation oriented ideas in the past thirty 
years. The search for understanding, the hermeneutic quest 
appears to have been relegated to a third neutral, 
non-action category of cultural consensus. This, I suggest 
is a grave error on our part, for I believe the search for 
understanding is the basis in ¥hich scientific-technical 
and critical theory effects are grounded (this author's 
emphasis, 1980, p.l). 
Hermeneutic philosophy directly addresses the presence of 
different cultural life expressions, calls for examining their symbolic 
meanings, and suggests that, through circular and dialogic interaction, 
the "parts" which are represented by each culturally mediated 
experience may be made more understandable if we examine them in light 
of a tacitly understood whole. Thus, individuated experience and 
personal knowledge are essential and presumed to exist, but their 
"grammatical structure" can only be revealed through interpretation and 
the revisioning of a newly informed sense of the whole. Each system of 
meanings, each communication cormnunity, is seen as having something 
vital to say about how its experience (both in an individual and 
collective sense) describes, and helps bring into possibility emerging 
consciousness. Macdonald cornments on both h01v Huebner pointed out: 
i•nportant perspectives regarding language analysis and human interests, 
::1nd yet had missed the "ground of talking:" 
As Huebner pointed out, all ·,.;ays of talking dre 
legitimate in some way, or for sor.1e purpose, or at sor.Je 
time, \Vhat wasn't explicated in ftis 1.:ork 1vas the ground of 
talking, which it is pro posed here (in ten1s of methods) is 
the frame or horizon of the hermeneutic circle of 
understanding (1980, p.l9). 
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Given the ontological rather than methodological focus on 
hermeneutics that Macdonald derived from the thought of Gadamer, it is 
clear that understanding is not si,nply the rasult of a technical, 
linear process or a process of problem solving. Rather, just as 
kn01vledge is seen as being formed by diverse and non-rational ways of 
relating to the 1vorld (e.g., aesthetic, spiritual, mystical, and 
transcendental), understanding emerges from the •..,rhole of human 
experience. To presume that any one methodology or ideology has "a 
corner on the market" of understanding is hubris. Hhat is needed ( and 
it is an hermeneutic stance that provides some measure of this), is a 
willingness to recognize the limited nature of what we know as well as 
the very real difficulty of being able to translate what we 1cnow in 
terms that invite meaningful exchange with those we encounter. This I 
believe is the central concept that Gramsci proposes in his suggestion 
that we become "organic intellectuals" -- that is, persons who are 
self-reflectively aware, critically aw·are, and grounded in the lived 
realities of the world we share i;1timately with others, Hermeneutic 
interpretation is never closed, nor complete, for our horizons of 
understanding are ever-changing. Hhat we were "certain" of a moment 
ago may change as new experience prompts us to reconceptualize this 
knowledge. The curricular implications Macdonald states as follows: 
Curriculum theorizing is then creating, developing, 
and using metaphors to increase our ability to describe, 
explain, and understand. The process that takes place is a 
process of interpretation. He project our metaphor, 
interpret experience in light of it, and use them until 
they no longer help us to interpret or disclose reality 
(1980, p.l6) 
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Hermeneutics calls for, as Huebner has intimaterl in his view of 
curriculum theorizing as a religious and ethical activity, a 
relationship between persons based upon a sense of fraternity and 
sorority rather than equality. He are each partners in this enrleavor, 
contributing our own attributes and "faults" to the dialogue. It 
should be obvious that such a stance is anti-elitist and communal. 
~1acdonald 's role in articulating this position is of great importance 
with regard to the development of the field. From his understanrling of 
hermeneutic philosophy and its important ontological implications, 
Macdonald's earlier thinking on the subject of transcendence may now be 
viewed as a tacit dimension from which new metaphors and interpretive 
frameworks emerged as he sought to examine hermeneutically why such an 
orientation was so meaningful to him. 
5. CIJRRICTJLUN AND TRANSCF.NDENCE 
As our earlier discussion of the curriculum theory of James 
~acdonald has indicated, ~acdonald came to a formulation of a 
transcendental developmental perspective of educational activity 
because it was from this perspective he felt that questions re~'Jrrling 
the "nature of man, the nature of kno1vledge, and the nature of v3lues" 
cou lrl be best rliscussed. ~lac donald refer reel to perenni>.1l themes such 
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as consciousness vs. materialism and idealism vs. realism within the 
literature of curriculum thought and demonstrated how any curricular 
orientation which focused on a specific theme to the exclusion of the 
others resulted in an artificially narrow conception of human 
existence. Macdonald has continually pointed out the intricate 
dialectic that links these themes to a more wholistic portrayal of 
human experience. Just as positivist epistemology failed to account 
for the tacit dimension of personal knowledge; technical and scientific 
rationalities failed to account for political, ethical and aesthetic 
dimensions of human knowledge; so do orientations which do not consider 
all of the four above mentioned themes fail to reco~nize the 
ontological ground which integrates these themes into an account of 
human possibility: 
The epistemological components of a transcendental 
ideology are grounded in the concept of personal 
knowledge. Thus, knowledge is not simply things anrl 
relationships that are real in the outer world and waiting 
to be discovered, but it is a process of personalizing the 
outer world through the inner potential of the human being 
as it interacts with outer reality (1974, in Gress and 
Purpel, 1978, p.l09). 
'lacrlonald advocated, then, 3 rather unique and eclectic a[lproach 
to theorizing -- an approach that drew upon the· playful thought of 
James Harch (n.d.), the concept of "methodological anarchisJTJ 11 of 
Fey,~rahend (1978) (whose central premise t~as that "anything r,oes" tvhen 
Lnfluiry and theorizing is attempted), an aest:1etic sensi.bil ity not 
unlike that of Valery as adopted by l!uehner, anrl a religious 
orientation to education derived from ~villiam James, Peter nerger and 
John Dewey. ~1acrlona ld 's linking of materia 1. ism and consci<Jusness 1vas 
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not only expressed in terms of a rlialectic such as that suggested in 
:1arxist analysis, but adopted a stance he located in the thought of 
Paulo Soleri: that one could view, through one's engagement in 
trsnsformative action in the \{Orlrl, "matter becoming spirit. 11 In like 
manner, ~!acdonald linked realist and idealist orientations by 
recognizing the interconnectedness of critical rationality to the 
practical intent of emancipatory praxis. This double linking, done 
without contrivance or violence, represents, I believe, the tremendous 
creative power and intellectual genius Macdonald devoted to curriculum 
theorizing. By highlighting the transcendent possibility of human 
existence, Macdonald helped to broaden both the scope and "measure" of 
human activity. Thus, curriculum theorists not only must attend to the 
technical, scientific, and political dimensions of their practice, hut 
they must come to recognize their participation in a transcendent 
dimension as well: 
In general, l{e would demand the satisfaction of one 
global criterion for every educational experience, 
activity, or interpresonal relationship: Does it promote, 
value, and support authentic personal responses by both 
teacher and student to the reality of the ongoing 
experience? (In Macdonald, Wolfson and Zaret, 1973, p.lS). 
This "ongoing experience" ~1acclonald conceived of in ontological 
terms; he saw that we are participants in creation a~ we are ourselves 
createcl within a "being" that is beyoncl our control and heyonrl our 
explanation. By broadening our sense of existence to a global or 
cosmic consideration, he neither reduces us to mere "bits" within the 
universe nor inflates us to some Ptolemaic cent2r of the universe. \•le 
c1rr~ p<cHt of the universe and this fact links us to the vastness of an 
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integrative whole which is often ignored or simply tacitly understood. 
If we <;ire to escape dehumanization, fragmentation and alienation, we 
must attend to the transcendent: 
a global view of the interrelationships of human 
structures and activities must he a central aspect of any 
curriculum which purports to have a transcendent 
developmental view (in Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.ll6). 
Huch of Macdonald's work reflects the importance of how this 
"global vie\/1 -- not unlike, and perhaps allied to the Jungian supreme 
value of "integration" -- serves to center human beings within the 
infinite. By embracing this global view as a "religious attitude," 
'1acdonald restores infinite value to human being and makes problematic 
each attempt to divide human activity along any prescriptive, 
interventionist orientation: 
Thus, the conscious attitude of integration is one of 
acceptance, of ceasing to do violence to one's own nature 
by repressing or overdeveloping any part of it. This Jung 
called a "religious" attitude, although not necessarily 
related to any recognizable creed (1974, in r,ress and 
Purpel, 1978, p.l07). 
\~ith Davirl Purpel, Macdonald suggests that such an "acceptance" 
does not imply the internalization of oppressive social conditions or 
human relationships, nor the denial of individual subjectivity: 
\~e propose that curriculum planning must as process 
emborly the transcendent, both in its cultural and spiritual 
meanings. The process must facilitate transcendence of the 
status quo through cultural consciousness and active 
subjectivity (art, play, etc.); and nust embody the 
recognition of the essential spiritual qualities of human 
existence (1981, p.lS). 
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Like Hueb~er, :--tacdonald and Purpel focus on the underlying existential 
structure of care as it is reflected in metaphors derived from 
religious cultural so11rces. Given the link between religious attitudes 
and the integration of human experience within unitary cosmological and 
ontological orders, the interpretation of such metaphors "can help to 
develop a moclel that goes beyond ·technology, control, and alienation" 
(1981, p .19). Macdonald and Pur pel go on to say that "\~e choose to 
view the world as being part of a larger transcendent reality, and our 
task as humans to be that of being in harmony with it" (1981, p.l9). 
An example of this "harmony" may be discerned in an observation 
~1acdona1d made regarding a difference between "intellect" as 
represented in Islamic thought and "reason" as it is represented in 
\.Jestern thought. Intellect, ~facdonald relates, "knows immediately and 
totally, and reason whose Latin root (ratio) reveals its function by 
analysis and division" (1980, p.2). Cikewise, wit~in a transcendental 
developmental ideology of curriculum theory (especially as hermeneutic 
philosophy informs interpretation), a sense of the 111vhole" neecl unify 
and guide the perception of the parts. Thus, as ~acdonald has alluded 
to the work of William Irwin Thompson, the "good is seen shining in the 
immediacy of the act itself" and our analysis, interpretation, 
reconceptualization, etc., need follow the apprehension of this good. 
That we tend to deny the immediate good for some more rationalized and 
logical calculus, causes us to discount and devalue aesthetic, ethical, 
intuitive, and religious avenues to knowing. 
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The transcendental developmental orientation to curriculum theorizing 
is a reconceptualization of the context within lvhich human agency and 
relationships to others and the \vorld are viewed. It is certainly a 
more metaphysical and cosmological perspective. How prevailing 
concepts employed by curriculum theorists fail to take account of this 
revisioned context may be seen in two specific foci -- individual 
behavior and learning theory. Pointing to the former and its 
implications for ~urriculum planning, ~acdonald and Purpel state: 
individual behavior becomes the focus of the 
planning process lvhich, of course, is a clear example of 
the philosophical liberal paradigm which sees each 
individual's acts as separate and autonomous from the world 
around them and more or less meritorious in terms of the 
general success criteria of school and society. Context is 
not seen to be relational, but merely facilitative of 
purpose (1981, p.7). 
Of the latter, Macdonald points to a similar decontextualization, this 
time seen in the blurred ontological distinction between learning and 
living: 
We have been seduced by learning theory in our 
teaching. We have apparently forgotten that a learning 
theory is only one small part of any living theory. The 
time spent between the goal and the consequence is just as 
much lived as the result is (n.d.a, p.4). 
I believe that Macdonald's distinctions drawn in both of the above 
quotations are penetrating criticisms of educational theory and 
practice and speak to the very heart of a reconceptualized view of 
curriculum which might reduce alienation and promote integration ancl 
care. By reconceptualizing the centering of the person within an 
infinitely integrated whole (cosmos), ·,;e may he less prone to separate 
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ourselves from the other, ourselves from ~ur selves and our being from 
extant patterns of "facilitation" and support. I believe that it is 
fair to suggest that such a reconceptualization will make us less prone 
to dichotomize school life from our "other" life; we might be less 
likely to inadvertently perpetuate a "banking" concept of education 
which t·facdonald describes using a somewhat different ·term 
"consumption:" 
Con~~mption then becomes in schools the substitute for 
production in real life .... This constant consumption has 
its corollary generalization in the consciousness of the 
modern person. The act of consumption becomes a good in 
and of itself, a criterion of worth and "living." \-/hat is 
lost is the consciousness of everyday life and its active, 
creative, and productive vitality (In Macdonald and 7.:aret, 
1975, p.83). 
By focusing upon disclosing and integrating ourselves within 
"meaningful wholeness" rather than fragmentary criteria such as what we 
own, how we are certified, or how self -assured 1ve are, we may come to 
new principles or criteria for assessing human potential. Instead of 
being alienated from our self and from others, we might find our inner 
experience and engagement in the world reciprocal and confirming. As 
'1acdonald has suggested, "Self- regulation strives toward unity, toward 
the integration of inner and outer realities in a meaningful ~~holeness" 
(1974, in Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.l08). 
We need not look far to find, as Peter Berger (1969) has 
suggested, "signals of transcendence" in our everyday experience in the 
\vorld. Berger identifies five such "signals of transcendence" that 
point to human attempts at transcending present limitations: order, 
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play, hope, damnation and humor. Each of these phenomenon intimate 
1vays we attempt to relate to the world in creative and affirmative 
ways. That flashes of humor amidst grim circumstances point to human 
resiliance and "good nature," that consolation offered, in the hope for 
a better tomorrow, to those who may have suffered loss and grief, both 
indicate a quality of human intelligence and wisdom that transcends our 
merely responsive or reactive abilities -- we can project a preferred 
reality and sustain this preference even under seemingly overwhelming 
adversity. This creative capacity, and the capacity to respond to 
others in caring and supportive ways (even at "our own expense"), is 
also part of human nature. Macdonald remained ever optimistic, despite 
his awareness of the terrifying possibilities human ignorance hes 
generated in the world. He suggested that 
..• humanity will eventually transcend technology by 
turning inward, the only viable alternative that allows a 
human being to continue to experience oneself in the world 
as a creative and vital element. Out of this will come the 
rediscovery of human potential (1974, in Gress and Purpel, 
1978, p.10l). 
Out of this cycle of exploring, integrating and transcending, 
human beings will prevail ..• or so 1vas the hope expressed by James 
~acdonald. While I fully share his hope, I have come to 3 different 
path through which I believe human potential may be realized. This 
"turning inward" certainly sets one scenario for a revisioning of human 
potential, but I believe that Macdonald has indicated others that, 
perhaps, should be highlighted. It is to this task I now turn. 
6. CONCLUDING REI1ARKS: TRANSCENDING THE PERSONAL 
t1y commitment is to the individual and 
and to his development as a member of 
society .•• to becoming the finest human 
beings we can by having a variety of 
lvorthwhi le experiences. 
James B. Macdonald 
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Against the tyranny of mass culture and hegemony, Macdonald has 
valiantly sought to bring to the attention of curriculum theorists the 
importance of personal experience and the emergence of consciousness. 
Individual experience and perception become the locus of change: social 
change can only be achieved if personal change preceeds it. "Actions" 
as the unit of curriculum analysis are formed from personal knowledge 
and self-reflective, dialectical engagement in the world. By pointing 
out the importance of personal authenticity and integrity in praxis, 
Macdonald, as 1ve have mentioned earlier, avoids both activism and 
intellectualism. Praxis that promotes diversity, liberation and 
understanding becomes an educational process. Macdonald has recognized 
the continuous nature of human experience, and this continuity calls 
for an attentiveness to not only objectives and outcomes but to 
processes which more sensitively regard the quality of lived 
experience: 
It is in fact during the ongoing flow of activity 
which carries us from objective to outcome that the 
aesthetic, moral, and reflective thinking processes operate 
most forcefully. We are, in effect, teaching students what 
is noble and beautiful in human life, what is right and 
good in interpersonal relations, and what are appropriate 
processes and standards of thinking continuously. These 
qualities may perhaps dec-ide the fate of the future in n 
way that the consequential information we purvey could 
never hope to do. It is suggested that some attention he 
paid to them (n.d.a, p.4). 
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Hacdonald paid attention to why aesthetic, moral and reflective 
thinking enrich personal experience, how these orientations speak more 
directly to personally meaningful experience. He preferred not to 
focus on demographic, sociometric, or psychological descriptions, hut 
on how these factors are experienced by those whom these factors 
supposedly describe, and how these descriptions are interpreted by 
those who use them to research human being. Thus, ~acdonald sought to 
understand the nature of schools in our society by their impact upon 
the persons who work and "live" within them: 
If we are to understand the meaning of the schools we 
must search for the social meaning of the human activity 
that takes place there; and if we wish to examine the 
meaning implications of schooling we must look at the 
personal activity of people in the schools (In Macdonald 
and Zaret, 1975, p.85). 
Given ~1acdonald' s remarkable intellectual curiosity and breadth, 
it is somewhat surprising that he seems to have fallen victim to, as 
Huebner had pointed out many educators had done, seeing the schools as 
some privileged place 1vhere education and social transfortTJation could 
expect to occur: "The schools are perhaps the only effective social 
force for the safeguarding of the potential growth of full human 
beings" (n.d.a, p.24). That he slightly qualifies his statement wit!, ::! 
"perhaps," may indicate his uneasiness with this orientation. Liln~ 
Huebner, I would choose to make this uneasiness more prominent in my 
conception of curriculum practice. Macdonald was ever the school-based 
theorist. This is not surprising given the prevailing constituencies 
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served by most schools of education, however, T believe that this 
"fact" may point out a social and political reality which must 
continually be questioned. While I will discuss this issue in the last 
chapter of this dissertation, let me just comillent here that schools of 
education have, by and large, missed an opportunity to broaden their 
social and political support by ignoring or not attending to other 
units of analysis and practice beyond schools and school people. 
Education is taking place in far more settings than schools. That 
education too often is viewed in terms of formal instruction and 
individual learning is most unfortunate. 
A related narrowing of scope, I believe occurs in Macdonald's 
focus on "consciousness" as the "moment" in which educators may 
"intervene." Drawing upon a dialectic Habermas describes composed of 
two moments, work and communication, Macdonald states that "it is at 
the "moment" of consciousness (sic) in this dialectic lvhereby we may 
expect to have any meaningful input in the change process" (1977, 
p.S). Two issues can be raised here: first, I believe that it is a 
mistake to assume that work and communication are really distinct 
moments in a dialectic. \~ork may indeed be communication and 
communication may indeed be work. It is unclear to me whether 
consciousness can be seen residing more in one moment or another. 
Second, that consciousness is depicted as somehow distinct from 
environmental conditions is an ontological error, but one that is 
understandable given Macdonald's adherence to a view expressed by 
V!ichael Polanyi: "Though rooted in the body, the mind is, therefore, 
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free in its actions from bodily determination -- exactly as our common 
sense knows it to be free" (In Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, p. 51, in 1977, 
p.3). I am not suggesting here that we adopt a "rude determinism" 
linking mind or consciousness to material or environmental conditions, 
but that we maintain a dialectical view regarding the interplay between 
consciousness and cosmos and between "free will" and determinism. 
Oppression, w·hether it be class, race, ethnic, gender based, must, I 
believe, be seen in terms of both real environmental constraints and 
collective consciousness. Equating the "free actions" of the mind from 
its bio-physical host to the free will or self interest of the 
individual from his or her social and environmental setting is, I 
suggest, a confusion (as Bateson has defined it) of "logical typing." 
I would further suggest that (and I refer the reader to the discussion 
of Gustave Fechner in Chapter II) Macdonald's understanding of mind as 
a separate entity, separate from body and other minds, may in fact 
distance human consciousness unnecessarily from its participation 
within transpersonal and transcendental consciousness. \~hile this 
issue will also be discussed further in the next chapter, I suggest 
that we need to consider a different paradigm of consciousness that 
makes the leap from individually conceived consciousness to cosmic 
consciousness as the leap from individually based psychology to social 
psychology has already been made. 
That contemporary cybernetic culture suggests "a psychology of 
individuation, not individualism or socialism" (1974, in Gress and 
Purpel, 1978, p.l02), led ~lacdonald, to be fair, to consider units of 
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analysis beyond individual behavior/consciousness change. Nacdonald 
stated that "We propose that schooling be personalized, in contrast to 
standardized; that schools reflect and cherish pluralistic life styles 
and cultures" (In Macdonald, Wolfson and Zaret, 1973, p.6). Without 
full regard for personal meaning, membership within groups and cultures 
could be tyrannical or oppressive. Macdonald suggests that 
The challenge ahead would appear to lie in the 
resolution of the conflict between mass curricula and the 
concomitant powerlessness, alienation, and potential 
irrelevance to individuals and groups 1vhich accompany it, 
and in the development of planning procedures which 
preserve the integrity of cultural gr01vth as well as the 
personal and group participation which creates a specific 
motivational nexus for learning and living (n.d.c, p.1l). 
True particpation is only possible if each member is valued by 
some measure of equality. Macdonald stated that II if 1ve are 
interested in equal opportunity, then we are interested in the 
individual, not a group" (n.d.a, p.12). On one hand, it is prudent to 
avoid stereotyping; on the other, it is questionable, as Huebner has 
pointed out, to seek "equal opportunity" as our goal. A sense of 
distributive justice might suggest that our interest in the individual 
be informed by both historical and social dimensions as well as 
biographic ones. 
take: 
Hacdonald has pointed to two directions educational activity may 
It is my best guess that the next step, already begun, 
is an inward journey that will manifest itself by 
discovery, through perception and imagery, of human 
optential only slightly realized until now, and a outward 
journey for ne·.v communal life stages that are pluralistic 
and limited to small groups (tribes?) of people. The new 
communities will, of necessity, not threaten the 
technological superstructure that supports life, but they 
will seek pluralistic life styles within the superstructure 
(this author's emphasis, 1974, in Gress and Purpel, 1978, 
p.l03). 
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This statement has remained rather unfathomable to me. The 
"inward journey" has certainly been well represented among 
"post-critical reconceptualist" theorists. The "outward journey" may 
be occuring (as Huebner's, Purpel's, Giroux's, and lately Pinar's work 
may indicate). But ~1acdonald 's suggestion that the superstructure is 
life supportive and that these new groups will exist within it is quite 
strange. Having at other times called for a "cultural revolution," 
t1acdonald seems to be uncharacteristically tentative in his 
prescription for change. Perhaps his perspective of the field's 
limited resources causes him to adopt a "run silent, run deep" 
attitude. I would suggest that there are other a venues to explore, 
specifically, conceptualizing a more integrative conception of cosmic 
consciousness, building broader socia 1, political, economic and 
cultural bases for curriculum and change movements, and developing 
wider units of analysis than personal experience. 
~acdonald has, at various times, though without much emphasis, 
suggested ways these issues might be addressed. He has called into 
question traditional teacher roles and suggested a more network 
oriented educational approach. He has identified the importance of 
communities mediating the influence of technologically proliferated, 
expert-developed national curricula, he has drawn ~ttention to the 
cultural aspects of student needs and resources. 3ut perhaps the most 
far reaching vision he had to offer was one he described as follows: 
\4e have tried to argue that any model of curriculum 
planning is rooted in a cluster of visions -- a vision of 
humanity, of the universe, of human capacities and 
potential, and our relationship to the cosmos. These 
v1s1ons though dimly viewed and rarely articulated 
nonetheless have a profound impact on our day to day 
educational practices as well as our more theoretical 
formulations (1981, p.27). 
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The 1vork of curriculum theorizing remains very much an unfinished 
project. James B. Macdonald has pointed to, and articulated, vibrant 
visions of what humanity and the universe are capable of. l~hi le his 
voice will be sorely missed, his writings will. continue to provoke 
inquiry and discussion for years to come. I owe a tremendous debt of 
gratitude to his inspiration and dedication to human liberation and 
understanding. His questions reverberate, his insights disclose 
ever-widening horizons, and his courage will always shine as a quality 
he imparted to those he loved ••• in his own way. 
E. DI.JAYNE HUEBNER: CURRICULUM AND TfrE STRIJCTURRS OF CARE 
1. I:JTRODUCTION 
Dwayne Huebner's 1vork in the field of curriculum theorizing 
reflects his abiding concern for preserving what he considereci to be 
the importance of the past whi.le maintaining, at the same time, an 
openness to the future. This he does, in part, by applying his 
sensitive understanding of phenomenological ontology as expressed in 
the thought of Heidegger -- the past anci the future are not seen to be 
what has happened and what is yet to happen, rather, past ;.md future 
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reside in, to use Heidegger's term, the "Eternal Present.'' It is within 
this Eternal Present that Dwayne Huebner retrieves both history and 
education from mere artifice (a separation from the lived moment) and 
restores them to an ethical consideration. 
Huebner combines a profound regard for the human condition and its 
transcendent qualities with a discriminating eye for the continuities 
and rliscontinuities occurring within systems of meaning. Another way 
of saying this is that he combines the visionary qualities of a poet 
with the keen observation of a scientist. Curriculum theory, then, for 
Huebner, is a forum within which multiple modes of observation and 
expression can participate in the interpretation of shifts in the 
education world: 
The curriculum worker is stuck, so to speak, with 
conventional wisdom, which yields only to the 'onslaught of 
circumstance.' The onslaught of educational circumstances 
is felt differently by various educators. The individual 
educator's professional sensory and cognitive system is a 
delicate instrument for detecting shifts in his educational 
world. His responsiveness takes the form of new actions 
and ne1v speech. Fortunately, all educators have not been 
shaped by the same conditioning agents, their sensory and 
cognitive systems detect different shifts, and their 
responsiveness takes different forms (in Pinar, 1975, p. 
218). 
Huebner's view somewhat mirrors Greene's high regard for the 
"heteroglossia" of public discourse. Huebner's philosophicil.l 
orientation, strongly influenced by both phenomenology and 
hermeneutics, prompts him to attend to the present and atte~pt a 
systematic construction of meanings from the diverse viewpoints offered 
by those who are likewise participating in the world. This systematic 
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"construction of meanings" is done, as fluebner is careful to explain, 
with not only a pragmatic or functional concern, but is guided by an 
aesthetic appreciation as well. Huebner cites the work of Valery as 
having been important to his understanding of aesthetic rational i.ty. 
Theorizing, then, considered as an art as well as a science, reflects 
the "transition from disorder to order, from formless to form, or from 
impurity to purity, accident to necessity, confusion to clarity" 
(Valery, 1964, in Pinar, 1974, p. 232). This perspective is akin to 
Greene's existential concept of meaning emer~ing out of encounters with 
chaos, but, as we shall see later in this discussion, Huebner has come 
to a somewhat different appreciation of extant patterns and ontological 
order. 
Huebner has attempted to restore to curriculum theorizing a 
concern for the transcendent and normative dimensions of human 
activity. He has been passionately opposed to reductionist tendencies 
of curricular workers who focus upon technical and instrumental 
concerns. According to Huebner, " ... too often today, promise is 
replaced by demand, responsibility by expectations, and conversation by 
telling, asking, and ans1vering" (in Pinar, 1975, p. 231). Huebner 
calls our attention to the shallowness of much of curricular thought. 
lJe suggests that most curricularists are simply not asking the kinds of 
questions \vhich might yield important information regading "shifts in 
the educational worlrl." Most questions tend, instead, to responrl to 
the "onslaught of circumstance." Huebner suggests that more 
penetrating 811fl i 11 uminating curricular questions 11ight he :1sked if 
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curricular workers attended to the value framework from which their 
questions emerge: 
The key curricular questions, rather neutral from most 
descriptive and value points of view, are ~~~~hat can go on 
in the classroom?" and "Ho1v can this activity be valuer!?" 
The central notion of curricular thought can be that of 
"valued activity." All curricular workers attempt to 
identify and/or develop "valued educational activity." The 
most effective move from this central notion is the 
clarification of the value frameworks or systems which may 
be used to value educational activity (in Pinar, 1975, p. 
222). 
If education is to be viewed as "valued activity" (and 1 wholly support 
this view), what value frameworks can be seen operating in this 
process? In his brilliant and by now, classic, article "Curricular 
Language and Classroom :vteanings," (1966) Huebner states that 
Five value frameworks or systems :nay be identified. 
The terms which identify them are not as precise i'lS they 
might be, but discussion and criticism should aid in 
sharpening them. For purposes of discussion, and 
eventually criticism, they may be labeled technical, 
political, scientific, esthetic and ethical values (this 
author's emphasis, In Pinar, 1975, p. 223). 
Huebner maintains that each of these value frameworks offers a· 
logic, a set of expectations and possibilities, a rationality which 
dialectically reflects and guides inquiry and expression. For example, 
a technical value orientation is directed at change, instrumental 
action, and problem-solving. A political value orientation focuses 
upon issues of power, prestige, status, etc. Huebner is careful to 
explain that virtually all value frameworks are operating in any human 
activity; the emphasis, however, upon one or another framework will be 
reflected in the kinds of questions which tend to be asked most 
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frequently, the "information" which is considereri legitimate, and the 
kind and quality of the relationships among those present. Huebner's 
work in this area of value frameworks, and later the 1vork of Jur3en 
Habermas in his Knowledge and Human Interests ( 1971) are extremely 
important contributions to curriculum theory. Just as Hahermas helpect 
to raise the issues of "communicative competence," so has Huebner 
helped to raise the issue of competing and complementary rationalities 
within curriculum discourse. While Huebner maintains that the 
preponderance of curriculum theorizing is derived from technical, 
scientific, and to a lesser extent political value frameworks, he 
suggests that "The proposition may be put forth that educational 
activity in classrooms will be richer and more meaningful if all five 
categories are brought to bear'' (in Pinar, 1975, p. 228). His own work 
has provided ample evidence that aesthetic and ethical value 
frameworks, combined with conscious awareness of the other three, do 
indeed inform educational activity of "higher and more meaningful" 
possibilities. 
Huebner's attentiveness to value frameworks and the language which 
reflects their influence has also yielded important insights into the 
functions which language. serves. Just as the five value frameworks 
reflect various rationalities, Huebner suggests that there are six 
tasks to which curricular language may be put. The six functions, 
acconling to Huebner, are: descriptive, explanatory, controlling, 
legitimating, prescriptive, and affiliative. Huebner has suggested in 
his article "The Tasks of the Curriculum Theorist" (in Pinar, 1975) 
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that, unlike the technician, or scientist, " ... the curricularist must 
be concerned not only with description of scientific theory, but 'llso 
with prescriptive or normative theory" (p. 251). "The valuing problem 
and the description problem are consequently intertwined, thus 
complicating curricular language" (in Pinar, 1975, p. 222). f;i_ven his 
aesthetic, but more importantly his ethical, value orientations, 
Huebner represents how legitimating and affiliative tasks of the 
curricularist are best addressed applying these value frameworks. The 
tasks of the curricular worker include drawing upon diverse sources of 
insight and authority (e.g., scientific, artistic, philosophical, and 
religious) to create new ways of looking at, speaking about, relating 
to and participating in the world. He laments, however, that 
~ve have a tendency to search for the final solution, 
and to think that we can discover the one and only best way 
to talk about curricular phenomena. In so doing, we fail 
to operate as historical beings and shirk our 
responsibility for the continual criticism and creation of 
new language forms and new ways of speaking (in Pinar, 
1975, p. 257). 
Huebner goes on to say that "The theoretical problem is one of 
finding, creating, or borrowing a language that can be used to describe 
and explain human events in educative situations" (in Pinar, 1 G75, p. 
265). By combining an a1vareness of the v.slue frameworks our language 
reflects and the tasks to which we consciously address ourselves, 
Huebner believes that we can act more responsibly, critically and 
compassionately. By recognizing the sources of our meaning systems, 
the traditions within which these meanings have found legitimacy and 
have been a source of community, Huebner suggests that we :night better 
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understand the continuities and discontinuities within human 
preoccupations. This comparative form of interpretation .-- drawing 
upon insights and meaning systems of many disciplines is a 
hermeneutic activity. The horizons of each community of discourse may 
be bridged by the creative adoption of metaphor: 
I understand metaphor to be an expression or word from 
one discourse system or life situation used in a situation 
of discourse system where it does not normally belong. 
This transfer of word or expression is from quite disparate 
or previously unrelated traditions or endeavors. The use 
of metaphor is a 1vay of shedding new light on an already 
existing phenomena, by looking at and speaking about that 
phenomena from a totally different perspective. In this 
1vay we obtain a transfer of meaning, and thus an opening up 
of awareness (1982, p. 1). 
Huebner has found, and continues to find, the symbolism and metaphors 
contained within religious communities to be enlightening for 
curricular theorizing. In fact, he has stated that he " ... accept( s) 
\vhitehead 's statement that 'The essence of education is that it be 
religious"' (1982, p. 3). 
Huebner has found religious symbol ism and metaphors that counter 
the "value neutrality" of scientism and technical rationality to be 
important contributions to curricular discourse. Huebner's concern for 
the transcendent, the possibility of ne11 a1·rareness, and the present 
limitations of curricular language and thought ;ue quite evictent when 
he states that 
... present curricular language is much too limited to 
come to grips with the problems, or rather the mysteries, 
of language and meaning of the classroom. The educator 
must free himself from his self-confining schemas, in order 
that he may listen anew to the world pounding asainst his 
intellectual barriers. The present methodologies which 
govern curricular thought must eventually give way (in 
Pinar, 1975, p.235). 
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This discussion of Huebner's work will focus on two of the 
"self-confining schemas" he identifies -- scientism and the failed 
vision, and individualism vs. the common. This discussion will 
conclude with an examination of Huebner 1 s attraction to "Structures of 
Care" and his emphasis on transcendence and temporality as key motifs 
for understanding education as a religious activity. 
2. CURRICULUM LANGUAGE: SCIENTISM AND FAILED VISION 
The educator participates in the 
paradoxical structure of the universe. 
He wishes to talk about language, 
but must use language for his talk. 
He infers that meanings exist, but has 
only language, or other symbol systems, 
as a vehicle for his inference. Hemmed 
in by his language, he nevertheless has 
audacity to tackle problems on the edge 
of his awareness. 
Dwayne Huebner, "Curriculum 
Language and Classroom Meanings." 
While Dwayne Huebner refers to the "audacity" that educators must 
exhibit in order to "tackle problems on the edge of his awareness," he 
has also lamented the fact that, as he sees it, this audacity is a rare 
quality among curriculum theorists. F:arl.ier he referred to the fact 
that it appears to require the "onslaught of circumstance" for nost 
theorists to react to shifts in educational environments. Huebner's 
i1ttentiveness to language and i.ts connection to the environment withi.11 
which it is found in use is evident when he states that 
A reciprocal relationship exists bet1veen language and 
environment. Language can be used to create new 
environmental conditions, and new environmental conditions 
can lead to the emergence of new language patterns. 
However, these are not dependent relationships, for both 
language and the various environmental conditions can 
evolve independently. It seems appropriate that the 
curriculum theorist should explicate this reciprocity 
between language and environment (in Pinar, 1975, p.265). 
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This reciprocal, though not dependent, relationship between language 
and environment has led to a form of "slippage" or cultural lag within 
the field of curriculum. Hhile curricular language may, in some 
respects "mirror the world," it is a mirror which contains its own 
flaws, imperfections and colorations. That is to say, that even as 
curricular language attempts to describe the world, encounters 
resistance to changes in these descriptions, and exerts influence upon 
the world, the world (in terms of material conditions, social 
realities, etc.) is changing all along. Thus, Huebner suggests that 
the "language in use" of curricular discourse he constantly and 
adroitly examined for its adequacy and promise. That this is being 
done so minimally is a discredit to the field: 
Today's curricular language seems filled with 
dangerous, non-recognized myths; dangerous not because they 
are myths, but because they remain nonrecognized and 
unchallenged. The educator accepts :1s given the language 
which has been passed down to him by his historical 
colleagues. He forgets that language 1vas formed by man, 
for his purposes, out of. his experience -- not by God with 
ultimate truth value. As a product of the educator's past 
and as a tool· for his present, current curricular language 
must be put to the test of explaining existing phenomena 
and predicting or controlling future phenomena. Such 
curricular language must be continually questioned, its 
effectiveness challenged, its inconsistencies pointed out, 
its flaws exposed, and its presumed beauty denied. It must 
be doubted constantly, yet used humbly, with the 
recognition that that is all he has today. Perhaps 
tomorrow the educator will have better language, if he 
stays open to the world which speaks to ~im, and response 
with the leap of the scientist, or the vision of the poet 
(in Pinar, 1975, p. 218). 
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Perhaps central to Huebner's criticism of curricular language is 
its reliance on technical and scientific frameworks. Given the 
dialectical relationship of language to environment, Huebner is 
particularly disturbed by the hegemonic nature of these rationalities. 
He maintains that this hegemony is apparent if one examines some of the 
myths operating within curricular language: 
Two tyrannical 'llyths are embedded deeply in curricular 
language. One is that of learning -- the other is that of 
purpose. These have become almost magical elements within 
curricular language. The curricular worker is afraid to 
ignore them, let alone question them, for fear of the wrath 
of the gods (in Pinar, 1975, p. 219). 
The gods (in this case the lesser gods such as program administrators, 
funders, review and evaluation teams, technocrats, etc.) are in a 
position within most educational institutions at this time to exert 
considerable pressure and influence upon curriculum planners. Given 
this "state of affairs," it is fair to say (and Huebner, Greene and 
Giroux, have) that what is needed to struggle against such powers is 
not just audacity, but moral and civic courage. 
Huebner reminds us that "It must be emphasized that 'learning' is 
a postulated concept. There is no such 'thing' as 'learning.' Learning 
theory is postulated as an explanation of how certain aspects of 
behavior are changed" (in Pinar, 1975, p.240). This "explanation" 
makes use of categories and systems of meaning lvhich are directly 
traceable to technical and (at best) a scientific rationality. Huebner 
states that "Current curricular ideology reflects, almost completely, a 
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technical value system. It has a means-end rationality that approaches 
an economic model" (in Pin a r, 1975, p.223). That as many 
curricularists have "bought into" a technical value system is 
noteworthy for two reasons: first, that by adopting a technical 
rationality curricularists tacitly or explicitly reinforce this way of 
viewing the world; and second, that this technical rationality does 
violence to historical, biographic, epistemological, and ontological 
sources of meaning. Techniques and concepts become rei fied within a 
technical rationality, thus contributing to alienation and fixity: 
"Curricularists responsible for given educational situations are often 
alienated from their own roots because of this concern for ideas to the 
exclusion of concern for the environment'' (in Pinar, 1975, p.263). 
Technical rationality, such as that found within the "Tyler 
Rationale," separates purposes and objectives from the moral and 
ethical environment which, according to Huebner, must be attended to in 
all human interactions. Huebner seeks to restore the connection 
between purposive action and the prescriptions of behavioral objectives 
to a normative frame: " ... the so-called purpose or objective is not 
a specification of a determined future; it is a value category used in 
selecting the ready-at-hand and present-at-hand in the educational 
environment" (in Pinar, 1975, p.247). Huebner dra1vs our attention not 
to behavior change nor to the techniques by which this change is 
brought about, but rather to "how to explain behavior patterning or 
fixation" (Pinar, 1975, p.241). It is the organization of behavior and 
the systematic use of influence and values which both help to define 
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what we ~ as our influence and toward what end this influence is 
directed. Thus Huebner makes a significant contribution to the 
descriptive and normative language of curriculum by linking technique 
to value and influence to political action: 
It has almost been assumed that if the educator can 
clearly specify his goals, then he has fulfilled his 
responsibilities as an historical being. But historical 
responsibility is much too complex to be so easily 
dismissed. It is too easy to forget that debate about 
educational objectives is part of the continuous struggle 
of rival political ideologies, which has its consequences 
in who controls the educational environment. The problem 
of living historically, or at least of living as an 
historically aware person, is not resolved by 
pronouncements of goals or purposes, but by engaging in 
political action (in Pinar, 1975, p.239). 
Historical responsibility links us to the sources (institutional, 
conceptual, and affiliative) of the value frameworks \vhich inform our 
practice, as well as to a sense of agency which enables us to act to 
conserve and transform the traditions within which these value 
frameworks are advocated. 
Seen in this light, technical and scientific "vision" is situated 
within a broader range of perspectives -- perspectives which offer 
alternative accounts and approaches to the practice of historical 
responsibility: 
I am convinced that the curriculum person's dependency 
on scientific thought patterns, even though these have not 
yet found their way into practice as they should, has 
broken his linkage with other very great and important 
intellectual traditions of East and West which have 
profound hearing on the talking about the practice of 
education (in Pinar, 1975, p.215). 
Technical and scientific rationalities, while necessary syste~s of 
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or-ganization when examining educational pr-actices, according to 
Huebner-, offer narr-ow and insufficient language or promise for human 
achievement. Technical and scientific rationalities impose a severe 
reductionism upon both the description of and the forward vision of 
human possibilities, the not-yet-realized ways of "being-in-the-world:'' 
The educator confronts the human being and no language 
will ever do him in or do him justice. Yet the curricular 
worker seems unwilling to deal with mystery or doubts or 
unknowables. Mysteries are reduced to problems, doubts to 
error, and unknowables to yet-to-be-discoverables (in 
Pinar, 1975, p.220). 
That Huebner, drawing upon religious and theological traditions 
and language, comes to a quite different appreciation for the 
"paradoxical structure of the universe" is noteworthy and important. 
That doubt is not reduced to error, mystery not reduced to problems, 
represents a different posture vis-a-vis the 1vorld. A similar 
qualitative shift is recognizable in the statement ~ade by the 
sc~entist Niels Bohr. "The opposite of a correct statement is a false 
statement. But the opposite of a profound truth may well be another 
profound truth" (in Greene, 1973, p.93). Huebner suggests that by 
expanding our conception of the 110rld beyond the instrumental and 
scientific, beyond objectives and learning to a "moment of vision" we 
may shift our attention from viewing educational activity as a 
smorgasbord where we simply range about a wide array of consumables, to 
a "Last Supper" \vhich invites all participants the technician, 
scientist, politician, artist and philosopher -- in a com~unal, sacred, 
event. That we each, as participants in a universal order, rise beyond 
our individual pursuits to a sense of the collective, communal, ::1ncl 
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affiliative is no small feat. It is to this qualitative shift from the 
individual to the human that I will now turn. 
3. FROM INDIVIDUALISf1 TO THE COMHON 
Dwayne Huebner 1 s work has done much to refocus the attention of 
curriculum theorists upon the issues of historical responsibility and 
the descriptive and normative dimensions of curricular thought. One 
significant target of his writing has been the reductionism, at the 
hands of educators, technicians and scientists, of behavioral change. 
But according to Huebner, the response, even by those within curriculum 
theory, against the "value neutrality" of technical and scientific 
rationalities has been far from adequate. Huebner states that 
During the past two decades questions of value have 
resurfaced, frequently cloaked in scientific and 
developmental language. The cognitive emphasis of the post 
sputnik era influenced this in t\olo ways. 13y emphasizing 
individual intellectual achievement, the social and 
historical fabric of human life became an easily forgotten 
and often neglected background. A corrective for blat':lnt 
individualism was a renewal of interest in personal 
responsibility for maintaining social standards and hence a 
concern for values and ethics (1984, p.2). 
According to Huebner's critique, the interest in personal 
responsibility and for maintaining social standards did not represent 
an advance from laissez-faire individualism nor liberal reform 
ideology. This response maintained a perilous. closeness to social 
engineering, social Darwinism and conservation of the status quo. A 
concern for the primacy of individual sovereignty and a stable society 
dict little to address structural inequalities: 
\ve have the utter gall to be concerned with the 
mundane destiny of individuals, ours and our students. 
Ours is not a power over individuals, but a power for 
individuals. An a power for the future of our public world 
(in Pinar, 1975, p.275). 
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Huebner maintains that issues of power and transformative action are 
rarely, if at all, able to be addressed within the language of 
developmental psychology dr liberal reform ideology. Self-interest, 
self-actualization and autonomy fail to adequately recognize the social 
construction of knowledge nor the sense of historical responsibility as 
has been previously outlined. Huebner straightforwardly identifies the 
conservative values implied in contemporary schooling: 
For if we use our power for the future of all young we 
may indeed be in a political conflict with our own 
self-interests. lve are in that conflict, which is one 
reason that school people, although speaking a liberal 
political rhetoric, are essentially conservative in the 
political spectrum. Our individualism is a 
nineteenth-century individualism, aimed at the freedom of 
those who partake of the prevalent means of production and 
consumption (in Pinar, 1975, p.275). 
Huebner points out, and I believe that he is quite accurate in his 
assessment, that the scientific rationality reflected in developmental 
psychology and the conservative values embedded in liberal reform 
ideology have serious implications for liberative social theory, 
epistemology and pedagogy: 
Dependency upon "learning" as the :najor concept in 
curriculum thought leads one to one other problem. The 
very nature of such "learning" suggests abstraction and 
generalization. In so-called cognitive learning,· certain 
patterns, assumed to exist within the object world, are 
abstracted by the individual and carried into ne1v 
situations. In psychomotor learning, certain patterns 
wit!1in the individual are abstracted and carried into new 
situations. The learning process implies the possi !)il ity 
of abstracting certain patterns of events from a specific 
situation or a series of like situations and transforming 
them to new situations. Thus, learning is assumed to be 
something that happens within the individual. Education is 
consequently conceived as doing something to an 
individual. This leads to the proposition that there is 
the individual and there is the world, and that the 
individual develops in such a way that he has power over 
the world or to act upon the world. Such thinking leads to 
consideration of the individual as something distinct. 
Obviously, this is not the case. The individual is not 
separated from the 1vorld, or apart from it - he is part of 
it. The unit of study, as Heidegger, among others, points 
out, is a "being-in-the-world." Any system of thought 
dealing with human change as something that happens 1vithin 
the individual is likely to lead the educator astray. 
However, if a curricular language can be developed so that 
the educator looks at the individual and the situation 
together, not separately, then his pO\'iers of curricular 
design and educational responsibility might be increased 
(in Pinar, 1975, p.242). 
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Huebner 1 s tracing of the copenetration of the logic of developmental 
psychological and liberal reform ideology is instructive. ~1uch of 
contemporary educational theory and practice (e.g., competency-based 
instruction, individual achievement, the separation of "gifted and 
talented" programs from more democratic and egalitarian educational 
configurations, increasing numbers of private over public schools) may 
be linked to these traditions in social and pedagogic thought. 
Huebner offers a counter proposal which, drawing upon 
phenomenological thought, ontological her~eneutics, and ~ore radical 
social and educational criticism such as that of Ricoeur, Freire and 
Habermas, suggests more wholistic and normatively progressive 
alternatives to prevailing social and educati0nal ideology. 
An example of Huebner 1 s high regard for individual freedom and 
historical responsibility can be seen when he suggests that the 
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language and perspectives of biography offer more illuminative i.n.sights 
into human agency and historical consciousness: 
Retrospection about the threads of continuity and 
change composing an individual is the discipline of 
biography. These same threads projected into the future 
become the concern of the educator. Might it not be 
possible, then, that insights into curriculum planning for 
the individual are to be sought in the discipline of 
biography, as well as within the discipline of psychology? 
(in Pinar, 1975, p.242). 
Huebner thus points to the dialectical nature of praxis, a quality 
which is superficially addressed, if not foreign to, psychological and 
social control orientations. 
Huebner recognizes an important qualitative dimension of an 
individual's membership and participation in communi ties of meaning. 
Drawing upon his understanding derived from ~ermeneutic philosophy and 
the religious traditions of community, Huebner identifies the 
importance of interpretive communities within 1vhich social meaning 
arises: 
Knowledge, as social meaning, is always constructed 
with another. Knowledge is a social construction, not an 
individual construe tion. New knowledge, that which comes 
from others, is a description of their comings and goings 
in the world. Hence knowledge which comes from others must 
always be interpreted (1984, p.l6). 
The individual, while seeking to transform self and others, inevitably 
draws upon meanings introduced to him or her from soci3.1 and historical 
a1vareness. This "knowledge," then, is derived from one's relationship 
to the world, a world which offers not only chaos and disorder, but 
membership and communality: "It is important to remember that knmvledge 
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is, fi~st of all, a relationship with something that was, at one time, 
stnmge" (1984, p.l4). 
It is this participation within communities of meaning 
communities that one adopts through the very basic adoption of language 
-- that is overlooked or discounted in individualistically oriented 
learning. Mo~eover, the "adoption" of language must be viewed not only 
as a response to a socially-constructed world, but also must be seen as 
an act of conscience and initiative on the part of the individual (and 
community) and an attempt to participate in that construction. As we 
outlined earlier, Huebner refers to the various functions which 
language serves. Language, beyond its descriptive, explanatory and 
other functions, serves the function of affiliation: 
•.. language used by curricularists frequently serves 
as a symbol of cohesiveness or of belonging to a particular 
community. It becomes, in some instances, the language . .£.[ 
affiliation, which serves as a vehicle and token of 
cohesion. Mastering the language is frequently part of the 
initiation into the community, and proficiency with the 
language indicates one's belDnging to the community (in 
Pinar, 1975, p.256). 
According to Huebner, community need not he viewed as a 
homogeneous or closed society. Just as language changes and is 
modified to meet new conditions and no~ms, so do communities. 
Communities may be seen, then, as social configurations which ~re 
unified by a sense of brotherhood and sisterhood, a configuration whose 
very basis is a sense of caring ann love. Rifts wit~in communities of 
care, if approached lvith a concern for control and conformity and not 
ca~e ann love, fragment and isolate. But, Huebner, astutely comments: 
Love and care, as reconciliation, provide the 
patience, trust, collective memories and hopes, and 
conversation to heal the social body -- to bring wholeness 
to the family, class, organization, ·or gathering which 
appeared to be disrupted by the ne1vness ( 1984, p. 13). 
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These qualities of love, care and reconciliation, have provided D•.vayne 
Huebner with a threshold across which he sees great hope and 
possibilities for both historical responsibility ?nd transcendent 
possibility. It is this linkage between curriculum and the "structures 
of care," particularly those Huebner finds within the religious 
traditions that will be examined next 
4. CURRICULUM AND THE "STRUCTURES OF CARE 
D1vayne Huebner states in his powerfully written "The Search for 
Religious ~1etaphors in the Language of Education" (1982), that his 
attention has more recently been focused upon the "interpenetration of 
religious and educational experience." This focus is not si~ply on the 
shared language (which is only minimally shared), nor on the insights 
lvhich may be gained by transferring metaphors from one tradition to the 
other, rather Huebner is attempting to disclose the human exe_erience 
that is shared in both realms of meaning. That Huebner understands the 
process of education to have a religious dimension has already been 
indicated. That knowledge is constructed within communities of mea~ing 
has likewise been mentioned. But Huebner's turn to religious 
traditions and the discourse addressing spirituality may he better 
understood if \ve examine the contexts 1vithi:1 which he finds love and 
care most clearly evident that is, within faith co;mnunities 
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specifically, and more generally, "the structures of care." Huebner 
points to "faith collll!lunities" as a manifestation of care and love: 
Those who claim to be educators must care for, indeed 
love, those whom they would presume to educate. The source 
and rene\val of that love is primarily within the faith 
communities, for they are the primary keepers of the 
traditions of love and care (1984, p.ll). 
Huebner has criticized educators for pandering to the ideologies 
of control and ahistoricism. Moreover, he anticipates that 
i::J.stitutions \vhich are characterized by these ideologies provide little 
intellectual, emotional or spiritual support for the caring, empathic 
attitude which, according to Huebner's logic, must precede a truly 
educative commitment. In his "Poetry and Power: the Politics of 
Curriculum Development" (in Pinar, 1975), Huebner passionately rails 
against the one-dimensionality of prevailing educational awareness: 
I.Jhy are we lost? I think it is because we have let 
the school become our center and we have become an 
appendage, nothing but a role or functionary in someone 
else's institution. Institutions do not have memories, 
they cannot recall their past; who established them, under 
\vhat circumstances, for what purposes. The people \vho 
started them disappear in the mindless routines. Only men 
and women have memories, an historical consciousness, and 
we can recall how things got started, why and by whom. If 
we forget or never knew that schools are a product of men 
and women who used their pO\ver to build or maintain a 
certain kind of public world, then we easily become 
bondsmen of those who live only in the routines. We do 
their things, maintain their world, distribute their 
awards. And they reward us by a humdrum comfortable life 
style, perhaps with tenure and retirement, access to the 
more common goods of our production lines, and permit us 
the privacy of sex and family life, but deprive us of 
public vitality and joy, clean air and water, safe, 
comfortable, exciting urban areas that support our 
well-being and sociality (p.272). 
The charge that \ve may "easily become bondsmen" is serious. 13ut 
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Huebner does not merely stop with this charge; he supports it with a 
chilling account of the "state of affairs" in which he sees educators 
widely participating. Though the quotation I have selected is lon~, I 
believe it need be quoted in its entirety for the full power of 
Huebner's indictment to be felt: 
\ve do not talk about a more just public wor-ld; we talk 
about school, we think about school, and we see the world 
through the windows and doors of the school. The school 
has become our place. \.Je have become school people, our 
language of learning, discipline, motivation, stimulus, 
individualization, is school language. Our images for 
generating new educational possibilities are school 
images. So we seek more diversified and smaller packages 
of instructional materials, not greater public access to 
information without federal control, or better development 
of cable television for neighborhood use. He seek open 
classrooms, not open societies. He seek alternative 
schools, not alternative public worlds. And because we are 
school people our public statements affirm the school, 
defined the present public school, and hide social 
injustice. Our propaganda of individualism is liberal cant 
that hides the basic conservatism of school people and 
permits those who control our public world to continue to 
control it. Our public statements are not socially or 
personally liberating. They do not excite us to imagine 
more just public worlds. They do not harness the po1ver of 
people in the political struggle to reform our present 
inequitable institutions. They do not enable men or women 
to recognize and grasp their political right to share in 
the maintenance and reforming of our public world. 
For instance, how much individuality can school people 
tolerate in an institution that is compulsory? The 
expression "curriculum for individuals" hides from our 
awareness that the school is a place of control; of 
socialization if you prefer this pseudoscientific term thRt 
hides political domination. We maintain that control by 
our power. Of course, with our goodwill and out of our 
good graces we grant reasonable po1ver to students to be 
individuals, providing they are not too individualistic in 
their speech, their actions, their commitments (in Pinar, 
1975, p.273). 
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Huebner's charge reverberates with great pain and moral 
indignation. It stands, I believe, as one of the :nost polferful voices 
in an eerily well-modulated discipline. ijis charges, I feel, must be 
continually raised lest we crumble into an oppressive silence. 
Given the challenge that schools as a "socializing" or controlling 
institution must be confronted, how does Huebner suggest we attempt 
this? One way he suggests is that we alter our view that education is 
a conditioning technology: "Education is not something that we do to 
others, although it can only happen in community, education happens to 
us" (1984, p. 6). Huebner shifts our attention from the technique of 
manipulation and control, to the ethical quality of our encounters with 
the other. Educational activity occurs within community; in a sense, 
"none of us gets there unless all of us get there." The educator, and 
the student, despite their differences in maturity, knowledge, skills 
and/or awareness, must, if education is to be an ethical activity, join 
each other in mutual dialogue and encounter: 
Ethical valuing demands that the human situation 
existing between student and teacher must be uppermost, and 
that content must be seen as an arena of that hunan 
confrontation, This human situation rnust be picked BIHY at 
until the layers of the knovm are peeled back and the 
unknown in all of its mystery and awe strikes the educator 
in the face and heart, and he is left with the brute fact 
that he is but a man trying to influence another 11an (in 
Pinar, 1975, p.229). 
The issues of pO\fer, authority and influence, whJ.le ::1ble to be 
discussed in terms of their political, and social ,iimension.s, must, 
according to Huebner, be broached in ter;ns of their ethical 
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dimensions. That the "eternal present" contains the sum of the past 
and the unfolding possibility of the future, our influence upon another 
becomes infinitely important and sacred. Without love and care, it is 
doubtful that this influence can achieve its infinite quality, can be 
extracted from manipulation or coercion. 
\Vhi le the religious traditions and communities of faith have 
provided Huebner a source for supporting what he considers to b2 a 
glimpse at the infinite within human intercourse, he broadens the 
concept of "faith communities" and coins the phrase "structures of 
care" to point us to their similar counterparts: 
In words that are perhaps less loaded with specific 
religious affiliation, we could speak of the structures of 
care in our world society - 1vho cares for whom and for 
what reasons. If we do not care for someone, why should we 
participat~ in their education -- in their being led out to 
find new for:ns of life? (1984, p .10). 
Structures of care may be seen as extant networks or co:nmunities 'dit'1in 
which ethical rationality is highly valued, in which the individual's 
well-being is held (if not as "infinitely valuable") at least Bs 
central to the concerns and cares of those who belong and participate 
in them. These are special places; these structures of care, while 
they can indeed be schools, may just as well be families (whether 
nuclear or alternative), neighborhoods (where neighbors attend to the 
needs of fellow neighbors), trade unions, advocacy groups, churches, 
and intentional communities. 
Given the perilous times in 1vhich we :.11l live, how may the thrents 
against our planetary survival, the oppressiveness of economic and 
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political forces, the dehumanization of so many of work places be 
countered?: 
How can we face the threat of the unkno1m and the 
threat of the stranger outside of us and inside of us? It 
is not easy. We need the assurance that we will not be 
destroyed, that life wi_ll indeed be enhanced rather than 
destroyed. Love is that assurance. \ve can face the threat 
of the unknqwn and of the stranger if we are not alone; if 
we are in the presence of love which affirms life (193L;, 
p.9). 
Structures of care rather than military, economic, political, 
personal or intellectual aggression are one avenue. By learning from 
and learning within these collective, co~~unal environments we may 
find, as Bob Dylan has so aptly put it, "shelter from the storm." If 
curriculum theorists are able to broaden their units of analysis froQ 
the individual, their units of identity from other school people, and 
their units of solution from curricular discourse, .schools or teachers, 
there may be cause for optimism. Unless this occurs, we may be faced 
with microscopic achievements and yet suffer global suffering and 
catastrophe. Huebner points out, from a broad perspective, that 
Arguments over school purposes are not simply academic 
arguments, but efforts to shift the values determining the 
educational environment 'ind, hence, influencing the 
continuity -- change tempos or rhythms or individuals and 
society (in Pinar, 1975, p.247). 
That curricular thought must attend to a sense of human agency 
within the temporality of individuals and society, ca Us for 
revisioning of both our understanding of agency and temporality. It is 
1vith these last issues I \vi.ll conclude this r=xaminHtion and 
interpretation of D\vayne Huebner 1 s curricular thought. 
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5. TRANSCENDENCE AND TEMPORALITY: A NEH SOCT.AL CONTRACT 
Dwayne Huebner's personal and intellectual :levr;lopment fror1 
engineer to a psycho-socially grounded researcher to elementary school 
teacher to educational philosopher to professor religious l:hought 
represents one man's search for conceptual frameworks and work settings 
·which were more personally satisfying and mea:1ingful. Hu~bner 
describes his inquiry in the later stages of his personal and 
professional development as follows: 
Throughout this contact with the diverse philosophical 
and theological traditions, the basic operating assumptions 
of curriculum thought bothered me. How coulri one plan 
educational futures via behavioral objectives 11hen the 
mystical literature emphasized the present moment and the 
need to let the future care for itself? The thread that 
ran through my questions and my searching was an intuition 
that an understanding of the nature of time 1vas essential 
for understanding the nature of education. This intuition 
turned me to the literature on ti:ne and the criticism of 
learning theory as only one way of conceptualizing man's 
temporality (in Pinar, 1975, p.215). 
That Huebner came to appreciate, particularly through the writing of 
Heidegger, that human beings are better understood as living in a 
present moment -- a moment filled with memories of the past, concerns 
about their present lived reality, and ~opes and aspirations for the 
future: "Human life is not futural; nor is it past, but, rather, a 
present made up of a past and future brought into the tno11ent" (in 
Pinar, 1975, p. 244). Huebner translated his understandinB of 
humanity's "being-in-the-world'' into an educational principle: 
.•• it does seem obvious that education must he 
concerned with man as a temporal being. The focus upon 
learning (as si;nply the change of behavior) has cletracl:ecl 
the educator from this larger and more complicated 
phenomenon of man's temporality (in Pinar, 1975, p.242). 
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Human temporality can be easily understood if we simply refer to 
li. Ee as "being-in-the-world" and death as not being-in-the-\wrld. 
Temporality is recognized whenever we attend to one's existence -- the 
fact that they simply ~ -- rather than what they 01m, what they do, 
etc. This existential quality presents conceptual and philosophical 
problems for, for example, behavioral engineers, or technocrats, ·11ho 
separate discr-ete behaviors and intended outcomes from the continuity 
of one's existence. Huebner indicates his concern about how this type 
of thinking fails to acknowledge temporality in the following 
quotation: 
Basically, the determination of objectives is the 
search for the bridge between the past and the future; it 
is argument over the degree of continuity necessary for 
change, or the amount of change that is necessary for 
continuity; it is concern for the balance between 
succession and duration. All of these categories are 
concerned with society's existence "in time" and refer to 
man's concern for the historical continuity which gives his 
social forms and institutions some kind of stability, yet 
vitality, as they emerge from yesterday into tomorrow. 
Unfortunately, the educator's too easy acceptance of the 
function of or the necessity for purposes or objectives has 
replaced the need for a basic a1{areness of 'lis historicity 
(in Pinar, 1975, p~.238-239). 
·Objectives and purposes can do violance to one's sense of 
historicity. Change \vithout regard to duration or- continuity brings 
about chaos; continuity without regard to succession brings about 
stasis. Both chaos and stasis are, from the perspective of 
temporality, equally alienating. In order that curricularists not 
contribute to alienation, Huebner believes that it is their task "to 
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cortceptualize man's temporality and to find means to express his 
concern for man's temporality" (in Pinar, 1975, p.243). By attending 
to human temporality, educators open themselves to the transcendent 
quality of time and participate in an historically grotmded emergence 
of one's and society's future projected beyond the present moment. 
This creation of a new response to the world, when informed by an 
understanding of temporality, is not framed in terms of a response to 
some discrete stimulus, purpose or objective, rather, it draws upon the 
sum of the past (through historicity) and the projection into the 
future (as a promise or hope) and thus participates in the infinite. 
Indeed, Huebner states that educational encounters with an eye on the 
temporal nature of human beings invite us "to provoke infinite 
developments in someone." Hmv different and more important this 
educational encounter is than exerting one's influence and p01ver to 
bring about a discrete, convergent behavior! 
This infinite quality is reflected in, to use two of Huebner's 
five value systems, aesthetic and ethical values. It is, I surmise, 
not prominent in the language and metaphors used in t~chnical, 
scientific or political diJlensions. It is, however, capable of being 
discerned within these three value systems when we simply look at how 
language and metaphors point E£. transcendent possibilities. Gadamer, 
Ricoeur, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger all give us clues to this 
trar1scendent dimension of language and symbolism. Hhctt is r.emarkable 
is that aesthetic and ethical value systems, instead of just 
unconsciously borrowing from the transcendent, consciously direct our 
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attention to this possibility. Aesthetic values which, as Huebner 
drawing upon Valery has suggested, ask us to cultivate psychical 
distance (that is, "to remove the aesthetic object from the \vorld of 
use"), appreciate wholeness and design, and explore symbolic meaning, 
focus our consciousness upon timelessness and thereby help us to better 
understand how our temporality is transcended through creative acts. 
Aesthetic experience is· not only engagement with an artifact, a 
painting, a film; it is an experience lvhich joins artist and audience 
in a conspiracy to redraw our horizon of a\vareness. Thus, while art 
objects may display texture, form, color, har:nony, etc., the whole 
transcends the parts and quite possibly it is silly even to approach a 
\vorlc of art with a taxonomer' s range of categories. \~hat is not said 
is as important "lS what is saici, what is conce:::1led is as i:nportant as 
what is disclosed, what is unfinished is as important as what is 
finished. To approach art with the demand that it meet our 
expectations or conform to our tastes is violence. And t~is violence 
is no different than the violence one inflicts when one acts without 
ethical consideration: 
For some, the encounter of man with man is seen as the 
essence of life, and the form that this encounter takes is 
the meaning of life. The encounter is not used to produce 
change, to enhance prestige, to identify newkno;vledge, or 
to be symbolic of something else. The encounter is. In it 
is the essence of life. In it life is revealed ann lived. 
The student is not viewed as an object, an it; but as a 
fellow human being, another subject, a thou, \Vho is to be 
.lived with in the fullness of the present- moment or the 
eternal present. From the ethical stance the educator 
meets the student, not as an embonied role, as a lesser 
cRtegory, but as a fellow human being who demands to be 
accepted on the basis of fraternity not simply on the basis 
of equality. No thing, no conceptual barrier, no purpose 
intrudes between educator and student when educational 
activity is valued ethically. The fullness of the 
educational activity, ~s students encounter ench other, the 
1vorld around them, and the teacher, is all there is. The 
educational activity is life -- nnd life's meanings are 
witnessed and lived in the classroom (this author's 
emphasis, In Pinar, 1975, pp.227-228). 
"A fellow human being 1vho demands to be accepted on the basis of 
fraternity not simply equality." This to me is a brilliant ontological 
and epistemological insight. Equality is inferior to fraternity. How 
shallow rings the expression "equal opportunity under the law." 
Ethical valuing need not stop at equality, at justice, but may indeed 
involve a higher principle, that of compassion or mercy. This is how 
human communities differ from the Universe of Maxine Greene -- •.vhile 
the Universe may feel no obligation to us, we have the potential to 
feel an obligation to it. This sense of obligation involves us in the 
necessary in the "world of necessity." Dwayne Huebner states that: 
A common theological description of man 1 s nature is 
tha~ he participates in both the conditioned and 
unconditioned, or in necessity and freedom. Ma~ is 
conditioned to the world; he participates in the world 1 s 
structures of necessity. But given this patterning, 
fixation, and conditioning, he also participates in the 
unconditioned in freedom, or (if you wish) in the 
continual creation of the world. The explanatory problem 
is not to explain the unconditioned, or freedom, but to 
explain those conditions 1vhich make man a part of the world 
of necessity. This, I believe, is the function of the 
"learning" category. It attempts to explain man's 
conditionedness, the patterning of ~is behavior. By 
raising questions about learning how to learn or ~e 
creative, man is probing the very nature of what it rneans 
to be a human being and hence delving into metaphysics and 
theology (in Pinar, 1975, p.241). 
Huebner has delved into metaphysics and theology because it offers 
a domain in which he finds fraternity and through lvhich he can oost 
freely respond to the world. Hhi le the curricul:l.r theorists of the 
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left and critical theorists in general may struggle against what they 
see are "unnecessary social constraints," they provide few clues to 
what may be considered necessary social constrgints. Dwayne Huebner, I 
suggest, only implicitly points to these clues. That he adopts the 
theological terms conditioned and unconditioned, necessity and freedom, 
gives us some intimations; that he places fraternity over equality 
points even more directly to a source. It is not altogether clear, in 
Huebner 1 s thought, how 1ve may move from freedom to necessity, from 
freedom to obligation. But the fault, if there is one, may lie not in 
his inability to explicate this, but more in the mystery in which our 
freedom resides. Freedom is our participation in "the continual 
creation of the world." No hubris here, he does r1ot presume that we 
create the 1vorld; we are participants. This creation is an element of 
life, a transcendent dimension and the language Huebner uses to discuss 
this is derived from theological discussions of the spiritual: "Spirit 
refers to that which gives vitality, that which gives life, not to 
merely the forms of life. It indicates that life is more, can be more, 
than the for:ns in which it is currently lived" (198!;, p. 
be more," but how do we know this? Huebner 
8). "Life can 
answers this 
straightforwardly and unflinchingly: "Can spirit, which gives vitality, 
force, and transcending capability to human life, he knovn? These 
questions have only one ans1ver. N 0 • II (198L; , p • 12) • Huebn<:!r 's :nov~ 
from Teacher 1 s College to Yale Divinity School signifi8s l1is 1nover.1ent 
from one comrnunity of meaning to another; mon~ importantly, his move 
may he seen as transition fro;n a more school-based setting to a 1:1orc 
diverse, extensive constituer1cy. Huebner foreshadowed thLs tr':lnsition, 
when in 1975 he wrote: 
If we really believe these words ('curriculum for 
individuality'), 1vould we not be 1vorking with nonschool 
people who are trying to increase the educational 
possibilities that exist outside the school? (in Pinar, 
1975, p.274). 
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That he now may focus his energies and awareness toward serving 
"structures of care" (for schools, as he had earlier indicated 
ill-serve this role), is a wonderful opportunity. His work may no1v 
more fully realize "a new form" he has long advocated: "To have ne·.v 
forms emerge, old forms must give way to relationship: love takes 
priority over knowledge. Love and care, however provide not certainty, 
but hope" (1984, p.24). From within his new community of faith he may 
better serve and keep Eden. From his new community of meaning he may 
better realize "an ethical rationality of educational activity: 
response-ability, conversation, influence, promise and forgiveness" (in 
Pinar, 1975, p.230). It is my hope that he can. 
F. \HLLIAM PINAR: RECONCEPTUALIZATION, YES; RECONCEPTUALIS~l, NO. 
Old paint on canvas, as it ages, sometimes 
becomes transparent. \.Jhen that happens 
it is possibl2, in some pictures, to see 
the original lines: a tree will show through 
a woman's dress, a child makes way for a 
dog, a large boat is no longer on an open 
sea. That is called pentimento because the 
painter "repented," changed his mind. Perhaps 
it would be as well to say that the old 
conception, replaced by 3 later choice, is 
a way of seeing and then seeing again. 
Lillian Hellman, Pentimento 
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In his influential work entitled "Currere: Toward 
Reconceptualization" (Pinar, 1975) \.Jilliam Pinar boldly states: "The 
curriculum theory field has forgotten what existence is. It will 
remain moribund until it remembers" (p.396) Pinar's dedicated and 
creative project has been to remember what he claims had been 
forgotten, and restore the lived experience of the individual to the 
center of educational discourse. This he does by examining and 
portraying the "inner-centeredness" of the individual. Pinar 's range 
of subjects is extensive and difficult to sucinctly outline; he has 
written intelligent and provocative articles on interpretive 
frameworks, autobiography, gender issues, psychoanalytic portrayals of 
human development, and historical perspectives of curriculum 
theorizing. In this section I wish to examine Pinar's portrayal of the 
"world of personality," his concentration on autobiography as 
disclosure of educational experience, gender issues as a focus on 
oppressive social conditions and as avenues for revisioning personal 
and perhaps should, development. While these subjects each could, 
11arrant a more comprehensive treatment, for the purpose of this study, 
1 wi.ll try to link them to a conceptual logic Pinar seems to operate 
within -- that is, each of these topics 1vill be discussed as they 
disclose various forms of alienation, offer suggestions for overcoming 
this alienation, and point to new 1-1ays of understanding educational 
experience. It can be mentioned here that Pinar's 1vork has evolved 
over time and that, while his earlier emphasis on existential and 
phenomenological still is evident in his theorizing, he has adopted or 
generated other frames of reference that, from my reading of his work, 
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pose difficult "mixed metaphors" if not outright contradictions and 
paradoxes in his writing. I will reserve my discussion of these 
possible conflicts for the last section of my interpretation of Pinar's 
work. 
Pinar expressed the view that neither the "pragmatic" orientation 
of traditional curriculum theorists (those preoccupied with providing 
"guidance" for those teaching in schools) nor the "conceptual 
empiricists" (those adhering to social science conceptual frame1vorks 
and research methods) have attended to the experiential or existential 
dimensions of education. Pinar identifies a third branch of curriculum 
theory, the reconceptualists, whose work more directly speaks to, 
"remembers" what existence is, and within which curriculum theorizing 
might be revitalized: 
••• the reconceptualists tend to concern themselves 
with the internal and existential experience of the public 
world. They tend to study not "change in behavior" or 
"decision making in the classroom," but matters of 
temporality, transcendence, consciousness, and politics. 
In brief, the reconceptualist attempts to understand the 
nature of educational experience (Pinar, 1975, p.xi). 
Pinar' s concept of currere bespeaks his personal approach to the 
examination of educational experience: 
The study of currere, as the Latin infinitive 
suggests, involves the investigation of the nature of the 
individual experience of the public: of artifacts, actors, 
operations, of the educational journey or pilgrimage (1975, 
p.400). 
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Pinar 's approach through the process of currere focuses on the 
experience of the individual as he or she encounters the world. 
Drawing upon existential, phenomenological, psychoanalytic and literary 
critical thought, Pinar synthesizes these perspectives to form a new 
orientation, "a discipline of its own," which emphasizes subjectivity 
and self-reflection. This emphasis, Pinar suggests, counters technical 
rationality, unreflective 11 sci en tism," and various pragmatic and 
materialist orientations to human action. Pinar was deeply concerned 
about, as Sartre had described it, "the loss of the self to the idea," 
that is, to use Pinar's words: 
As ideas become more real than concrete human beings, 
the capacity to sacrifice the latter for the sake of the 
former is more likely expressed. \vhether the conceptual 
idols be "master race" from the Right or "the people" from 
the Left, the fact of human sacrifice remains ( ,p.4) 
To counter this oppressive, alienating state of affairs, Pinar 
suggested an "imvard turning," a revisioning of both figure and ground, 
context and content of educational activity. But this he did with the 
critical eye of the historian and the aesthetic openness of the artist: 
One surmises, however, that an intensive adherence to 
one's "within" forms the basis of renewal strategies. lvhat 
configurations this loyalty to one's subjectivity must take 
and what such configurations mean for theorists of the 
process of education are not yet clear (1975, p.382). 
Pinar cultivated and advocated for, not a stalwart commitment to 
prediction, control, or even prescription, but instead focused on the 
singularity of individual experience, "even its eccentricity." Despite 
his skillful and accomplished ability to categorize, generalize and 
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paint broad sweeps and currents within the curriculum field, he 
suggested that "What is necessary, in order to portray more accurately 
human activity and experience, is descriptions of particular 
individuals, on particular days, in particular circumstances" (n.d., 
p.S). This "particularity" is a keynote of Pinar's work; his 
theorizing reflects an ethical and aesthic sensibility through which he 
strives ever to rescue himself and "the other" from abstraction and 
socially conditioned perception. 
In Pinar's earlier writing, one can find a strong influence of 
phenomenological thought. Pinar draws upon Cooper's (1971) definition 
of phenomenology: 
By "phenomenology, 11 I mean the direct experience of a 
person or object without the intervention of preconceptions 
about that person or object. It is a matter of 
apprehending the person or object in its pristine reality 
rather than through the obscuring panes of glass that 
represent our preconcepts (In Pinar, 1975, p.360). 
In order to extricate ourselves from the "taken-for-granted," the 
given, the 1vorld of social forms, Pinar suggests that we adopt the 
phenomenological attitude of "bracketing" one's experience fror.J 
external conditions. The "historical moment" from this perspective is 
not our occupying some space in an abstract flow of events and 
circumstances, but rather our concrete lived reality to which we give 
"substance. 11 Pinar reacted with passion against the reified for;ns of 
social reality, especially as they were formulated among Marxist 
revisionists, and maintained that our hope for renewal of human 
possibility lay not in attending to the "public," but the psychic state 
of the individual: 
••. what is clearly ignored in the work of this group 
[politically oriented curricularists] is the inescapable 
fact that these dimensions are rooted in the lives of 
concrete individuals, and it is this biographic context 
that must take logical, as well as ontoiogical precedence 
(n.d., p.6). 
He follows with: 
It is this "living through" this historical 
conjuncture that is the present time, this crystallization 
of the historical moment in individual lives, which holds 
the greatest promise of movement in the short-term. I am 
suggesting that it is not only that the person i:IUSt be 
attended to in order to act effectively in the public 
domain, I am suggesting that for n01• the major arena for 
struggle, the "site" if you will, of the most intense 
struggle of conflicting historical forces, is in individual 
lives. It is not in the congealed and presently stagnant 
political, economic, and social realms (1984b, p.6-7). 
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lvhile it is clear that Pinar' s attention is focused on individual 
experience and his view of ontological issues is informed by such an 
orientation, I will address this ontological dimension in a later 
section of this examination of his work. At present, I wish to focus 
on Pinar's selection of the psychic state and especially his 
description of "the world of personality" which thematically unifies so 
much of his curriculum theorizing. Pinar states that: 
I will argue that the development of a 
sophisticated understanding of one's psychic state will 
probably result in more accurate and eventually more 
comprehensive social and educational observations, as well 
as having psychically and educationally beneficial 
consequences for the researcher himself (1975, p.385). 
This, I believe is Pinar 's touchstone, his 01m Httempt at 
"pentimento." The canvas is not the frame of material reality, hut the 
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fabric of an individual's life, the layer upon layer of experiential 
pigment applied by the individual as artist. As the paint ages, so 
does the artist revealing changes in life, changes in the choices 
one makes •.. and the fleeting images one once found noteworthy, but 
1.,rhich subsequently have been altered, sometimes forgotten, now bleed 
through the surface as evidence of some prior transformation. Pinar 
sought not the accidental occurrence of this emerging image, but in a 
sense cultivated this aging process, this distancing from the 
superficial, the surface of lived reality. 
That Pinar adopted the "world of personality" and the psychic 
state as his domain of exploration does not place him within the group 
of curricularists he termed conceptual empiricists. Pinar ·..,ras less 
interested in the exlanations or organizing principles that 
psychological theories provided, more interested in person-centered 
descriptions of experience. That he breaks from the epister.10logical 
foundations upon which psychology as a behavioral science is built, is 
noteworthy. auch of Pinar' s thought is based upon a transcendental 
perspective, a perspective drawing upon an aesthetic sensibility and 
critical attitude found within the humanities. Thus, while the ''lvorld 
of personality" intimates developmental and social structures, Pinar 
examines this world as a text created by the individual. The coherence 
and orderliness/messiness of the text is approached through internal 
dialogue, through attentivness to the particular details of one's 
concrete, lived exper-ience, and through change in consciousness: "This 
tur-ning inward, the process of individuation, is change of 
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consciousness. A shift in the source of behavior signals a shift in 
the behavior itself" (1975, p.413). 
This shift in the source of behavior is of great concern for 
Pinar. Perhaps what typifies his thought, and distinguishes 
reconceptualist theorizing from prior orientations is exactly this 
attention to sources of behavior. Pinar chooses to focus on the being 
of the individual as the source, as opposed to the social, political or 
other contexts within which the individual is situated. This is as 
much an ontological issue as it is a methodological one. Pinar's 
advocacy of autobiographic r<=search methods is deriver! from this 
existential ontology. By attending to how an individual makes sense 
(or doesn't make sense) of his or her experience rather than merely 
describing human behavior or social realities, Pinar directs our 
attention to the various, particular ways this experience is ctisclosed 
to the individual and conveyed to others. Autobiographic methods are 
one avenue along which this emphasis is discernable. 
2. AUTOBIOGRAPHY AS CONCRETE HISTORY 
Pinar has frequently employed the metaphor of "the student as 
traveler." 1-/hether this jourr1ey is viewed as a forced march or a 
self-directed excursion is central to Pinar's interest. As I have 
quoted earlier, Pinar raises this issue in the follo1ving manner: "So 
one's reasons for traveling are often not one's own. So one is coerced 
into acquiring skills and information that one failed to request. \Vhat 
sense lies in this arrangement?" (1975, p. 404). 0 inar encourages the 
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individual to examine his or her journey through life so that both 
internal and external constraints or compulsions are disclosed. That 
the 11 journey" is not our own, but scheduled, directed and organized by 
another is anathema for Pinar. That we may be una1vare of the external 
and internal controls operating in our lives is a central educational 
problem. For Pinar external control :nakes no sense, is oppressive and 
is essentially disintegrative. 
Pinar's assessment of early school socialization experiences 
clearly reveals his existential orientation and his focus on the 
individual as the source for meaning: 
To get them to desire to be like someone else, 
children must learn to be dissatisfied with themselves. 
Dissatisfaction with oneself is almost always the 
introjected nonacceptance by a significant other (1975, 
p.363). 
That we do not accept the other, and more importantly for Pinar, that 
we do not accept ourself, is a source of great dehumanization, 
oppression and misery. \Vhile schools often emphasize that students 
learn to "think," they rarely attend to the feelings of students. 
Pinar is not suggesting that we adhere to the contrived distinction 
between cognitive and affective dimensions of human development, rather 
he is drawing attention to the very foundational nature of feeling in 
human nature. That we are taught to become dissatisfied with 
ourselves, that we turn outward for legitimation and "knowledge" is 
pedagogically unsound. Quoting Arthur Janov, a radical ps ycholog is t, 
Pinar says: "Lack of feeling is what destroys the self, and it is lack 
of feeling lvhich permits destruction of other selves" (1971, in Pinar, 
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1975, p.372). Schooling more often than not, according to ?inar, is 
characteristically bureaucratic, technocratic and controling. Even 
when school curricula are guided by a "progressive philosophy," t!1e 
day-to-day experiences of those (both students and teachers) in schools 
are often influenced by controling and conditioning activities and 
circumstances. \.fhat is required, _.._:conling to Pinar, -:_s that we view 
education as a reflective activity which promotes our emergence from 
i:hese circumstances of control and·conditioning: 
The fact that one can reflect and understand a matter 
that was misunderstood does not imply that one is 
understanding nothing, rather it suggests a certain 
evolution of one's powers of understanding. This evolution 
can be conceptualized as a slow, continued emergence from 
reality, a transcendence of self from circumstances. This 
process is tantamount to what is called humanization, and 
it is precisely that, a becoming of what we are, a bringing 
out what is there but obscured if not buried by 
conditioning. That sense of bringing out of course recalls 
another term: education (1975, p.394). 
This "transcendence of self from circumstances" has been a 
constant preoccupation of Pinar, and one of the most problematic of all 
circumstances for him is that of language. Language as a socially 
constructed reality within which we become embedded at an early, 
essentially pre-reflective age, seems to Pinar to be one circumstance 
of conditioning '~hich must be struggled against. Pinar sees language 
as a cultural phenomenon which obscures as much as it discloses 
reality. It, like any form of knowledge, must be made subject to 
personal direction. That language is seen to be a rei fiect reality 
instead of a nexus of particularized meaning structures of individuals 
is a form of cultural imperialism. Moreover, language, whether it he 
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configured as "Standard American English," various dialects and 
regionalisms, or the "language" of science, politics, aesthetics, etc., 
conveys a sense of "congealed meanings" and embedded r10rms, values and 
expectations. Pinar cites Stern's comment that "The language of order, 
coherence, and continuity is thus seen to be inadequate, to be at odds 
with the true nature of experience" (in Pinar, l984c, p.8). Pinar 
suggests that much of curriculum theorizing, drawing upon the meaning 
communities of behavioral and social science, has assumed or even 
imposed a mechanical and false sense of order and continuity on human 
experience. Pinar suggests that through autobiographical research 
methods, the individual is encouraged to develop an "interior 
monologue" which he or she then observes his or her use of language and 
distances oneself from the merely denotative meanings (or, perhaps to 
be more exact, the culturally conditioned sense of meanings) and 
returns to the experiential base from which these various expressions 
and descriptions emerge. This process presumably counters the tendency 
of one being lost to the idea, in this case the idea as manifested in 
social definitions and cultural forms. Through this process of 
interior monologue and autobiography, one attempts to construct 
... an amplification of the self that exists outside 
the social and especially bureaucratic definitions of it. 
Autobiography as Grumet, I and others have practiced it can 
provide the device by which we find crevices in the wall of 
our self-estrangement, our self lost to social definition 
and role (l984b, p.8). 
Autobiography provides an opportunity to reflect and construct 
personally meaningful definitions and descriptions of one's 
experience. The social is distanced; the personal is central. 
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Perhaps a comment made by Pinar might illuminate why he envisions 
autobiographic processes to be so crucial for education and the 
reduction of our alienation from ourselves and others. This comment is 
drawn from Pinar's article "The Abstract and the Concrete in Curriculum 
Theorizing" and represents observations Pinar makes employing 
autobiographic methods: 
I was reacting against the social as habit, as 
[quoting from Virginia \voolf] 11CO\vs... draw together in a 
field." I distrust the social; it seems to function 
primarily as a way of forgetting oneself, a way of not 
paying attention to immediate experience, a way of playing 
tapes recorded long ago, and only vaguely appropriate now 
(n.d., p.25 manuscript copy) 
Pinar's distrust of the social is evident in most of his writing. 
He has outlined numerous ways that the individual is "lost" -- lost to 
others, to roles, ideas, to reified social and political structures, to 
conventions and to constituative rules. Autobiographic research 
methods can assist one to recover one's self, return to experience not 
as abstract or abstracted data, but as the source of data -- data that 
only the individual has access to. Pinar's valuable contribution to 
educational research is that he offers an orientation, through the 
process of currere, which brings personal experience back into the 
realm of consideration. What people feel, ho1v they make sense of their 
day-to-day encounters with the world, is equally if not more important 
than socially prescribed norms, attitudes and practices. By placing 
the person at the center, consciousness in the forefront, Pinar 
attempts to show an ethical course toward social change. 
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Despite Pinar's focus on the individual and autobiographic 
research, he claims that this attention will have implications for how 
one may better understand social phenomena. The interpretation of the 
text of one's experience, currere, leads to a synthesis of these 
sources of information: 
it seems plausible that initial information 
generated by this method will be in fact idiosyncratic. 
However, later information derived by free association and 
information derived by critical analysis of the associative 
kind of information, will reveal aspects of a collective or 
transpersonal realm of educational experience. That is to 
say, once we get past the indi viudalized details of an 
individual's biography, we may gain access to a 
transbiographic realm of currere (1975, p.411). 
What the process of currere can make possible is the conscious 
awareness of personal agency in constructing reality. As one seeks 
integration of various episodes of lived experience, and as one becomes 
aware of one's ability to not onl)' reconstruct meanings for various 
events, but to actively bring into reality possibilities that are 
personally important, one has learned to affect change in the world. 
One is no longer merely a product or object of the material world of 
forces, but becomes a creator and agent of change: 
Self-reflexive examination of the biographic functions 
of one's intellectual work makes less likely its 
unconscious use. If its use is relatively unconscious, it 
is more likely that use will perpetuate dominant cultural 
themes, i.e. scholarship as economic investment. Further, 
one begins to glimpse how autobiographical work of this 
nature, as it transforms individual consciousness, must 
transform as ''ell the material structures of the culture. 
l~hile the linkage between specific individuals' work and 
material transformation cannot be explicit, we know, given 
the inseparable and dialectical relation between 
consciousness and matter, that self work has its material 
consequences. \~hat is perhaps easier to comprehend is that 
individual work necessarily contributes, microscopically 
although not negligibly, to the transformation of the 
cultural weltanschauung (n.d., p.9). 
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While Pinar recognizes the dialectical relationship between 
consciousness and material reality, he has dedicated himself to 
highlighting the consciousness side of the dialectic. In this regard 
his orientation is similar to Macdonald 1 s and Greene's. Pinar 
identifies currere to be similar in function and aim as Freire's 
conscientization. Self-reflective thinking aims to reduce oppression, 
oppression from external co11straints and internal, self-imposed false 
conscious11ess. Pinar quotes Freire \{hen he discusses oppression and 
disintegration: 
The central problem is this: H01v ca11 the oppressed, as 
divided, unauthentic beings, participate in devel0~ing the 
pedagogy of their liberation? Only as they discover 
themselves to be 'hosts' of the oppressor can they 
contribute to the midwifery of their liberating pedagogy. 
As long as they live in the duality in which to be is to be 
like, and to be like _is to be like the oppressor, this 
contribution is impossible (1970, in Pinar, 1975, p,365). 
It call be said, then, that Pinar attempts to reduce oppression by 
making conscious the "internalization" of oppression, the passive 
conditioning of the unaware person, and by assisting the person to 
become aware or his or her participation in the perpetuation of 
oppression through their lack of awareness, misunderstanding and 
disintegration, the cycle of oppression can be broken. It is precisely 
this "Extrication from reality, from unconscious, conditioned 
participation in oppressive political reality to self-reflexive, active 
mov·=ment to alter that reality" (n.d., p.ll), that autobiographic 
research serves a liberative function, 
227 
Recently, however, Pinar has himself commented on the limitations 
of autobiographic methods, limitations which may point to the need for 
yet another reconceptualization of the source of liberative pedagogy, 
personal support and social transformation. Pinar writes: 
But the past three years have shown that 
autobiography, however practiced, supplies no insulation 
from the pain of living in bad times, times when the forces 
of what is dead-and-past triumph, when what is ugly mars 
the landscape, when death fouls the air, and we the living, 
cringe, cry and despair (1983, p.8). 
That Pinar has come to this somewhat bitter realization is 
poignant and moving. That the malevolent and oppressive conditions of 
contemporary times seem to fail to yield to "microscopic" movement 
toward transformation does not come as a surprise given the nature of 
these conditions. While I will address this issue at a later time, I 
think it is worth noting that Pinar is openning the door for other 
conceptualizations of life-supporting and transformative educational 
agendas. That reconceptualization never truely evolved into a 
community or collective endeavor, I think, lies at the heart of this 
problem. Pinar consistently strove to deny that reconceptualization 
could or should have evolved into reconceptualism, that is, become a 
community of meaning and a collective effort and identity. There were 
other collective engagements he gravitated towards, and gender issues 
may well be one which may be better conceived of as lending itself to 
this kind of identification. It is to this agenda that I now turn. 
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3. GENDER ISSUES AS AN ARENA FOR CURRICULUM 
William Pinar has long expressed the view that "socialization is 
roughly equivalent to going mad" (1975, p.359). Pinar's more recent 
examination of gender inequalities as a source of powerful and 
predominantly destructive socialization has suggested that nowhere is 
social conditioning more prominent, and more mad, than in the practice 
of sex role stereotyping. Gender specific social conditioning is not 
only pervasive in schools, but mass media, legislation (or the lack of 
legislation), family structures, and bureaucratic organizations all 
tend to manife~t deep-seated and powerfully enforced norms and 
expectations regarding sexual identity and roles. Pinar has suggested 
that a basic human need is the need to be perceived as an individual, 
not as a "representative" of a particular class, group, or gender. 
~Vhenever we are categorized, classified and sorted according to 
superficial accidents of birth, we are violated, reduced to an object, 
and denied the fullness of our being. This, as 1vas mentioned in the 
previous section, results in a "loss of self" to objects, others, 
roles, and the idea. In like manner, gender specific social roles 
convey or enforce particular human behaviors, attitudes and values that 
are made manifest in modeling and imitative behaviors. When "the 
other" is seen to be a set of conventional behaviors, when rewards and 
sanctions are employed to manipulate behavior toward some abstract 
standard of human development, the concrete individual is neglected, 
dehumanized and oppressed. Pinar has focused on gender issues because 
they offer a domain in which many uncontested assumptions are present, 
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and lvhich affect the microcosm of personality formation as well as 
macrocosmic realities such as cultural beliefs and social practices. 
Pinar, in adopting existential and psychoanalytic conceptual 
frameworks, has attempted to disclose h01v this oppression is 
internalized and this oppression is both consciously and unconsciously 
carried over in educational settings. Pinar 's argument that gender 
issues disclose powerful determinents of personality is certainly well 
taken. He has marshalled considerable evidence for his illuminating 
critique of such issues. But in his discussion of gender-related 
educational issues, Pinar tends to reveal some inconsistencies that, 
while present in his earlier theorizing, were somewhat less extreme. I 
will comment briefly on some of these inconsistencies in this section, 
and will reserve my critical interpretation for a later one. 
Pinar outlines the contributory role that industrialization and 
modern capitalist economic development in general has played in 
institutionalizing and perpetuating/exacerbating a division a labor and 
corresponding discrimination based on gender. Modern economic 
institutions have, according to Pinar, played an instrumental role in 
shaping the modern family structure, social relations, and hierarchical 
distribution of power and authority. The increasing marginalization of 
physical labor has ironically eroded many of the historical bases for 
male dominance in the working world. Replacing the criteria of 
physical strength with criteria of bureaucratically structured power 
and authority has only minimally affected the pervasive presence of 
male dominated social and economic organization. Technical 
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rationality, scientific management, and competition have sedi;nented a 
"male epistemology" deeply in \.Jestern societies. Changing the criteria 
has not changed the rules of the game -- male domination in 1vork 
places, religious institutions, educational institutions, and 
government continues apace. 
But Pinar points out that there are promising developments in 
social psychology, curriculum theorizing, and epistemology which 
promise a revolution in the way men and women will view themselves and 
each other. The human liberation movement has been dramatically 
enhanced by critical perspectives emerging in gender related analysis. 
This analysis, while focusing on psycho-social aspects of human 
development has clearly called for a more encompassing unit of analysis 
than individual choice and experience. Of course, individual 
experience remains the domain in which oppression is felt, but the 
conditions which perpetuate this oppression virtually all require a 
cultural and social critique. This critique has called upon a much 
more clearly articulated dialectical perspective, a perspective which 
draws ever more attention to the dialectic between individual 
consciousness and the psycho-social environment within which one 
lives. While reconceptualist analysis of culture and psycho-social 
dimensions is far from uniform or homogeneous, it is clear that a more 
cultural and collectivist perspective is being emphasized. 
Pinar and Miller (1982) point to the work of Grumet as reflecting 
an awareness of the distinction between male and feminine epistemology: 
"Grumet establishes the basis for feminine epistemology as a 
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dialectical dependence of subject and object. Male epistemology is a 
subject-object dyad in terms of cause and effect" (p.l3). Male 
epistemology with its emphasis on cause and effect reinforces the 
excesses of patriarchy, specifically the domination of women, the 
aggressive "ownership" of children, and preoccupation with control over 
"underclasses." Feminine (or perhaps more accurately, feminist) 
epistemology provides an alternative vie1~ not only of the relations 
between men and 1~omen, but offers an alternative view of any 
individual's relationship to another individual. Feminist epistemology 
recognizes the mutual dependence, complementarity and symbiosis of 
human relationship. This change in perspective has a concomitant 
change in research methodology and interpretive frameworks. 
these lines, Pinar writes: 
It may be we men (men who refuse to participate in the 
reproduction of patriarchy, or at least attempt to refuse), 
joining with certain feminists (those who celebrate not 
contradict their matrisexuality) who might rediscover and 
reformulate hermeneutic research methods, methods IYhich 
portray more fully, if more messily at first, the flux and 
multi-dimensionality of experience (1983, p.41). 
Along 
Men (and women) who adhere to patriarchal beliefs and practices 
reduce this multi-dimensionality to one-dimensionality; role 
definitions are reified and, for the most part, quite restrictive. The 
result of social conditioning for men based on patriarchal values, 
according to Pinar is that "~ve men do exhibit 'stunted relational 
potential'" (1983, p.28) (this author's emphasis). Pinar goes on to 
say that macho men, preoccupied with power and authority and repressive 
of maternal values are generally ''clumsy interpersonally, primitive 
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intellectually, and neantherthal (sic) emotionally." Perhaps these 
"qualities" are consistent with male one-dimensionality, but Pinar 
fails to address female one-dimensionality, or if he does, tends to 
describe this one-dimensionality as the result of :nale dominance and 
not female initiated preferences. Thus, the "total woman" attitude is 
seen as the female counterpart of "stunted relational potential 11 among 
men. While the fit may be neat, the interpretation seems flawed by a 
rather cavalier acceptance of male domination being a priorily located 
at the center of this one-dimensionality. This is not unlike the 
situation where various Marxist categories such as \vork or economism 
were viewed as central social realities around which other Marxist 
concepts such as class and division of labor were clustered. 
That the reproduction of patriarchy perpetuates hierarchical 
social relations is clear. What remains unclear, hO\vever, is whether 
some of the premises that Pinar adopts can be adequately defended. 
Pinar maintains that "Heterosexual sons become Fathers, and Fathers 
require sons, daughters and wives, all metaphors for underclasses" 
(1983, p.26). That patriarchy as an abstract concept contains such a 
system of social relations is not disputed here, rather, to return to 
Pinar's earlier ·concern for the concrete, it seems that we must 
consider that fatherhood offers other possibilities than requiring 
"underclasses 11 for its nature. Given Pinar 's view that the 
over-developed ego of males within male dominated sets of social 
relations precipitates this desire to control wives and children, we 
must call into question the ontological order of this reality. Are rnen 
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so plastic and malleable that they simply conform passively to 
patriarchal cultures? Can we reduce patriarchy to either an outcome of 
relatively QOdern capitalist, 
epistemology? I think not. 
bureaucratic structures, or male 
Pinar stretches the credibility of his argument when he attempts a 
psychoanalytic assessQent of the anxiety men supposedly feel with 
regard to the "inferential character of paternity." To assume that men 
sought to control and master women (and subsequently children) due to 
the anxiety of not knowing with any certitude whose children one 1 s \dfe 
was bearing is disturbing and somewhat paranoid. Why this issue is any 
more anxiety producing for the male than the female is most unclear. 
Furthermore, with recent technological incursions into reproductive 
processes, in vitro fertilization for example, this certitude becomes 
further complicated. In vitro fertilization of a female egg makes 
problematic not only the existential knowledge of whose sperm is used 
in conception, but whose egg is used as well. Hhile technological 
interventions may indeed be seen as having the possibility of 
controling the "match" of particular eggs and sperm, it also opens the 
possibility of doing away with negotiated participation in conception. 
If a ~>'oman desires fertilization, she requires no specific male for 
this choice; if a male desires to father children, he may nmv recruit 
the services of surrogate mothers. This is all quite complicated and 
ethically and morally tumultuous. But what this points out, I believe, 
is that biological reproduction seems to have transcended the very 
boundaries of either patriarchal or matriarchal structures. Individual 
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choice seems to have been greatly increased, while the issue of 
socially conditioned bases for reproduction (e.g., genealogical lineage 
and family structure in general) are thr01m open to as yet unknown new 
forms. 
Yet another issue Pinar calls attention to in his discussion of 
gender-specific social conditioning is that of the oedipal stage of 
personality development. That mothers project "sameness to the female 
child 11 and "otherness to the male child" is perhaps a pervasive aspect 
of early conditioning. But it seems to contradict the feminine 
epistemology he so warmly regards where a woman may be more attentive 
to the dialectic between subject and object. 
Perhaps the most compelling issue Pinar raises is the one he 
locates in the work of Adrienne Rich, that heterosexuality is seen as 
compulsory in male-dominated cultures. Why this is exclusive to 
male-dominated cultures is unclear, but that this compulsoriness is 
seen as a political institution is extremely important for curriculum 
theorizing. The mere fact that heterosexuality is seen as compulsory 
makes it an oppressive ideology. That sexual preference, which is 
essentially an individual choice, becomes highly politicized (while 
other preferences such as '~here one chooses to live, what "hobbies" one 
pursues, etc, may or may not be scrutinized for their political 
implications), reflects a strong gender-based dimension of power and 
authority, that is, patriarchal and feminist conflict as having both 
personal and political implications. But Pinar is quick to point out 
that 
.•• the broad political project of which resistance is 
a historical, theoretical moment, is finally sabotaged by 
reducing feminist and gender issues to their political and 
economic concomitants (1975, p.26). 
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Thus, while Pinar identifies via Rich the politicel dimension of 
"compulsory heterosexuality," he refuses to embrace this political 
dimension fully. Pinar attempts to extricate himself from this, I 
would call real and concrete political agenda, by undercutting the 
validity of political action: "Political life is inevitably a lower 
order of existence than one need settle for" (1975, p.405). Resistance 
to the oppressiveness of patriarchy, for Pinar, while he admits is a 
political act, is yanked back to an individualist orientation: 
With domination, concomitant dependence, loss of 
freedom, the development of autonomy is arrested. Autonomy 
means making one's own rules (Cooper, 1967), being one's 
own instructor in a sense, and making 'external laws 
conform to the internal laws of the soul, to deny all that 
is and create a new world according to the laws of one's 
own heart' (quoted in Hampten-Turner, 1970)" (in Pinar, 
197 5 ' p. 366) 0 
The abovementioned quotation points out a curious inconsistency 
and ambivalence present in Pinar' s logic. Politically inspired acts 
are of a "lower order," because they address external, abstract social 
structures; resistance to gender inequalities is a political act, but 
must not be reduced to political or economic arenas. That economic and 
political structures are any more abstract than "internal laws of the 
soul" or "laws of one's own heart" is problematic. Until this 
ambivalence is resolved, I believe that reconceptualization as 
described by Pinar will continue to remain fragmented and despairing. 
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There remain just a couple of related issues I wish to address in 
this section, and they concern a basic conflict between an uxistential 
sense of autonomy and a diametrically opposed yearning for community. 
Pi.nar states that "Systems of kno1vledge production and distribution, 
such as curricula, are likewise systems, or in the present context, 
codifications of desire" (this author 1 s emphasis, 1983, p. 37). The 
term "codification of desire" is, I think, a most interesting and 
important concept. Referring back to Pinar 1 s concern that schools 
teach thinking and do not attend to feeling, one may see the roots of 
this orientation. Autobiographic research is one attempt to refocus on 
how one feels about concrete, lived reality. The existential 
orientation of this type of research may be discerned in Pinar 1 s 
reference to a quote from Kierkegaard: "The more consciousness, the 
more self, the more consciousness, the more will, and the more will, 
the more self" (in Pinar, 1975, p.390). That one becomes more aware 
and more conscious of oneself i.s tied with the emergence of will and 
autonomy. Dra•,o~ing upon the existential thought of Sartre, one may 
remember that one 1 s project should not be defined for another or by 
another, but for oneself. But the juxtaposition I wish to make is with 
an earlier discussion Pinar makes regarding the distinction between the 
attitude of the oppressor and the oppressed. Pinar quotes Hegel: 
The one is independent, and i.ts essential nature is to 
be for itself; the other is dependent and its essence is 
life or existence for another. The former is the Master, 
or Lord, the latter the Bondsman" (in Pinar, 1975, !.J.364). 
There is a peculiar correlation between striving for increasing 
autonomy (existential "for oneself") and the nature of the oppressor. 
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If we are to encourage the development of autonomous individuals, how 
are we to avoid the gravitation toward the attitude of the Master? 
Increasing independence seems to imply a decreasing concern for the 
existence of the other. It appears to be dangerously close to the male 
epistemology Pinar finds so abhorent, that is, that we become 
preoccupied with being the cause of our various projects/effects. HOI{ 
does Pinar escape this dilemma? One was his linking individuation to 
intimacy. Pinar states that 
. . • it is only by an unconditional devotion to one 1 s 
otm process of individuation that one can experience 
genuine intimacy. A co<ollary follows: self-estrangement 
means other-estrangement. I cannot get in touch with you 
if I cannot get in touch tdth me (1975, p.373). 
I fully agree that one who is estranged from oneself is alienated 
and risks dependence and/ or isolation from others. But if we follow 
the course that Pinar 1 s logic takes, we might see hO\{ his 
interpretation and mine differ. The devo~ion ~o self, self love, is 
presumed to be a prerequisit for intimacy. Pinar refers to H.S. 
Sullivan 1 s concept of the "rna ture personality," that intimacy perrni ts 
validation of all components of personal worth. Sullivan describes 
such intimacy as: 
the collaboration with at least one other, 
preferably more others, and in this collaboration there is 
the very striking feature of a very lively sensiti.vity to 
the needs of the other and to the interpersonal security or 
absence of anxiety in the other (in Pinar, 1975, p.369). 
Thus, we are faced with a logic t{hi.ch requires interpersonal 
security and lack of anxiety between persons. But Pinar has indicated 
his distrust of the social. His distrust is, I believe reflected in 
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his preoccupation with decreasing one 1 s anxiety regarding one's 
existence by increasing one 1 s awareness of, kn01vledge of oneself, This 
turning inward seems to discount the qualitativ~ human dimension, the 
human need according to Slater, for human dependence. That is, why 
should we assume that we each and alone must wrestle with our devils? 
I suggest that whether one adopts an individualistic unit of analysis 
and solution or a communal one is based upon a principle of faith. 
Pinar has clearly adopted the view and acts upon the belief that the 
individual is the agent for dealing with alienation and anxiety. I 
have chosen a somewhat broader view which recognizes the dimension of 
social support, affiliation and community which may assist one and 
share this sense of possible alienation as a co!IIDon as opposed to an 
individual or isolated condition. 
Pinar seems to have some fleeting insights into this possibility, 
but he more often than not fails to sustain this vision. Pinar's grasp 
of the ontological condition of individuation seems to preclude this 
vision from being sustained. One last example of this dilemma may be 
seen in his discussion of the etiology of collective action: 
A sense of individual impotence short-circuits 
collective action. However, collective action is essential 
because we do not have democracy in this country; we have. 
the contradiction between certain democratic rights and our 
subjection to racist, sexist, and economic exploitation. 
In these circumstances democracy can be extended only in 
the collective struggle to resolve this contradiction. 
Specifically this means a struggle between the classes of 
people whose interests are on opposite sides of the 
contradiction (1975, p.l70). 
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I would suggest that might take a more dialectical view of Pinar's 
first sentence and invert the order to read: "A sense of collective 
action shortcircuits individual impotence." This, I believe is the 
crux of not only Pinar's alienation from the social, but of 
reconceptualism's degeneration into yet another moribund curriculum 
movement. I wish to conclude this section with a comment Pinar made 
which seems to point the way out of this situation. I wish he were 
only able or, perhaps more accurately, willing to honor what he himself 
has discovered: 
Instead it is the intellect which portrays the 
simultaneity of thought, feeling, and action, not of 
atomized individuals (those with over-determined egos, 
characteristic of the modern male) but those still 
connected, co-mingling, [that is] capable of community 
(1983, p.41-42). 
4. ONTOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PINAR'S HORIZON 
OF UNDERSTANDING 
Earlier, I had quoted Pinar 3.S he chirted curriculum theorists for 
"forgetting what existence is." It is my intention in this section to 
examine more closely Pinar 's view of existence, of human being, and 
what he has urged us to remember ••• and what he himself has seemed to 
have forgotten or not yet come to remember. That Pinar has chosen to 
employ such a term as "remembering" is rather fortuitous, for our 
purposes. Remembering implies or suggests a re-collecting of extant 
reality, and I would extend this further to include the possibilities 
for reality. Pinar has described education as a process of "bringing 
out what is there already." Parallel to this we might reca 11 Huebner's 
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description of curriculum -- that it is an "environment producine, 
field." Pinar's relationship to the environment is of particular 
importance in this discussion, for it is here that 1ve might identify 
the horizon of his understanding, and map the boundaries of our own. 
Pinar has consistently vacillated in his stance regarding 
i.ndi vidual autono~y and community. Unlike Greene, Pinar has depicted 
the "public" in almost exclusively perjorative terms: for him the 
public is equated to bureaucratic and congealed forms. f-!is view of 
psychological balance and stability is characterized by its 
"field-independent" quality, that is, the self must, if it i.s to be 
free, recognize its own sense of agency, immediacy, particularity, and 
existential uniqueness. One who has not come to this awareness is lost 
to others, and this loss precipitates anxiety and alienation: 
this nothingness and its attendant anxiety, 
prompts if not compels most to search for stability and 
being outside themselves. One form this search takes is 
what has been charcaterized as interpersonal collusion; 
another involves absorbtion in what Sartre termed one's 
project; yet another is the identification of self with 
role (1975, p.386). 
That Pinar consistantly highl i.ghts the negative possibil i.ties of 
external realities and seeks to shore up the internal resources of the 
"world of personality" to contend with the possible dehumanizing 
aspects of the social and the public is reflective of his ontological 
·view. Pinar describes this "ontological vocation" as follows: 
The self turned against itself seeks to be like 
someone else. The seeking is dangerous; one's identity is 
constantly in question, since it resides outside oneself. 
Clne feels ontologically insecure (Laing, 1969), and such 
insecurity prevents and arrests man's ontological vocation 
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of becoming more human, more himself (Freire, 1970) (1975, 
p.364). 
Pinar has pointed to early socialization and personality 
development as contributing to this insecurity. Citing David Cooper, 
Pinar states that "'One of the first lessons, ' David Cooper writes, 
'one is taught in the course of one's family conditioning is that one 
is not enough to exist in the world on one's own. ' (Cooper, 197la)" 
(in Pinar, 1975, p.365). This "lesson" presumably teaches us that we 
are essentially inadequate and must depend upon others for our 
existence. That Pinar paints this possibility as exclusively negative 
is, I believe, unfortunate. This situation may, if viewed in a more 
positive light, be both prudent and life enhancing. It is clear that, 
of all mammals, the human is one of the most dependent upon others 
during early stages of infancy. That this dependency must be 
transcended so that we achieve independence and autonomy is central to 
Pinar's conception of human development. But to portray dependency in 
totally negative terms is a form of hubris which sets up the aim of 
independence and autonomy as the only path for existential 
responsibility. Quoting from Cooper again, Pinar writes: "'Any meaning 
derived from a source outside our acts murders us' (Cooper, 197la)" (in 
Pinar, 1975, p.374). That "our acts" become the exclusive domain of 
meaning is unnecessarily narrow and ontologically myopic. While 0 inar 
has frequently commented on the transcendental possibility of our acts, 
he tends to deny this transcendental reality in much of his analysis of 
the human relationship to the world. The transcendent possibility for 
Pinar seems to lie only within the experiential domain of the 
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individual; we are only able to transcend our limited understanding, 
awareness and disintegration through acting upon our consciousness. 
This "inward turning" enables us to protect oursel;-es from an 
essentially hostile or benignly indifferent universe: "It is when 1ve 
are unknown to ourselves, when our presence is not in our bodies but 
distended into the social space around us that we are manipulable, 
bullied, and fooled" (1984c, p.l4-15). This is precisely the 
"ontological bind" Pinar sets up for himself. That "our presence" is 
limited to our bodies, and that our bodies are not allowed the 
possibility of being integrated into a wider, transcendent presence or 
order or being is a severe form of anthropocentrism, an essentially 
non-ecological perspective, and an extreme form of secularism. Pinar 
seems to assume that it is only through human meaning making and 
pattern making that the external world can be plumbed for any order or 
coherence. Perhaps more accurately, Pinar maintains that order and 
coherence are superimposed upon the worlct by human design. Human 
beings individually are the source of meaning and order. Pinar's 
"cosmological view" can be seen in the following comment he makes in 
"Teaching the Text": 
The relations among language, reality and experience 
are taken up as well by Christopher Prendergast in his 
essay on Sartre's Nausea. He observes that embedded in this 
novel is the idea that the language of logic and order 
disguises the flux and fluidity of reality by creating the 
illusion of fixed states. Categories create such 
illusions; they are, in Nietzsche's words, "vital lies," 
illusions one creates for the sake of certainty and 
safety. With this safety and certainty, however, comes the 
hubris of the middle and upper classes, the 
self-righteousness accompanying the view that their 
position is, if not decreed by God or birth, is at least hy 
talent and hard work. The reality is, of course, 
considerably more arbitrary. This arbitrariness is hidden 
from children through textbooks and teaching which 
communicate that the world is by and large and orderly, 
sensible place. Particularly for academics and 
intellectuals, many of whom no longer see the world 
especially sensible or orderly, formal knowledge still 
functions as guides for thought and action (1984c, p.8-9). 
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That Pinar describes the "arbitrary" nature of one's position in 
the world, a world which he represents as being characterized by flux 
and fluidity, is emblematic of his ontological understanding. That the 
world is perceived as being not particularly "sensible or orderly" is, 
I suggest, not the "fault" or even necessarily the character or nature 
of the world; it may reflect the inversion of ontological categories 
which certain academics and intellectuals (not to mention the people 
who are neither academics nor intellectuals but who still seek ways of 
guiding their thought and action) have "imposed upon the world." vlhi le 
I am not suggesting that "certainty and safety" are to be achiever! by 
simply substituting one set of categories for another, I bel i.eve that 
an armistice may be made between our egocentric projection of "vi.tal 
lies" and our attentiveness to the transcendent, ontological 
pre-conditions which may be present beyond humanly projected designs. 
Curriculum theorizing as a "field preoccupied with design, development, 
instruction, and evaluation" must, as Pinar has suggested, go beyond 
the cause and effect orientation of male epistemology. But even 
feminist epistemology simply points to a dialectic which considers the 
dependence between subject and object, but seems to deny the 
interdependence of the objects. That is, neither the cause anrl effect 
orientation of male epistemology, nor the mutual dependence of feminist 
epistemology recognizes the possibility of pre-existing, ontologically 
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derived meaning and design. More about this in a moment. 
I am suggesting that Pinar has fallen victim to a 
deconstructionist view which posits that "true reality" is where there 
is no reality. Pinar describes this formula in the following manner: 
It is a formula for "revelation" and "insight" that 
requires distantiation from the everyday. Not the distance 
of alienation, when persons are unknowingly split off from 
social structure and events by their unquestioned belief in 
and fear of them. Revelation suggests a distancing that 
comes when social forms are seen as forms rather than 
timeless realities, when what is common is seen to be 
arbitrary rather than fixed or divinely decreed (1984c, 
p. 6-7). 
Pinar seems to set up a somewhat false dichotomy: "forms" need not 
be either arbitrary nor timeless. That forms may be seen as forms is 
important, but more important, I believe, is how we come to understand 
the source and ontological condition of such forms. As I have 
previously mentioned, Pinar 1 s ontological view is essentially secular 
and transcendent in particularly trans personal and aesthetic 
dimensions. He does not appear to be comfortable with a religious 
dimension such as that described by Berger, or an ontological view such 
as that described by Gadamer. Berger states that "In the religious view 
of reality, all phenomena point toward that which transcends them, and 
this transcendence actively impinges from all sides on the empirical 
sphere of human existence" (1969, p.94). Pinar begins, 1 believe, at 
the opposite side of this ontological order, that of 
.•. the firm ground of lived experience, the truth of 
exceptional and marginal experience. Only hy the 
experience of such firm ground -- what is irrational and 
hidden to the Many - can one sense one 1 s own path, a 
somewhat metaphysical conceptualization of the development 
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of individuality, or individuation" (1984c, p.4). 
Pinar begins with an ontological order from which he asks "I.Jhat 
place in one 1 s psychic life do phenomena occupy?." Berger and Gadamer 
might ask, "Hhat place does one 1 s psychic life occupy in a continuing 
process of creation and meaning making?." Integration for Pinar begins 
with the indivdual 1 s initiating this process. The source of this 
process is the existence of the individual. This, I believe, is 
reflected in Pinar' s use of the phrase "codification of desire it to 
describe the process of curriculum theorizing. But to understand a 
deeper sense of ontological order, that is, to transcend the individual 
as the source of substance, I'd like to refer to Gadamer's depiction of 
this order. Gadamer approaches this issue by discussing the nature of 
"truth." Truth not only exists as a semantic reality, that is may be 
discerned as the result of experience and can be demonstrated in 
sentences which may be analysed as either being true or false. Truth 
in this semantic sense may proceed from the assumption that it is the 
result of arguments or experiments, something that we do. It is based 
on the assumption that "We find the truth." Gadamer describes another 
"version" of truth, that of an ontological truth, which may be 
understood in the claim that "Truth finds us." (Howard, 1982, 
p.123-124). Put another way, 
"... the fundamental conditions for truth's coming to 
light [are] not not simply as the result of a technique 
of something that the subject does -- but as a result of 
something that "happens to us over and above our wanting 
and doing" (Howard, 1982, p.122). 
Thus, truth in this sense, refers not to the "re-production" or 
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"reconstruction" of" meaning, but to the coming into beirrg, of our 
mediating truth from one historical process to a future possibility. 
This is the ontological nature of truth; it exists as a historical 
pre-condition, as not only a "tacit dimension" as described by Polanyi, 
but as a an ontological reality which extends beyond the motives and 
intentions of the subject and contains possibilities which we in turn 
submit to. This is, needless to say, not a simple nor, I might add, 
unimportant concept. Perhaps if I refer to Gadamer 's own description 
of this ontological quality of truth, the importance may be more 
readily grasped: 
What I mean by truth here can best be determined again 
in terms of our concept of play.... Language games are 
where we, as learners -- and when do we cease to be that? 
--rise to the understanding of the world ...• [It is] the 
game itself that plays in that it draws the players into 
itself and thus becomes the actual subjectum of the 
playing. What corresponds to this in the present case is 
neither play with language nor with the contents of the 
experience of the world or of tradition that speaks to us, 
but the play of language itself, which addresses us, 
proposes, and withdraws, asks, and fulfills itself in the 
answer (TM, p.446) (in Howard, 1982, p.l58). 
Gadamer is suggesting that the ontological possibilities (truth) 
of a game resides in "it playing us," that is, submitting to its being 
in the world. Gadarner maintains that, ontologically speaking, we do 
not so much play chess for example as it plays us. To play chess, to 
experience the possibilities of the game is to submit to the order and 
rules inherent in its being, borne along by the tradition which is 
historical and futural. This submission is a form of passivity to the 
being of the game which extends before and beyond us and is not 
exhausted in our playing it. \ve cannot both play the game/have the 
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game play us and remain detached from it. Perhaps another way of 
describing this situation is to say that the figure-ground relationship 
is such that the source of the figure is not our making but the living 
within the horizon of the game. 
the horizon of the ground 
Thus, the horizon of the figure and 
merge. This refers precisely (if 
obliquely!) to the circular hermeneutic process of interpretation. 
Our process of interpretation does not merely reproduce or reconstruct 
extant meanings, but particip9.tes in an ongoing process which is both 
beyond our wanting it to occur, beyond our doing anything to make it 
happen. It is happening precisely because this process is inherent in 
being as opposed to nothing or non-being. This ontological condition 
proceeds "behind our back" so to speak, instead of at our hands. 
Pinar's concept of ontology situates truth at the level of 
desire. He assumes, or to use the hermeneutic phrase, it is his 
prejudice, that meaning is to be created from the source of our 
particular, concrete, lived experience. Gadamer's concept of ontology 
suggests that individual agency does not account for the fact that the 
meaning of a text or object "goes beyond its author." Meaning happens 
to us as much as we desire or intend it to happen. This is the reason 
why this rather difficult topic of ontological order was broached in 
the first place. Given that it is neither technique, nor desire, nor 
motive, nor intentionality which exhausts the possibility for meaning 
to emerge, curriculum theorists must remain open to "codifications" of 
meaning that transcend individual desires. Moreover, the separation of 
individual consciousness from the external world of forms and order 
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must be reconceptualized in light of this ontological distinction. A 
new ecological and ontological awareness can be reflected in curriculum 
thought... but this awareness is not to be gained exclusively through 
what we know of ourselves but through what is beyond us and yet 
contains us. Pinar has occasionally grasped this ontological 
possibility as the following quotation in which he discusses 
"transpersonal educational experience" intimates: 
Such structur~s would be somewhat analogous to Jung's 
notions of archetypes and the collective unconscious. Jung 
writes that 'a more-or-less superficial layer of the 
unconscious is undoubtedly personal. Yet this personal 
unconscious appears to rest upon a deeper layer that does 
not derive from personal experience and achievement but is 
inborn. This layer is the collective unconscious.' So, 
while it it true that each person's intellectual biography 
will be unique, it will eventually become possible to 
uncover the world of transpersonal educational experience 
and to disclose the most profound understanding of the 
educational process possible. Since this conceptual level 
will lie below the details of individual experience, the 
structures identified may also transcend historical 
circumstances and cultural milieu (1975, p.392). 
I suggest that this concept of collective unconscious being inborn 
may be understood in Gadamer 's ontological sense not so much that it 
resides within the individual, but rather that we are born within an 
ontological order. As the reference indicates, Pinar wrote this over 
nine years ago. His more recent theorizing has not seemed to reflect 
this insight. It remains unclear to me why the continues to explore in 
greater and greater detail the "details of individual experience" and 
has commented so rarely or penetratingly on the transpersonal. To 
demonstrate this claim, I wish to turn to Pinar's concept of the 
"biographic function" to disclose a moral and ethical cul-de-sac his 
ontological and conceptual logic has taken him. 
5. "BIOGRAPHIC FUNCTION" AND ITS ATTENDANT 
MORAL AMBIVALENCE 
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Pinar, dra1dng upon the thought of Jung, notes two fundamental 
forms of thinking: the associative and the directed; the objectives of 
these forms"of thinking a~e: 
to render one's own educational experience into 
words •... The second is to use one's critical faculties to 
understand what principles and patterns have been operative 
in one's educational life, hence achieving a more profound 
understanding of one's own educational experience, as well 
as illuminating parts of the inner world and deepening 
one's self-understanding generally. The third task is to 
analyze others' experience to reveal what I call basic 
educational structures or processes that cross biographical 
lines.... This movement toward greater awareness of the 
present should make the researcher more existential in his 
lifetime, more detached from current roles and emotions, 
and more able to recognize the origin of those roles and 
selves and to form those public expressions, i.e., his 
personality, according to his (the genuine self) wishes 
(Pinar, 1975, p.389-390). 
While Pinar has pointed out that "basic educational structures" 
may include the Heideggerian sense of "care" as one such structure, and 
the Jungj_an concept of "collective unconscious" as another, Pinar's 
focus on educational experience tends to focus on the personality of 
the individual and the "codifications of desire" that a genuine self 
initiates. The objective of associative thinking is to find language; 
the directed or critical form of thinking is to uncover one's 
existential sense of agency and initiative. Detachment, an ontological 
grounding of one's roles, and the formation of personality all seem to 
be the basic objectives of critical awareness. That the 
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meaningfullness of the experience of the individual becomes the sole 
criterion upon which actions are judged seems to be central to Pinar's 
critical perspective. His perspective is most clearly portrayed in his 
recent article entitled "Teaching the Text" (1984c), I wish to focus on 
one particular analysis Pinar makes in this article because I believe 
that it distills a central element of Pinar 's ontological and moral 
understanding, 
Pinar's discussion for this particular point focuses on the 
account, in a novel by Robert Musil entitled Young Torless, of a young 
boy's early school experience. Torless was involved in what apparently 
was a rather violent and sadistic rape of a fellow schoolmate, an act 
in which other boys participated and which resulted in his (and their) 
expulsion from the school. Pinar focuses on Torless' later reflection 
on the incident to frame his presentation of the "biographic function" 
of how one assigns meaning to events in life. Pinar states: 
For instance, one would think that Torless' sadistic 
collaboration with his schoolmates 1vould produce lasting 
shame and guilt. Rut, 
• . . when asked whether, looking back on this episode 
of his adolescence, he (Torless) did not after all have a 
feeling of shame, he ans1vered, with a smile, 'Of course, I 
don 1 t deny that it was a degrading affair. And why not? 
The degradation passed off. And yet it left something 
behind -- that small admixture of poison which is needed to 
rid the soul of its overconfident, complacent happiness, 
and to give it instead a sort of health that is more acute, 
and subtler, and more understanding' (p.SO). 
One cannot predict the effect of one's actions upon 
others or upon oneself (in Pinar, 1984c, p.ll). 
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Pinar seems to come to the conclusion that actions themselves are 
morally ambiguous. That we cannot predict the effect of one's actions 
upon others seems to imply that our actions are then only important as 
they relate to the meanings we assign to them. Pinar states this in 
the following manner: 
Biographic function refers exactly to what Tor less' 
comments suggest; namely that experience that might seem, 
from the point of view of safety and certainty, unhealthy 
or noneductional, might prove to be both educational and 
developmentally furthering. One cannot grasp the notion of 
biographic effect unless one situates educational 
experience individually, that is to say in individual 
lives, lives with histories, and lives with particular 
future paths, paths the discovery and rediscovery of which 
is a paramount calling for each of us, if we wish to be 
individuals.... Any action can function to shock one to 
such sight (1984c, p.ll-12). 
Pinar 1 s analysis of Tor less' comments presents for me an problem 
that is extremely disturbing, and perhaps, one which causes me the 
utmost difficulty in deciphering. Pinar's position in this discussion 
is so foreign to my orientation to human action that I scarcely know 
where to begin a critique. Pinar 's sense of "biographic function" only 
seems to make sense to me if the individual is the sole unit of 
analysis of human activity. Pinar clearly identifies this to be the 
case in his discussion. What is particularly disturbing in his 
analysis of Torless' reflection is both his and Torless' lack of 
recognition that our actions do not merely concern us, are not solely 
for our gratification or benefit or peril. Neither Torless nor Pinar 
seem to be at all concerned about the "other" -- in this case the chap 
who was raped -- in their assessment of the incident. That that action 
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of rape, considered as simply "any action" that can "shock one into 
awareness," is not examined in light of the experience of others is a 
dreadful reductionism, a moral and ethical depravity which is hard to 
ignore. Pinar seems to excuse this amoral condition by maintaining 
that "reality does reveal frightening impulses and instincts which 
cannot always he sublimated or otherwise controlled" (1984c, p.7). I 
do not deny the reality of "frightening impulses" (I'm not quite so 
sure about whether or not to attribute human behavior to instinctual 
programs), nor do I deny the uncontrollable nature of human acts, but 
that this situation excuses one from any moral or ethical assessment of 
these actions is most doubtful. It appears to me to be somewhat ironic 
that Pinar, who has sought so valiantly against submission to "the 
given," seems to capitulate rather effortlessly to the givenness of 
violence, impulsive behavior, ·and instinct. 
Pinar comments on the lack of control in the story of Young 
Tor less: "It is this control that is absent in the sado-masochistic 
world of Young Torless, and it is this lack lvhich in this novel permits 
extraordinary experience" (1984c, p. 7). "Extraordinary" in a most 
macabre and brutal manner. While excessive control may le~,i to a 
"numbness" in our experience is undeniable, but a lack of control as 
manifested in the novel leads to a numbness of a different sort -- a 
moral and ethical numbness that is, I believe, hardly justifiable in 
any other than the most normatively relativistic of educational 
perspectives. Pinar seems to recognize this when he cites a comment 
made on Sartre's Nausea: "Nausea is akin to an experience of 'melting' 
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'The veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, in disorder 
naked, with a frightening, obscene nakedness. "' (in Pinar, 1984c, 
p.9). That the rubbing out of the "feeble landmarks" men have traced 
on the surface of things resu'Its in monstrosity and not beauty is 
central to my understanding of Pinar's (via Sartre's) view of the 
world. Pinar seems to include in the category of "feeble landmarks" 
all normative frameworks, all systems of social constraints (whether 
necessary or excessive), all institutions which have been hi3torically 
developed to protect the weak or ''underprivileged." Quoting from 
Pinar 1 s own reflections in his autobiographic writing: "Does aspiration 
to become conscious necessarily involve such distain of the social?" 
(n.d., p.25). It may not "necessarily" require it, but Pinar seems to 
have adopted such distain, if inadvertantly. In order not to 
"reproduce" the social and all its grotesque inequalities and 
distortions, Pinar seems to jettison the noble and worthwhile as well. 
This attitude is also evident in his "oedipal strategy" "whose aim 
is dissolution of the oedipal complex, of the familial, social, and 
economic structures which accompany it' (1983, p.33). Pinar goes on to 
state: 
This strategy shares the interest in 
"non-reproduction." It is a male who loses interest in his 
ontological and political status as "first cause," as the 
locus and impetus of generation. He becomes degenerate 
(1983 ' p . 33) . 
This degeneration has been intimated earlier. The "student as 
traveler" was, perhaps its earliest sign. This rather non-ecologic 
metaphor seemed to suggest that the student could undertake this 
254 
endless journey, seeking and consuming stimultion, heightening his or 
her awareness, justifying all actions by whether or not they met one's 
self-derived expectations and desires. And all the while, someone 
presumably kept the allowance coming, harvested the food, cared for the 
sick and the poor, and at~8~ded to the needs of the community at home. 
What Joseph Campbell in his Hero With ~Thousand Faces points out, but 
Pinar fails to recognize, is that the journey out of one's cultural 
background and community, presumes a return -- a return anticipated by 
those who remain, a return to the responsibilities of community life, 
and a return which signals an initiation into the cc,mmunity, not an 
initiation by the individual. Pinar seems to be cognizant of the value 
of community, but he chafes under its needs and demands. He, himself, 
has stated that "Nor can we believe in the bourgeois abstraction 'the 
individual, 1 whose claimed independence was in effect a disguise for 
self-aggrandizement at the cost of community" (n.d., p.7). Pinar's 
most recent writing seems to blur the distinction between "biographic 
function" and this self-aggandizement, for if one cannot even consider 
the consequences of one's actions upon the other, if we cannot 
anticipate the future possibilites residing in our ontological nature, 
then the community is, indeed, lost. 
6. RECONCEPTUALISM: FAILURE TO THRIVE SYNDROME 
In his gothic article "Death in a Tenured Position" (1984b), Pinar 
states "The Reconceptualization, as a social movement within curriculum 
studies, is dead" (p.S). That Pinar came to see Reconceptualization as 
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as social movement is noteworthy, given his earlier assessment that the 
term merely signified a loose aggregate of curriculum theorists 1~ho 
were in no way really linked in any collective endeavor. Pinar has 
resisted until the present the possibility that "the 
Reconceptualization" might become Reconceptualism. That it might become 
an "ism" like Marxism, Taylorism, or humanism, seemed to bode only a 
tendency toward dogmatism and parochialism. I respect his resistance 
to this tendency, but I suggest that this attitude may well have 
represented the very distance that prevented the Reconceptualization's 
transformation into a community of meaning. Pinar and Miller (1982) 
point to the fragility of this union: 
These individuals [reconceptualists] represented 
disparate intellectual traditions but joined together in a 
fragile political coalition, uniting in opposition to 
traditional curriculum work, work they judged to be 
politically native (sic) [naive?] and theoretically 
primitive. This origin of the "Reconceptualization" . meant 
that the bond united this group was as political as it was 
intellectual. The Reconceptualization was in this sense a 
social movement within an academic field. It is crucial to 
recognize that its collapse is as a social movement only; 
the intellectual work continues (p.S). 
Just as "the economic and political basis of traditional 
curriculum work began to disappear" (1982, p.4), so have the economic 
and political bases of the RP.conceptualization begun to disappear. 
Perhaps the same criticism Pinar leveled against the "social 
reconstructionists" can be made against Reconceptualization: "Social 
reconstructionists fail to recognize that oppression and exploitation 
are a fundamental characteristic of class structure in the United 
States and cannot be altered by tinkering with the schools" ( 1975, 
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p.l70). A vast amount of the theorizing informing the 
Reconceptualization focused on school-related topics. A significant 
remainder of the theorizing focused on "tinkering" with the 
consciousness of the individual. Both failed to recognize the 
behavioral ecology of either the "movement" or the individual. Pinar 
attempted to address a rapprochement among collective and individual 
foci, but the "fragile political coalition" had already splintered: 
"The two orders of liberative work collective and individual, matter 
and consciousness -- are correlative. They are companion efforts which 
ought not to be at war with each other, attempting to reduce one to the 
other" (1982, p.l3). But Pinar identifies the real malaise in another 
comment; the malaise was not internecine warfare, but a failure to 
thrive -- albeit a kind not threatening to an infant, but to the adult 
counterpart who responds identically to the conditions which constitute 
the "failure to thrive syndrome": inability to bond, sensual 
deprivation, isolation and withdrawl. Pinar describes the condition in 
the following manner: 
The danger is not murder but suicide. The crisis of 
the present time is thus not only political and economic. 
It is a crisis of heart, of spirit. Whatever form our 
aspirations and our work takes, that form requires the 
strength and wariness that might come from a continuing 
realization that the defeat of our project is threatened 
not only from political events but from personal ones as 
well (1984b, p.6). 
As is his mein, Pinar takes an individualistic view of the 
problem. Personal problems and events forestall the survival of the 
movement. I would suggest that while personal crises contribute to the 
threat, selecting the individual as unit of analysis cannot help to 
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save a collective victim. It is precisely this orientation that has 
failed to account for the social, political and cultural resources 
necessary to sustain a movement... or transform oppressive conditions 
within American society. 
Pinar identifies various "competencies" which are called for if 
the individual (and organizations) are to achieve some semblance of 
viability: 
••. one must be able to participate in a variety of 
group processes, committees, research teams, sales teams, 
and so on, in ways that are sensitive to the feelings, 
perceptions, and even semi- and unconscious motives of 
others (1984b, p.4). 
While Pinar's observation continues to emphasize the personal 
agency of the individual, he opens the door to collective endeavors 
which demand participatory competence, group identity and larger units 
of analysis. He misreads, however, as did Maxine Greene, the role of 
the individual in social, political and corporate settings. 
states that 
From the corporate point of view, what is needed is 
literate but imaginative and self-reliant individuals, 
individuals who can conceptualize the series of tasks 
associated with a job, and imagine more effective 1vays to 
perform those tasks (1984b, p.2). 
Pinar 
Unfortunately, Pinar plays right into the hands of bureaucratic 
and authoritarian forms of corporate management. The more workers 
focus on individual needs, the more the individual is oriented to the 
"tasks" of job performance, the less likely is the possibility that 
that individual will recognize his or her membership in the collective 
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identity of labor. Taylorism gained ascendency and continues in the 
scientific management programs of today precisely because the 
individual was reduced to the individual, a cog in the machinery of 
production. The organized labor movement represents one attempt at 
helping to counter the distortion of power relationships in 1vorkplace 
organization. Autonomous \York groups have addressed this alienating 
condition of the individual "stuck" (however imaginatively or 
self-reliantly) within a narrow range of action possibilites. Quality 
of Working Life programs have the potential of redefining ~York 
environments (as they have successfully done in Sweden) to include not 
only material conditions such as air, light, noise, but the 
psycho-social conditions as well. Thus, the liberation process must be 
directed at liberating ourselves not only from psychological, political 
and economic inequalities, but from the very ontological perspectives 
which assume that we each, and individually, are masters of our fate. 
This is not just a semantic argument or a debate over "starting 
points"; it is a profoundly crucial clarification of human 
possibility. When Pinar asks the question (to uncover the degree and 
kinds of "other-directedness" we manifest): "Hhose am I?", I suggest 
that the reply might include "I am of the Universe, and we are One." 
IV. RAPPROCHEMENT: TRANSCENDING METHODOLOGICAL SOLIPSISM 
SPECULATATIONS ON DEHOCRATIC PEDAGOGY 
But what's wrong with that man? 
All afternoon (yesterday the day before yesterday and 
today) he's been sitting there staring at a flame 
he bumped into me at evening as he went downstairs 
he said to me: 
"The body dies the water clouds the soul 
hesitates 
and the wind forgets always forgets 
but the flame doesn't change." 
He also said to me: 
"You knmv I love a woman who's gone away perhaps to the 
nether world; that's not why I seem so deserted 
I try to keep myself going with a flame 
because it doesn't change." 
Then he told me the story of his life. 
George Seferis, "Nr. Stratis 
Thalassinos Describes a Man" 
A. THE ECLIPSE OF EPISTEHOLOGY 
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John Fowles begins his novel Daniel Martin with the line "hTHOLE 
SIGHT; OR ALL THE REST IS DESOLATION." This statement may well be the 
leitmotif or motto of this dissertation. This dissertation grew out of 
my perception that, despite pockets of affluence, scattered voices of 
idealism, and oftentimes dazzling ciisplays of technological innovation, 
there is something grotesque and threatening afoot. I do not mean to 
ressurrect the "Manichean Heresy" which divided the world into two 
competing forces of good and evil (Reagan has done this recently when 
he depicted the Soviet Union as "an evil empire"), but I wish to call 
attention to an hegemonic myopia which has brought not only 
"civilization as we know it" but all life forms to the brink of 
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extinction. E. F. Schumacher ( 1973) has pointed to this development, 
couched in terms of "production," in modern western cultures: 
The arising of this error, so egregious and so firmly 
rooted, is closely connected with the philosophical, not to 
say religious, changes during the last three or four 
centuries in man's attitude to nature. I should perhaps 
say: western man's attitude to nature, but since the whole 
world is now in a process of westernization, the more 
generalized statement appears to be justified. Modern man 
does not experience himself as part of nature but as a 
outside force destined to dominate and conquer it. He even 
talks of a battle with nature, forgetting that, if he won 
the battle, he would find himself on the losing side. 
Until quite recently, the battle seemed to go well enough 
to give him the illusion of unlimited powers, but not so 
well as to bring the possibility of total victory into 
view. This has now come to view, and many people, albeit 
only a minority, are beginning to realize what this means 
for the continued existence of humanity (p.l3). 
It is not so much evil, but rather ignorance, blindness and a lack 
of understanding that has brought us to this perilous time. This is a 
painful admission to make, one which makes for unsociable "cocktail 
conversation," is a proverbial "wet blanket." I wish to make it clear 
that (echoing the "blanket" metaphor) this is not a blanket 
condemnation of human evolution -- for just people and institutions, 
loving relationships, compassion and beauty are present in this world. 
In the midst of plenty and poverty one may find, as Berger has 
suggested, "signals of transcendence." But just as there are signals 
of transcendence there are also signals of abnegation -- against hope 
we find despair, against play we find stultifying autonomism, 
counterposed against order we find chaos, against the moral act of 
condemnation there is relativism and ambivalence, and against humor 1ve 
find grim resignation and hubris. 
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I have selected the pervasive presence of alienation in human 
experience as a focus for exploring an intersection of these signals of 
abnegation. The discourse of curriculum theorizing has been revieweri 
with an eye for its understanding or lack of understanding of this 
human condition. I wished to examine several curriculum theorists whom 
I believe are influential in the field, have resonated with my own 
theorizing and who have contributed to a widening of my own horizon of 
understanding. Hhile these theorists may or may not have directly 
spoken to the issue of alienation, I have read them with this 
"prejudice" in mind. In like manner, I have attempted to explore 
conceptual frameworks, modes of research and language, and world views, 
which might assist me in orienting my awareness to counter-alienating 
possibilities for educational practice and which might, in turn, be 
reintroduced into the curriculum conversation. In part, this search 
has been an attempt to address my own feeling of alienation from 
intrapersonal, interpersonal and socio-political dimensions of being. 
In this regard, the research and creation of this dissertation has 
contained an element of personal therapy. This project has helped me 
transcend the "amputation from the trunk" of being by introducing me to 
ideas and perspectives which reaffirmed the existence of a trunk •.. 
not only a trunk, but roots and a firmament lvhich support this 
metaphysical and physical form. 
I have attempted to locate in the various traditions of 
speculation and discourse a community of meaning, not unlike the search 
Huebner made for "structures of care" and Purpel made for a "prophetic 
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tradition," which holds these questions and issues as not only 
interesting and stimulating, but important. And to my delight and 
comfort, such communities exist. It is my hope that my discussion of 
curriculum theorizing may help to bring about greater understanding 
a rapprochement -- between communi ties which have by and large, been 
speaking past one another. 
So from an initial interest in the topic of alienation and 
counter-alienating praxis, my inquiry turned upon six dimensions: 
descriptions of constraints upon human possibility, an analysis of 
language and metaphor, human interests and knowledge, interpretation 
and meaning, which led eventually to a consideration of humanity's 
ontological condition and a normative approach to human action. l.Jhat 
may have begun more as a concern for programatic ways of "improving 
educational practice" turned toward the ontological question James B. 
Macdonald asked: "Why is there being rather than nothing?". As Huebner 
has pointed out, no convincing or iron-clad answer can be formed for 
such a question. But in the entertaining of such a question, one may 
come to a more conscious awareness of the fragility and the resiliance 
of being .•• as well as the value of being over non-being. Once again, 
the issue of alienation proved to be a catalytic focus for such an 
inquiry. 
Schumacher again sheds light on this movement from non-being to 
being, from unconscionable oversimplification to an awareness of hO\v 
complex and intricate our participation in the course of life is: 
Estrangement breeds loneliness and despair, the 
1 encounter with nothingness 1 , cynicism, empty gestures of 
defiance, as we can see in the greater part of 
existentialist philosophy and general literature today. Or 
it suddenly turns -- as I have mentioned before -- into the 
ardent adoption of a fanatical teaching which, by a 
monstrous simplification of reality, pretends to answer all 
questions. So, what is the cause of estrangement? Never 
has science been more triumphant; never has man 1 s power 
over his environment been more complete nor his ·progress 
faster. It cannot be a lack of know-how that causes the 
despair not only of religious thinkers like Kierkegaard but 
also of leading mathematicians and scientists like Russell 
and Hoyle. \ve know how to do many things, but do we know 
what to do? Ortega y Gasset !_)lit it succinctly: "We cannot 
live on the human level without ideas. Upon them depends 
what we do. Living is nothing more or less than doing one 
thing instead of another." \.Jhat, then, is education? It 
is the transmission of ideas which enable man to choos2 
between one thing and another, or to quote Ortega again, 
"to live a life which is something above meaninglessness 
tragedy or inward disgrace" (p.79). 
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But this issue of "choice" brings us only part way from the 
powerlessness associated with alienation; Dostoevski has pointed to the 
problematic nature of choice and freedom. "Choice" itself offered no 
real clue to the escape from "meaningless tragedy or inward disgrace." 
A comment made by William Graham Sumner might indicate the inadequacy 
of such a notion: 
if a chance (sic) is used one way it results in gain 
or advantage; if it is used the other way it issues in loss 
or disadvantage. A chance, therefore, has no moral quality 
or value; the moral question is what will be done with 
it?" (in Lewis, 1979, p.6). -- --- -- --
Clearly, then, Sumner misrepresents the very essence of human and 
cosmic interpenetration. Sumner 1 s blatant opportunism situates human 
agency at the center of an "accounting system." But the criteria, as 
well as the source of our "chances" and our "choices" remain quite 
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vague and shallowly understood. Unfortunately, much of educational 
theory and practice seems to be embedded within the same gain-loss 
calculus Sumner depicts. Little attention is paid to the conditions 
which permit, aye invite the potentiality to choose. In other words, 
most educational theorizing is as topsy-turvy as the ontology depicted 
in Sumner's view: value is assigned only to what we do and not to (or 
to speak dialectically and with an ontological concern from) the very 
ground of our being in the world. Thus, it is not surprising that a 
morality based upon a simplistic utilitarian view has brought us to the 
environmental and moral crisis we are presently witnessing. That a 
"winnable nuclear war" is still talked about, that food is used as 
blackmail against political regimes in Third World countries, and that 
the earth is raped for monetary gain is evidence of this moral and 
intellectual depravity. 
Having come to recognize the short-sightedness of technical 
rationality, and the need for more personally satisfying and meaningful 
conceptions of human possibility, it is perhaps not unexpected that my 
inquiry turned to an examination of meaning and understanding. In this 
regard, I started from a need to understand how meaning is arrived at, 
how it might be conveyed; therefore, language, symbols and metaphors 
were a "logical" step ::n this direction. But it soon became clear that 
meaning and representation call for more than a sense of literacy or 
syntactical structures. Meaning implies a grasp of some element of 
truth. And the "truths" we live by and through are as varied as the 
cultures and traditions present, past and future, distributed 
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throughout the world. How then might we ever arrive at some 
perspective that accounts for these disparate and at times discordant 
claims to truth? 
Kuhn (1970), Feyerabend (1975) and Rorty (1979, 1982) have all 
discussed the "incommensurability" of discourse centered within ctiverse 
paradigms. Paradigms as cultures, or as part of cultures, help to 
organize and rationalize the mea~ings and conventions existing within 
these communities. Feyerabend has offered an iconoclastic and playful 
analysis of how these incommensurable meaning communities seek to 
maintain or expand their domain. It is not through a competition of 
reasoned argument and debate, of proving or disproving the "truths" 
found in different meaning systems, but rather " ••• an argument becomes 
effective only if supported by an appropriate attitude and has no 
effect when the attitude is missing" (p.8). It follows from 
Feyerabend's claim here, that we will change our comprehension of the 
"truth" only when we cultivate the attitude which allows for this to 
occur. Feyerabend refers to this change as "conversion" rather than 
simply modification. Macdonald and Huebner have referred to this 
"attitude" as one of openness. Feyerabend describes this possibility 
for change when he describes the exchange between cultures as "an open 
exchange, not a rational exchange" (p.85). This attitude of openness, 
then, must in a sense transcend the standards and conventions of our 
meaning structures. Feyerabend states this in a somewhat different 
manner: "We, on the other hand, retain the lesson that the validity, 
usefulness, adequacy of popular standards can be tested only by 
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research that violates them" ( p. 35) • In other words, we cannot hope to 
expand our horizons by simply refining and purifying the logic and 
methods we deem almost unassailable. Feyerabend brashly maintains that 
"theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to 
encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives." Feyerabend 's 
considerable wit and intelligence not only dethrone "scientific 
knowledge" and rese.arch paradigms, but they sketch a vision of human 
inquiry which radically democratizes and broadens participation in 
cultural exchange. Against methodological and epistemological 
constraints, Feyerabend proposes that the arena of discourse be 
widened, a "free society" be created \vhere presently disciplinary and 
cultural ghettos exist: 
A free society is a society in which all traditions 
have equal rights and equal access to the centres of power 
(this differs from the customary definition where 
individuals have equal rights of access to positions 
defined by a special tradition (p.9). 
The excellence of any system of thought can only be asserted after 
it has faced all comers as equals in a social and political arena. 
Feyerabend would maintain, and I concur, that dogmatism is rampant and 
constrains alternative perspectives not merely by unintentionally 
limiting access to competing views, but by fundamentally denying the 
right of these alternative views to be heard (denying entry visas to 
leftist artists and politicians, expunging references to strikes and 
riots from school textbooks, etc.). The implications of this line of 
argument for research methods and educational practice will be 
discussed later. But suffice it to say here that Feyerabend 
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anticipated Rappaport 1 s Rule: "When most people agree with you, worry" 
(1981, p.3). Feyerabend, then, counters "methodological solipsism" by 
calling attention to the presence of an "a priori of communication," as 
Gadamer likewise did, and broadens a configuration of "rights" to 
include not only individuals, but cultures and traditions as well. It 
is a significant leap to make -- from individual rights to cultural 
rights -- but the really difficult one, I believe, is to make the leap 
from ascribing rights to cultures and traditions to ontological 
conditions, to a right for the forms of life in the universe to not 
only exist, but to be a source of value as well as a "thing" we value. 
This revisioning of our ontological condition is aptly stated by Ruth 
~anda Anshen in her eloquent prefatory remarks to Margaret Head 1 s 
Letters From The Field 1925-1975 (1977): 
• . • that the sin of hubris may be avoided by showing 
that the creative process itself is not a free activity if 
by free we mean arbitrary, or unrelated to cosmic law. For 
the creative process in the human mind, the developmental 
process in organic nature and the basic laws of the 
1norganic realm may be varied expressions of a universal 
formative process (p.xix). 
Thus, both personal and cultural values may be seen as fragments 
and residues of a unity \vhich is not only "brought a bout" through human 
valuing, but which beckons to consciousness in all its myriad forms. 
But I am getting ahead of the story, and wish to return to the 
rationale, the attitude, from which an hermeneutic orientation to 
experience may be seen as a progression from the "theoretical 
anarchism" of Feyerabend. 
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In Richard J. Bernstein's lucid and synoptic book entitled Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (1983), 
Bernstein anticipates this "leap" that I have been intimating. He 
states that: 
There has been a dramatic shift in 1vhat is taken to be 
the significant epistemological unit for coming to grips 
with problems of the rationality of science. In the 
philosophy of science, and more generally in contemporary 
analytic epistemology, we have witnessed an internal 
dialectic that has moved from the preoccupation (virtually 
an obsession) with the isoJ.ated individual term, to the 
sentence or proposition, to the conceptual scheme or 
framework, to an ongoing historical tradition constituted 
by social practices -- a move.ent from logical atomism to 
historical dynamic continuity (this author's emphasis, 
p.24). 
Bernstein traces a development which, I believe, takes us well 
along the way to an ontological perspective. Bernstein points out that 
the shift from "logical atomism" or paradigm-bound theorizing can, and 
perhaps has, been transcended. \vhHe he stops short of advocating a 
consideration of "cosmic consciousness" such as that described by 
Fechner, he does open up the prospect of viewing knowledge and 
conceptual frameworks in terms of an "historical dynamic continuity. 11 
\vhile this "continuity" is discussed in terms of social practices, it 
is not impossible to envision larger frames of reference (such as 
ecologic and spiritual) for such a continuity. But I believe that 
Bernstein 1 s appreciation of the work of Habermas, Rorty, Gadamer and 
Arendt, contributes to a reassessment of epistemology as a focus for 
understanding. The shift from epistemological concerns to hermeneutic 
and ontological ones is, I believe, not widely understood. It is most 
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unfortunate that this "development" has not yet been widely graRped, 
for much of the antagonism and divisiveness 11h:l:ch currently 
characterizes social and political (read: tradition and culture-based) 
confrontations might be ameliorated by this recognition. Bernstein 
points to the work of Rorty as being a significant clarification of 
recent philosophical insights: 
Rorty argues that it is epistemology that has been the 
basis for and stands at the center of modern philosophy. 
But he portrays the death of epistemology or, more 
accurately, shows why it should be abandoned. It is in the 
aftermath of epistemology (and its successor disciplines) 
that hermeneutics becomes relevant - not as leading to a 
new "constructive" foundational discipline but as "an 
expression of hope that the cultural space left by the 
demise of epistemology will not be filled -- that our 
culture should become one in which the demand for 
constraint and confrontation is no longer felt" (p.lll). 
It is hermeneutics, not epistemology, which Rorty (1979) suggests is an 
appropriate starting point for a revisioning of cultural pluralism and 
conversation, not confrontation: 
Epistemology views the participants as united in what 
Oakeshott calls an universitas -- a group united by mutual 
interests in achieving a common end. Hermeneutics views 
them as united in what he calls societas -- persons whose 
paths through life have fallen together, united by civility 
rather than a common goal, much less a common ground 
(p.318). 
That Rorty points to a different conceptual and normative logic than 
"common ends" is significant. Hhat he suggests we must base our 
"conversation" upon is not the commensurability of what we each know, 
but upon the fact that we ontologically exist together and that a form 
of social hope and openness need transcend our preoccupation with 
certainty, uniformity and self-interest. Hermeneutics cultivates both 
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this openness and this hope for transcending our horizons of 
understanding. We are united not in our beliefs and values, but in our 
being together. Bernstein quotes Gadamer in this regard: 
Once again we discover that the person 11Tith 
understanding (synesis) does not know and judge as one who 
stands apart and unaffected; but rather, as one united by a 
specific nond with the other, he thinks with the other and 
undergoes the situation 1vith him (TM, p.288, in Bernstein, 
1983, p.l64). 
Gadamer indicates a position which escapes both objectivism and 
relativism by formulating not a methodology which might save us from 
constraints and compulsion, but, to echo Buber, a communion 1vhich 
unites us in the spirit of both human relationships and ontological 
condition. Our "truths" however derived and expressed are a reflection 
of truth in our being, a truth which "transcends the 1vorld of facts." 
More will be said about this shortly. 
But I wish to tie this discussion to two specific issues: the 
practical and political consequences which a philosophical orientation 
implies, and a metaphysical consideration efter. I return to Bernstein 
for a discussion of the former issue. Bernstein (1983) states: 
Throughout my discussion of Gadamer, Habermas, .Rorty, 
and Arendt, I have sought to elicit the common concerns 
that they share, without denying the important differences 
among them. In all of them we have felt a current that 
keeps drawing us to the central themes of dialogue, 
conversation, undistorted communication, communal judgment, 
and the type of rational wooing that can take place when 
individuals confront each other as equals and 
participants. We have been made aware of the practical and 
political consequences of these concepts for as we 
explore their implications, they draw us toward the goal of 
cultivating the types of dialogic communities in 1vhich 
phronesis, judgment, and practical discourse become 
concretely embodied in our everyday practices (p.223). 
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Oakeshott has described education as an "invitation to participate 
in the 'Great Conversation'." In this light, dialogic communities, or 
communities of meaning, are units which, in part due to their 
historical continuity and synthetic quality, transcend personal 
agency. This does not deny the importance of personal agency nor 
praxis. But what this orientation provides that technical, 
psychologized or individualized frames of reference do not provide is a 
continuity which transcends self interest. Bernstein, referring to the 
practical and political dimension of hermeneutics, draws upon a 
dialectical understanding from Marx: 
As Harx cautions us, it is not sufficient to try to 
come up with some new variations of arguments that will 
show, once and for all, what is wrong with objectivism and 
relativism, or even to open up a way of thinking that can 
move us beyond objectivism and relativism; such a movement 
gains "reality and power" only if we dedicate ourselves to 
the practical task of furthering the type of solidarity, 
participation, and mutual recognition that is founded in 
dialogical communities (p.231). 
This dialogue provides the opportunity, affords the right, for 
diverse perspectives and truths to be raised and entertained. This, I 
would maintain is a liberative possibility, one which is quite 
different from the possibility promulgated by some rude (or even 
elegant) universal standard of truth. Thus, an hermeneutic approach to 
understanding counters privileged positions of power and authority, 
questions the "normal," and opens one to the alien, foreign and 
strange. It is a courageous perspective, and one \vhich validates the 
experience of the other while not invalidating our own experience. 
Rorty (1979), I believe, has captured this possibility well when he 
describes how this conversation and dialogue might be "edifying": 
Since "education" sounds a bit too flat, and Bildung 
[self-formation] a bit too foreign, I shall use 
"edification" to stand for this project of finding nevr, 
better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking. 
The attempt to edify (ourselves or others) may consist in 
the hermeneutic activity of making connections betw~en our 
own culture and some exotic culture or historical period, 
or between our own discipline and another discipline which 
seems to pursue incommensurable aims in an incommensurable 
vocabulary. But it may instead consist in the "poetic" 
activity of thinking up such new aims, new words, or new 
disciplines, followed by, so to speak, the inverse of 
hermeneutics: the attempt to reinterpret our familiar 
surroundings in the unfamiliar terms of our new 
inventions. In either case, the activity is (despite the 
etymological relation between the two words) edifying 
without being constructive -- at least if "constructive" 
means the sort of cooperation in the accomplishment of 
research programs 1vhich takes place in normal discourse. 
For edifying discourse is supposed to be abnormal, to take 
us out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to 
aid us in becoming new beings (p.360). 
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Hhile Rorty seems to discount hermeneutic understanding some1vhat 
by denying its attention to the "horizon within," I would suggest that 
hermeneutic understanding precisely provides the opportunity for 
engaging in the "poetic" activity Rorty advocates. Ricoeur has pointed 
this out when he speaks to the "mytho-poetic core" of understanding 
which is central to any (but specifically an hermeneutic) approach to 
the expressions of meaning from any culture -- that of another or our 
own. But what Rorty has done, and his perspective shares many aspects 
of that of Feyerabend, is he advocates for openness and praxis: 
"Edifying philosophy is not only abnormal but reactive, having sense 
only as a protest against attempts to close off conversation by 
proposals for universal commensuration through hypostatization of some 
privileged set of descriptions" (p.377). Rorty's, and Feyerabend's 
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points are well taken and will be considered when I discuss practice 
implications in a later section. But at this point of the discussion 
let me conclude with the observation that the shift from epistemology 
to hermeneutics has contributed to broadening both the sense of rights 
from within a cultural context to across cultural horizons, and has 
openned up the possibility for expanding our repertoire of 
self-descriptions. By implication I mean that through hermeneutic 
understanding we may be less alienated by that which is not understood 
by us (whether this otherness be described in terms of abnormality, 
strangeness, foreignness, incommensurability, etc.). In this light, I 
1vould suggest that hermeneutic interpretation and understanding frees 
us to consider alternative rationalities, diverse traditions, and other 
cultures for their illuminative power. 
potentiality that I now turn. 
It is to this liberative 
B. TRUTH, FAITH AND METAPHYSICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
1villiam James described truth as "what it is better for us to 
believe" rather than "the accurate representation of reality." In this 
light, I would suggest that it is better for us to believe in the 
possibility of a "free society," of "openness," 6f intimacy, 
affiliation and moral and ethical behavior. I 1vould also suggest that 
it is "better" to believe in truth as a living presence in the 1vor lrl 
rather than it being contingent upon our constructing it. I come to 
this conclusion, because this belief allows for greater possibility 
than its inverse; and because 11what may be better" need not be what we 
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Eind represented in the "normal" course of our day-to-day experience in 
the world. I refer the reader back to an earlier quotation of James: 
"The significance of a thing is more important than its tangibility." 
That we have suffered and are suffering under the domination of 
scientific rationality and .its eviscerated version of truth is 
regretable... but it is also not immutable. A.s I have poi:1ted out 
earlier, hermeneutic understanding can promote the affirmation of the 
other and oneself, the foreign and the familiar. It calls for a civic 
courage and an ontological attentiveness. I would suggest that it is 
by such courage and attentiveness that the evisceration of truth and 
its attendant alienation may be countered. I have referred earlier to 
the provocative philosophy of Fechner, and it is to him I return at 
this juncture. William James describes Fechner's contribution to this 
issue as follows: 
The original sin, according to Fechner, of both our 
popular and our scientific thinking, is our inveterate 
habit of regarding the spiritual not as the rule but as an 
exception in the midst of nature. Instead of believing our 
life to be fed at the breasts of the greater life, our 
individuality to be sustained by the greater individuality, 
which must necessarily have more consciousness and more 
independence than all that it brings forth, we habitually 
treat what lies outside our life as so much slag and ashes 
of life only; or if we believe in a Divine Spirit, we fancy 
him on the one side as bodiless, and nature as soulless on 
the other. Hhat comfort, or peace, Fechner asks, can come 
from such a doctrine? The flowers 1vither at its breath, 
the stars turn into stone; our o1.,rn body grows umvorthy of 
our spirit and sinks to a tenement for carnal senses only. 
The book of nature turns into a volume on mechanics, in 
which whatever has life is treated as a sort of anomaly; a 
great chasm of separation yawns between us and all that is 
higher than ourselves; and God becomes a thin nest of 
abstractions (1909, In McDermott, 1977, p.S35). 
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It is my belief that an ontological awareness rescues us from not 
only a wo;:-1~ .J~picted as "slag and ashes," spirituality as "a thin nest 
of abstractions," but from the very real danger that the world will he 
reduced to slag and ashes and that human beings alienated by 
abstractions and cut off from an intimate communion with the world will 
be the cause of it. Just as there is a pervasive sense of alienation 
and withdrawl from the world of nature as well as social and political 
domains, there have been some thinkers who maintain that this withrlrawl 
is not to be fatalistically considered nor acceded to. One such 
thinker is Hartin Lings \vho states: 
If it can be said that man collectively shrinks back 
more and more from the Truth, it can also be said that on 
all sides the Truth is closing in more and more upon man. 
It might almost be said, in order to receive a touch of It, 
which in the past required a lifetime of effort, all that 
is asked of him now is not to shrink back. And yet how 
difficult this is! (1964, In Schumacher, 1973, p.278). 
Thus, just as alienation and abstraction (and I would comment that the 
presence of competition, greed, violence and hatred are manifestations 
of alienation and grotesque individualism) are at crushing levels, 
there are reserves of hope and affirmation in the midst of this 
ennervating condition. \vhile this sense of hope and affirmation may 
not be prominent, there is no reason why curriculum theorizing cannot 
serve to make the:n more prominent. This qualitative and religious 
dimension, while perhaps not appearing as high-tech or sexy as 
modernist cultures are wont to appear, may contribute to a counter 
proposal against such superficiality. Ruth Nanda Anshen refers to this 
"counterforce" and its potentiality: 
There is in mankind today a counterforce to the 
sterility and danger of a quantitative, anony~ous mass 
culture; a new, i£ sometimes imperceptible, spiritual sense 
of convergence toward human and world unity on the basis of 
the sacredness of each human person and respect for the 
plurality of cultures. There is a growing awareness that 
equality may not be evaluated in mere numerical terms but 
is proportionate and analogical in its reality. For when 
equality is equated with interchangeability, individuality 
is negated and the human person transmuted into a faceless 
mask (In Mead, 1977, p.xix). 
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Few writers in the field of curriculum seem to have come to a 
recognition of this spiritual sense. Certainly D1vayne Huebner, James 
B. Macdonald, and David Purpel have. Others such as Ross Mooney, 
Florence Krall, Phillip Phenix, and Roger Simon also seem to have 
recognized this sense. But given the focus of this section so far on 
the topics of truth and faith, I believe that David Purpel's theorizing 
most directly and sensitively addresses these topics. 
Purpel has long advocated that education be viewed as and be a 
moral endeavor. Drawing upon the work of Kohl berg, Gilligan, and his 
o1m theorizing about moral development, Purpel has contributed 
significantly to the conscience of curriculum theorizing. His most 
recent article entitled "Public Education and the American Heritage" 
( 1984) represents to me the clearest articulation of his historical 
grounding, and speaks eloquently of education not only as a moral and 
ethical activity, but of education as participating in a tradition of 
spiritual attentiveness and being. Purpel's article 
deals with the rhetoric of educational policy, with 
the major theme being that those of us who are fighting for 
fundamental reforms of our educational system, refor~s that 
are rooted in the ideals of a more just, loving, and humane 
society have needlessly allowed and continue to ~llow 
ourselves to be cheated of the use of our mm powerful and 
enduring images (p.2). 
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The "powerful and enduring images" Purpel conveys, as similarly 
does Huebner, are drawn from the religious tn•ditions, specifically the 
Judea-Christian tradition (and more specifically the prophetic 
tradition within it). Purpel, like Fechner, resorts not to 
rationalistic arguments in a technical sense, but to mythic images 
which derive their power not from their slavish adherence to 
"accurately portraying" the world as it is, but by evoking hope for a 
better world and affirming the potentiality and power of human being to 
participate in the creation of this better world. 
Santayana stated that "religion should not be reduced to a 1 false 
physics. 111 In a similar vein, I would suggest, and I believe that 
Pur pel would concur, that neither should human being be reduced to 
material and behavioral descriptions. The descriptions of human 
existence should take into consideration an integration which 
transcends these domains: 
For me, I am finding that my faith emerges from what 
is called the prophetic tradition. It is a tradition that 
is rooted in the bibilical prophets and has found modern 
expression in such figures as Mahatma Ghandi and Martin 
Luther King. It is a tradition that speaks to the 
integration of the divine, the political, and the personal; 
a tradition that seeks to sensitize us to the obscenities 
of our time, to the disparities between our highest 
aspirations and vision and the realities of life. Prophets 
reveal the pain and agony of injustice, blasphemy, and 
broken covenants and also provide us with hope and energy 
(p.ll). 
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This "integration of the divine, the political, and the personal" 
represents in Purpel 's \vOrk, an interpretive effort quite consistent 
with hermeneutics. In fact, the earliest hermeneutic scholarship was 
directed at attempting to discover the meaning of religious texts. 
While the earliest scholarship often focused on trying to recapture the 
meaning of symbols, metaphors, expressions and stories contained in 
texts of another historical era, that is, recapturing \vhat the text 
meant to the author of the text as well as those who were 
contemporaries of the writer of such texts, modern hermeneutic 
interpretation focuses less on a sense of convergence toward a finite 
and completed meaning existing at a specific historical moment and more 
upon the sense of meaning grounded in historical and ontological 
dimensions but transcending both the historical moment and the meaning 
co~munity within which such texts where to be found. When Purpel 
speaks to the fact that his "fai.th emerges from \vhat is called the 
prophetic tradition, 11 he indicates that such a tradition had within it 
the potentiality or possibility to reach forward or across time and 
cultures, to new integration and understanding. That Purpel seeks to 
protect the rights of such traditions to speak to us today is 
quintessentially an hermeneutic position. Purpel is able to trace and 
reflect contemporary concerns for justice, community and love to the 
on3oing emergence of this concern throughout human experience. But 
that experience which "speaks to him" most powerfully, is the prophetic 
tradition expressed in the Bible. The mytho-poetic core of 
understanding is fed by the images and narrative of this tradition. 
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Such a tradition helps Purpel to orient himself to contemporary human 
experience. It helps him locate a normative framework and an 
ontological condition which unites the present world of human 
experience to both historical continuity and transcendental, 
transformative possibility. 
Purpel, referring to an observation of Abraham Heschel states: 
As Abraham Heschel points out, the God of the Bible is 
not the blind, even-handed balanced image of justice but is 
a God that is partial and biased to11ard the poor and the 
humble. The Sermon on the Mount does not speak to free 
enterprise, competition, and hierarchy but to a vision of 
community, love, and justice for all (1984, p.9). 
This observation, I believe, points to a counter-alienating 
possibility. Justice is not reduced to "objective" and mechanical 
depictions, but to loving, compassionate and passionate commitment to a 
utopian impulse, an impulse which both condemns wrong doing and affirms 
the dignity of the "least among us." Without romanticizing the poverty 
or oppression of those who chafe under such conditions, Purpel grounds 
his advocacy in a commitment, a courage, to reject such conditions, to 
express outrage at them, and to (as the prophets did) remind us of 
covenants which promise a bett~r 1vorld. That this promise has been 
eroded by pride, violence against ourselves, others and the world, and 
neglect is central to the call of the prophets. Purpel identifies one 
important manifestation of this promise when he states: 
It is my 
dimension in 
revolves around 
humanity (p.lO). 
belief that perhaps the most significant 
the conservative/progressive continuum 
the matter of faith in the educability of 
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This loss of faith may be cause for the preoccupation with control and 
legalistic conceptions of justice. Hhereever there is doubt (or lack 
of faith) in this educabUity, in this ability of human beings to 
tnmsform their consciousness from ignorance to awareness, from despair 
to hope, one may find a law in its place. Purpel's conception of the 
central importance of faith in the educability of humanity reflects an 
ontological a1vareness, an awareness 1vhich situates human being wit~in a 
nexus of faith and ontological power, courage and corn;nunity. Pur pel 
refers to Tillich to clarify this issue: 
Faith is the state of being grasped by the power of 
being - itself. The courage to be is an expression of 
faith and \vhat "faith" means must be understood through the 
courage to be. He have defined courage as the 
self-affirmation of being in spite of non-being. The power 
of this self-affirmation is the power of being which is 
effective in every act of courage. Faith is the experience 
of this power (In Purpel, 1984, p.ll). 
Tillich reveals the intimate interrelationship among courage, 
faith and being, and I would like to suggest that this is an 
ontological condition of bej"~ living in both the sublunary and 
spiritual worlds. Purpel seems to suggest, and I fully concur, that 
"faith in the educability of humanity" is understood when it is seen as 
an orientation toward being in the face of non-being. A human being is 
hurmn being in spite of mortality, ignorance, in spite of oppression 
and constraints. lf:hen Rorty (1982) discusses education to be the 
cultivation of "social hope" he appears to point to this same 
ontological condition. Hope, as a signal of transcendence, affirms the 
power of being over non-being. In this light, then, oppression is seen 
as an immoral act which denies the right of self-affirmation, restricts 
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the potentiality of being, and substitutes non-being for:- being. The 
task of education, accor-ding to Purpel (quoting Brueggeman ( 19 ) : "is 
to nur-ture, nourish, and evoke a consciousness and per-ception 
alternative to the dominant culture. 11 And the alternatives Pur-pel 
conveys are drawn from the symbolism and stories expressed in the 
pr-ophetic tradition, a tradition which clear-ly confronted the dominant 
cultures of its time and posed alternatives framed in the language and 
images of a more just, loving and affiliative society. While Pur pel 
draws upon the prophetic tradition as it is expressed within a specific 
religious tradition, it appears that his understanding of prophetic 
consciousness suggests that t11is consciousness transcends any temporal 
insularity. Thus, Purpel in integrating the divine, the personal, ~nd 
the political honors both the temporality of human existence and the 
timelessness of spirituality. For curriculum theorists such as Purpel, 
Huebner, and Macdonald (and I share this belief), the finitude of 
physical reality is nested within the infinite; ;natter and spirit are 
not separate, but whole. Ruth Nanda Anshen describes this relationship 
in the follmving manner: 
... the conception of wholeness, unity, organism is a 
higher and more concrete conception than that of matter and 
ener-gy. Thus [it is] an enlarged meaning of life, of 
biology, not as it is revealed in the test tube of the 
laborator-y but as it is experienced within the organism of 
life itself.... For the principle of life consists in the 
tension which connects spirit with the r-ealm of :natter, 
symbiotically joined. The element of life is dominant in 
the very texture of nature, thus rendering life, biology, a 
trans empirical science. The laws of life have their origin 
beyond mere physical manifestations and compel us to 
consider their spiritual sour-ce. In fact, the widening of 
the conceptual framework has not only served to restore 
order within the r-espective branches of knowledge, but has 
also disclosed analogies in man's position regarding the 
analysis and synthesis of experience in apparently 
separated domains of knowledge, suggesting the possibility 
of an ever more embracing objective description of the 
meaning of life (In Mead, 1977, p.xvi). 
282 
Purpel's adoption of the prophetic tradition and its rich literary 
and interpretive communities helps to point the way to a view that, as 
Anshen has staten it, "the laws of life have their origin beyond mere 
physical manifestations." It is to this more wholistic representation, 
specifically in a metaphysical sense that I wish to turn at this 
point. I have attempted to depict h01v the abandonment of epistemology 
in favor of an hermeneutic approach to the ontological condition 
expands our conception of entitivity and rights -- from the individual, 
to traditions and cultures -- and eventually to the totality of being. 
Since metaphysics, in my understanding of it, anticipates an organizing 
framework which integrates the spiritual, the personal and the 
social/political dimensions of existence, I feel that it may well 
provide curriculum theorists with organizing principles that speak to 
each of the domains mentioned above. 
That the personal, social and political dimensions of human 
experience reside wit~in a larger non-material and transempirical 
reality has been alluded to before. Anshen (In Mead, 1977) directs our 
attention to two dimensions which transcend and help to situate the 
three mentioned above: 
· Mankind can finally place its trust not in a 
proletarian authoritarianism, nor in a secularized 
humanism, both of which have betrayed the spiritual 
property right of history, but in a sacramental brotherhood 
and in the unity of knowledge (p.xvii). 
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The issue of alienation has prompted me to examine connective and 
associative potentialities \vhich may provide a counter-alienating 
response to human experience. The fragmentation that epistemological 
accounts of knowledge, the distortion in co;nmunication that results 
from inequality and disaffiliative practices, and the disregard of more 
encompassing frames of reference, all contribute to both an oppressive 
incoherence or silence. Anshen again brings this problem into high 
relief: 
Incoherence is the result of the present 
disintegrative processes in education. Thus the need for 
[coherence] expresses itself in the recognition that 
natural and man-made ecological systems require as much 
study as isolated particles and elementary reactions. For 
there is a basic correlation of elements in nature as in 
man which cannot be separated, which compose each other and 
alter each other mutually. Thus we hope to widen 
appropriately our conceptual framework of reference. For 
our epistemological problem consists in our finding the 
proper balance between our lack of an all-embracing 
principle relevant to our way of evaluating life and in our 
power to express ourselves in a logically consistent manner 
(p.xx). 
This widening of our conceptual frame•,yorks demands (which Anshen 
leaves to be said at a later point) that both the principles and the 
"logic" we employ account: for ways of knowing, modes of research and 
evaluation, and forms of expression which go beyond rationalities and 
logics which fail to account for the spiritual or metaphysical. Anshen 
articulates a perspective that was only tacitly understood by me at the 
outset of this dissertation, one which lends credence to the view that 
a metaphysical perspective is not to be confused with mere artifice, 
abstraction, or useful fiction. While metaphysics may attempt to 
describe and evoke order in the universe, it is suggested here that 
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metaphysics is no more abstract than conceptual frameworks which emerge 
~rom the disciplines focusing upon the physical sciences. I would 
suggest that where these orientations differ is in the limit situations 
or horizons that such theorizing set as their boundaries. 
describes this difference as follows: 
Nature operates out of necessity; there is no 
alternative in nature, no will, no freedom, no choice as 
there is for man.... [Our] understanding will become 
weaker and rarer unless guidance is sought in metaphysics 
that transcends our historical and scientific views or in a 
religion that transcends and yet pervades the 1vork we are 
carrying on in the light of day. For the nature of 
knowledge, whether scientific or ontological, consists in 
reconciling meaning and being. And being signifies nothing 
other than the actualiz~tion of potentiality, 
self-realization ~Vhich keeps in tune with the 
transformation. This leads to experience in terms of the 
individual; and to organization and patterning in terms of 
the universe. Thus organism and the world actualize 
themselves simultaneously. And so we may conclude that 
organism is being enduring in time, in fact in eternal 
time, since it does not have its beginning with 
procreation, nor with birth, nor does it end with death. 
Energy and matter in whatever form they may manifest 
themselves are transtemporal and transspatial and are 
therefore metaphysical (p.xx-xxi). 
Anshen 
\vhile I concede that it is difficult for human beings to function 
or remain continually conscious of their metaphysical nature, this 
difficulty does not mean either that it is an unimportant nor contrived 
perspective. Fechner refers to this a1vareness as one which accounts 
for synthesis upon synthesis, the compounding of consciousness, and the 
perception of the whole. William James likewise describes this 
"potential form of consciousness": 
••• our normal waking consciousness, rational 
consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of 
consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the 
filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of 
consciousness entirely different. lve may go through life 
without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite 
stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their 
completeness, definite types of mentality which probably 
somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. 
No account of the universe in its totality can be final 
lvhich leaves these other forms of consciousness quite 
disregarded. How to regard them is the question -- for 
they are so discontinuous with ordinary consciousness. Yet 
they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish 
formulas, and open a region though tliey fail to give a 
:nap. At any rate, they forbid a premature closing of our 
accounts with reality. Looking back on my own experiences, 
they all converge toiYards a kind of insight to 1vhich I 
cannot help ascribing some metaphysical significance. The 
keynote of it is invariably reconciliation. It is as if 
the opposites of the world, 1vhose contradictoriness and 
conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were 
melted into unity. Not only do they, as contrasted species 
belong to one and the same genus, but .~ o_i the ~pecies, 
the nobler and better one, is itself the ~1us, and ~q_ 
soaks .!:!2_ and absorbs it~ ~ite into itself. This is a 
dark saying, I know, when thus expressed in terms of common 
logic, but I cannot wholly escape from its authority. I 
feel as if it must mean something, something like what the 
Hegelian philosophy means, if one could only lay hold of it 
more clearly (1902, In Brody, 1974, p.483). 
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In the abovementioned quotation, I find several important 
insights: first, that metaphysical consciousness "may determine 
attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas." This comment may 
intimate the emergence of "faith" in metaphysical thought, 1vhile 
prescriptions for discrete behaviors or practices remain quite 
problematic. Just as hermenutic understanding demands an attitude of 
respect for the rights of other cultures and truths, so may a 
metaphysical understanding require a belief in the as yet unfathomed, 
myriad ways of kno1ving. Second, that forms of metaphysical 
consciousness may "open a region though they fail to give a map" brings 
us again to the central concern of hermeneutic interpretation -- that 
we remain open to the alien and other despite the seeming 
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incommensurability of those cultures and systems of thought to our 
own. Thus the "hold" of Hegelian philosophy is, I believe, the 
paradoxical situation that there is really no separation between the 
self and other (refer to Chapter I, Section B. on "Conceptual Logic" 
for a more detailed treatment of this topic). The loss of a "map11 in 
the conventional sense of the term does not imply that direction and 
order is lost; rather, the map merely represents agreed upon 
representations of a reality (e.g., cartographic symbols), but in this 
cas~, the terrain of metaphysics is real, the symbols lacking. This 
situation is often expressed as the "ineffability" of alternative, 
mystical or religious experience. 
Hermeneutic interpretation grasps this ineffability and turns not 
to a rude instrumentalism which seeks to pin the butterfly of 
metaphysical experience to a taxonomer 's tabV~, but rather, seeks the 
"potentiality" of such experience. Prediction is abandoned and 
potentiality in its ontological sense is revived: 
Virtually all of our disciplines have relied on 
conceptions which are now incompatible with the Cartesian 
axiom, and with the static world view we once derived from 
it. For underlying the new ideas, including those of 
modern physics, is a unifying order, but it is not 
causality; it is purpose, and not the purpose of the 
universe and of man, but the purpose in the universe and in 
ma11. In other 1vords, we seem to inhabit a 1vorld of dynam"i""c 
process and structure. Therefore we need a calculus of 
potentiality rather than one of probability, a dialectic of 
polarity, one in which unity and diversity are redefined as 
simultaneous and necessary poles of the same essence (In 
Mead, 1977, p.xiv). 
Anshen's observation that potentiality might redefine our 
apprehension of the 1vorld is quite important. If the 1vorld is viewed 
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as dynamic process and structure, and if purpose is not just restricted 
to an anthropocentric depiction of the universe, then potentiality, 
like metaphysical consciousness, spirituality, and, it might be 
suggested all those "signals of transcendence" noted by Berger, 
"transcend the world of facts." Potentiality is, like ontological 
hermeneutics, ::1n attitude toward truth which considers purpose not to 
be merely relativistic, but integral to being. Schumacher (1973) 
expresses this point in the following manner: 
All subjects, no matter hm'l' specialized, are connected 
with a centre; they are like rays emanating fror.1 a sun. 
The centre is constituted by our r.~ost basic convictions, by 
those ideas which really have the p01ver to move us. In 
other words, the centre consists of metaphysics and ethics, 
of ideas that -- ~'lhether we like it or not -- transcend the 
world of facts. Because they transcend the world of facts, 
they cannot be proved or disproved by ordinary scientific 
method. But that does not mean that they are purely 
'subjective' or 'relative' or mere arbitrary conventions. 
They must be true to reality, although they transcend the 
world of facts -- an apparent paradox to our positivistic 
thinkers. If they are not true to reality, the adherence 
to such a set of icieas must inevitably lead to disaster 
(p.87). 
To avoid this "disaster" Schumacher prescribes a new rol2 for 
education: 
Education cannot help us as long as it accords no 
place to metaphysics. Whether the subjects taught are 
subjects cf science or of the humanities, if the teaching 
does not lead to a clarification of metaphysics, that is to 
say, of our fundamental convictions, it cannot educate a 
man and, consequently, cannot be or real value to society 
(p.86). 
Education in this sense attends to both the real as physical and 
metaphysical. I find it interesting that Schumacher equates 
metaphysics and fundamental convictions. This adheres to the spirit of 
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hermeneutic understanding: convictions (read: faith and moral courage) 
tierive from the integration of, to quote Purpel, the divine, the 
personal and the political. Thus, what may on the surface appear to be 
a confusion of l0gical typing, that is, comparing dissimilar levels of 
organization, is in actuality a recognition of the interpentration of 
various orders and purposes forrnL1g a whole: "History is to be 
understo~d as concerned not only with the life of man on this planet 
but as including also such cosmic influences as i~terpenetrate our 
human 1vorld" (Anshen, In Mead, 1977, p.xviii). This awareness is 
rarely reflected in "history" as it is told as an account of discrete 
events leading in causal or quasi-causal sequence toward some present 
"situation." Ontological hermeneutics and metaphysical 
understanding/attitude is more readily discernible in mytho-poetic 
creation. This is so, I suggest, because metaphysics and hermeneutic 
interpretation rely more on, as Fechner anticipated, th·e imaginative 
use of analogy and metaphor for representation of truth. The writing 
of James, Bergson, Fechner, Bateson, Cox, Huebner, Purpel, Macdonald, 
Schumacher, and many others employ these mytho-poetic devices. This 
mytho-poetic orientation restores the metaphysical distance between 
literalness and figurativeness. If our educational practice is to 
remain open to the potentiality of being, I believe that we must 
cultivate evocative images and representations that do not merely 
attempt to "mirror" reality, but preserve the old insights and 
contribute new ways of seeing that emerge within diverse cultural 
settings. In this manner, the conversation widens and deepens, the 
images and associations cross horizons of understanding and intimate 
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frontiers for which maps lire as yet unknown or are sketchy. l3ut 
crucial to this entire project is the faith that such frontiers exist, 
that we are capable of responses other than colonization, and that 
without a metaphysical appreciation, all we will eventually bring forth 
in this new land is more slag and ashes. Lucia Lockert, a Mexican poet 
residing in Michigan, conveys this sense of attentiveness: 
In my lucid moments I understand 
that I have captured my existence just in time: 
as in the atoms and in all 
energy that flo1vs in me as in the stars, 
that is 8\vake or dreaming. 
I wish to turn one last corner around the course from alienation 
to a counter-alienating pedagogy. I have sought to explicate the 
restoration of rights not only to cultures and a cosmic sense of 
intimacy as intimated by metaphysical modes of representation, but also 
to an ontological condition 1.,rhich affirms our integration into the 
1vorld in ways that epistemic !!lodes of knowledge fail to account for. 
This has essentially been an attempt to counter idolatry of rationalist 
thought by suggesting a reverence for a metaecological consciousness, a 
consciousness that is collective, integrative, transtemporal, 
transspacial and religious. But there is a practical matter that I 
might point out which directly addresses the evisceration of competence 
which has been the "accident" of anthropocentric and 
self-interest-bound configurations of curriculum theorizing. I would 
like to suggest at this juncture t1vo allied reconceptua liza tions: the 
first being a reconsideration of the units of practice curricularists 
might allign themselves with, and the second is a normative frame1wrk 
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which directly speaks to a sense of hope and justice through collective 
identification. 
In 
C. EXPANDING UNITS OF PRACTICE: STRATEGIES 
AND NORMATIVE FRAr1EIVORKS 
this dissertation I have attempted to portray the 
interconnectedness of conceptual frameworks, normative dimensions, and 
curriculum theories as they address or fail to address the experience 
of alienation in modern western cultures. Having come to appreciate 
the importance of ontological hermeneutics, an importance not widely 
recognized among theorists here in the United States, as both an 
interpretive endeavor and a practical philosophy, I have attempted to 
suggest how such an orientation might re-situate human agency and 
consciousness within an environment comprised of both material and 
transcendental qualities. At the base of such a portrayal is the 
belief that order and being are neither the result of human 
interventions alone, nor unaffected by human action. Thus, the 
dialectic I wish to suggest is an ontological one in which a cosmic 
environment both affects and is affected by being. In one sense, I am 
suggesting a radical democracy and a metaecologic rationality which 
regards the rights of being, and all being as sacred and necessarily 
and positively embedded within cosmic wholeness. What is advocated 
here is a cultural revolution, one which reassesses the hubris of 
anthropocentrized conceptions of agency and meaning and 
reconceptualizes the cosmos not only as being more facilitative than 
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the "benignly indifferent" or malevolent depictions offered by 
curriculum theorists such as Greene and Pina.r, but also as being an 
entity entitled to its own transcendent purpose. Thus, personal, 
social, political and spiritual dimensions are depicted as threads in a 
seamless fabric of existence. 
It has been my aim to evoke a renewed sense of responsibility, a 
responsibility which emerges from a moral sensibility grounded upon the 
infinite value of integration within cosmic consciousness. I have 
tried to avoid a rude reductionism or instrumentalism which attends 
only to our actions in and upon th~ world. By attending to meaning and 
understanding, I have sought a different curricular unit than 
"actions." Actions seem to imply, in most curriculum theories, an 
origin within the intentionality and motivation of the actor -- usually 
the individual agent. I have suggested that this emphasis on agency 
and power begs the ontological condition of being, I am of the belief 
that this distorted sense of agency has contributed to alienation and 
separation from the source of being. In order to counter this 
anthropocentric (and perhaps even more separated, egocentric) 
orientation to agency, I have attempted to situate human awareness and 
action within a metaphysical domain \vhich calls for a revisioning of 
rationality and consciousness. \o/hile modern consciousness has perhaps 
brought self awareness into clearer focus, helped to sharpen the 
figure, the ground recedes ever further, becomes remote and eventually 
decontextualizes human consciousness. Unless human consciousness is 
reintegrated within cosmic consciousness, I fear that our collective 
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birthright will have been forfeited. While a philosophical and 
metaphysical approach to this human dilemma may seem wildly abstract 
and intangible, I believe that it is a necessary but not sufficient 
response to a crisis in human understanding. But I take some solace in 
the view that Gadamer advanced that philosophy can reflect a practical 
intent: 
I think, then, that the chief task of philosophy is to 
justify this way or reason and to defend practical and 
political reason against the domination of technology based 
on science. That is the point of philosophical 
hermeneutic. It corrects the peculiar falsehood of modern 
consciousness: the idolatry of scientific method and of the 
anonymous authority of the sciences and it vindicates again 
the noblest task of the citizen decision-making 
according to one's own responsibility instead of 
conceding that task to the expert. In this respect, 
hermeneutic philosophy is the heir of the older tradition 
of practical philosophy (in Bernstein, 1983, p.40). 
By suggesting a metaphysical and ontological orientation to human 
being in the world, I am attempting to reframe the human condition 
within a reality which is larger and more important than the sums of 
our individual self-interests. In a sense, I am flirting with the very 
problem that Pinar suggests an existential perspective is intended to 
counter: the loss of the individual to the idea. But my reply to 
Pinar, as 1vell as other existentialists, critical theorists, and 
empiricists, is that the "individual" as they have depicted him or her 
is already lost to the cosmos. That is to say, the self is lost to the 
idea of the individual for the self has lost its essential ontological 
conne·-tion to greater units of identity. When Polanyi stated that 
"Thought can live only on grounds which we adopt in the service of a 
reality to which 1~e submit," he was suggesting that it is the act of 
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submission, the perceived reality as well as the extant reality, \{hich 
sustains the quality of the life reflected in thought. I hav~ 
attempted to question or make problematic the thought and the reality 
manifested in curriculum theory -- :=specially because the quality of 
life within the curriculum field, though differing widely no doubt, 
seems to have lost this very basic vitality of service. 
It is the combined issues of service and identity that have 
prompted me to seek a counter-alienating pedagogy. Alienation, I would 
like to suggest, may be seen in part as an iatriogenic condition 
introduced by the specialization and professionalization of curriculum 
theorists. To be sure, other factors have contributed to the 
experience of alienation; but since I have tried to examine the role to 
curriculum theory in posing more illuminating insights into the 
etiology of alienation, it should not be surprising that I have come to 
certain observations regarding its participation in as well as 
resistance to alienating conditions. I would like to propose, in a 
practical vein and with a liberative intent, a reconceptualization of 
praxis which focuses on non-adversarial and transformati ve 
possibilities of expanded units of analysis and practice. I wish to 
demonstrate that this process of self-reflective action, while being 
instrumental and facilitative, transcends instrumentality and normative 
relativism. The essence of this revisioning is a renewed sense of 
competence and agency and an expanded potentiality of identity. 
I shall dra1v from important insights gained from my experience of 
a model of community organizing developed by Guy Steuart who is 
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presently the chairman of the Department of Health Education at the 
School of Public Health at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hi.ll. Dr. Steuart's work, while focusing upon health issues, issues 
which reflect a rather encompassing definition of health offered by the 
~vorld Health Organization (~VHO) which includes the physical, mental and 
social well-being of people, transcends medical, sociological, and 
political conditions to consider the cultural. Steuart's theorizing 
and pedagogy speak directly to curricular issues and offer, I believe, 
a fresh and little recognized understanding of behavioral ecology and 
environmental conditions. In his provocative article entitled "The 
People: Motivation, Education and Action," (1975) Steuart states: 
The American faith in education as the great i1ealer of 
human frustrations and as the mode d 'entre to the better 
things in life, to health and happiness, seems to remain 
unshaken in spite of its relative failure to meet these 
expectations" (pp. 176-177). 
As an educator (and a radical and iconoclastic one at that), 
Steuart asks the above-mentioned question and challenges the basic 
faith that the vast majority or educators have in the efficacy of their 
personal and institutionalized roles. This is an unsettling question, 
one which in similar spirit has been asked by curricularists such as 
those focused on in this study as well as critics such as Slater, 
Marin, Langer, Bateson, Bowles and Gintis. But by calling into question 
the durability of this faith, Steuart does not discount the importance 
of faith - he astutely points out that this faith is placed in an 
intellectually and strategically flawed sense of competence and 
agency. The ideology of American (and western) education remains 
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grounded in a naive view of behavioral ecology and environmental 
factors. Newmann and Oliver (in Purpel and Belanger, 1972) have 
described alienation as a "sense of powerlessness" and have proposed 
that, through education, students learn not only to change their 
behavior, adapt to environmental conditions, but learn how to affect 
change in the environment. This ability to affect environmental change 
they term "environmental competence." Newmann and Oliver are among the 
few curriculum oriented educators who directly address the 
participatory and democratic dimensions of competence. Their 
curriculum theory clearly situates the school within a broader context 
of social and political dimensions of community life. That is to say, 
while attempting to foster community and participation within the 
school itself, they have not ignored the extension of such qualities to 
the broader context outside the school nor have they discounted the 
influence of social and political environments upon the school. 
But returning to the work of Steuart, it is possible to envision 
personal and social change from a somewhat different vantage point. 
Steuart suggests that 
We need to return to the fundamental question, which 
is not "How can we educate in order to influence motivation 
and action?" but rather "By what means (any means) may 
health-related social and behavioral change be 
accomplished?" The latter question addresses itself, not 
to what people ought to know or how well they should be 
educated in health matters, but rather to issues of social 
and behavioral ecology -- therefore, to a broader range of 
determinants of change (p.l77). 
Among curriculum writers, Steuart's question is often posed as: "Under 
what conditions can people laarn, gro~>' and develop?" Steuart has 
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indicated that people base changes in their behavior not so much upon 
what they know, but how they feel. The graphic example he gives of this 
situation is that of the smoker: a smoker may well have the information 
which clearly presents the adverse health effects of smoking, he or she 
may fully understand the information, and he or she may even be totally 
against smoking -- for everybody else. But that the smoker continues 
to smoke is indicative 'that he or she has not felt that quitting is his 
or her highest priority. This feeling and attitude must, according to 
Steuart, be reckoned with. Educational programs lvhich seek by 
increasing the extent and quality of the "information" one has 
behavior change, are destined to be minimally effective because they 
fail to account for other powerful determinants of behavior. But 
Steuart's approach to environmental health and health education differs 
significantly from most school-based curriculum models. The 
"conditions" within which classroom learning occurs rarely include the 
environmental contexts outside the classroom or school ·.vhich both 
facilitate and constrain human development. Poverty, poor housing and 
health care, community resources and needs, and broader social contexts 
are often not seen to be within the purvie1v of curricular 
interventions. They remain education-related, but not 
education-directed issues. 
It was Huebner and Macdonald who noted that appropriate units of 
curriculum analysis and practice are very much up for grabs. I have 
found in Steuart's work a very fitting discription of conceptual units 
\vhich have trememdous potential to inform curriculum deliberations. 
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Steuart proposes a typology which consists of "units of practice," 
"units of identity," and "units of solution" (pp.lSl-182). "Units of 
practice" are those social and political configurations a practitioner 
selects as his or her focus of interaction and intervention. Steuart 
states that" ••• the individual is the primary, usually exclusive, unit 
of practice" (p.l81). I am in full agreement with his assessment, and I 
attribute a significant degree of educational failure and alienation to 
this exceedingly narrow frame of reference. Units of practice may, of 
course, be expanded to consider the family, school, neighborhood, or 
field as a unit of practice. But each unit of practice poses different 
problems and requires different intervention strategies for program 
development. But Steuart suggests that our envisioning units of 
practice is based upon the other two previously mentioned units: units 
of identity and units of solution. Steuart describes "units of 
identity" as: 
" units with which an individual feels himself to 
be associated. The individual -- with a sense of self, a 
personal identity - is the smallest of such units. To the 
extent that members of a family feel united with each 
other, share needs and aspirations, and suffer similar 
fortunes, the family is also a unit of identity. One's 
circle of friends and associates and one's local 
neighborhood may each, to differing degrees, be units of 
identity (p.l82). 
Steuart's suggestion here (and I believe that this is an extremelt 
important one) is that an understanding ·of a person's units of identity 
is a critical aspect of behavioral ecology. One's units of identity, 
as the description implies, reveal both the extant patterns of 
association and the integration one feels in one's i~terpersonal 
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net1vork. Identity in this sense may be seen as the various 
affiliations and senses of belonging and membership one perceives as 
meaningful. Thus, to counter Pinar's (and existentialists' in general) 
concern that the individual may be "lost to the other," units of 
identity offer a more positive potentiality -- that of helping to 
complete and integrate the person into a larger lived reality. This 
sense of belonging and identification may be similar to Giroux's 
assessment of the importance of "sphere 1 s of resistance" and other 
identifications based upon collective configurations or interest 
groups. Such collective entities may well afford the opportunity to 
engage in strategies and interventions beyond the scope of an 
individual agent. This collective sense of agency leads to Steuart's 
"units of solution." Of "units of solution," Steuart goes on to say: 
In contrast to units of identity, we may also conceive 
of units of solution, which would be those units 
appropriate or essential for the solution of particular 
problems. For example, in changing nutritional behavior 
the individual is the primary unit of solution in that 
changing his or her food preferences IY'OUld be essential. 
However, additional units of solution may include 1) the 
household, which acts as an economic unit and includes the 
person most responsible for t:_.::! selection and preparation 
of food, 2) certain subcultural groups 1vhich attach social 
status to certain foods, and 3) the larger social and 
political units that determine the cost, distribution, and 
availability of food. In contrast to the units of 
identity, units of solution may best be defined by 
professionals because of the technical knowledge and 
strategic position they bring to the situation (p.l82). 
I have outlined Steuart's approach to practice because it offers 
not merely strategies for interventions, but operates from a normative 
base which is quintessentially democratic and ethically sophisticated. 
Such strategies recognize both the "indigenous expertise" of people 
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belonging to various cultures -- solicits and respects the "inside 
view" of collective experience and the enabling resources that such 
a collectivity may have at their disposal. The role of the educator 
and community organizer in Steuart's model is that of a process 
consultant; from this relations~ip to co~unity groups, the consultant 
never can presume to know what is "best" for the community. Both the 
aims and the interventions remain within the control of comnunity 
members. This issue will be discussed more fully later in this 
chapter. I believe that Steuart's model of community organizing offers 
important counter-alienating potential. In this regard, Steuart states 
that 
A fundamental task, then, in strategies of social and 
behavioral change is to involve people in activities and 
services that benefit not only themselves and their 
immediate units of identity but \vhich provide opportunities 
for them to widen and expand their units of identity to 
those larger social systems that have such an important 
effect upon their personal and private behavior •••. We can 
begin by designing programs, not in categorical terms, ••. 
but in terms of individuals and social groups (p.183). 
Perhaps some clarification of the previously mentioned quotation 
is in order. In curricular terms, Steuart is suggesting that the 
"content" of educational activity emerges from the felt needs of a 
constituency -- be it the individual or a social group. This in itself 
is hardly a new or radical idea. But an examination of present 
curriculum designs (especially school-based programs of instruction) 
would no doubt disclose that educational programs, individual courses, 
and departmental structures remain organized along the lines of "the 
structure of the disciplines." Courses are all too often based upon 
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predeter:nined content ("information to be conveyed") and individual 
mastery of the content is equated with competence. If an individual's 
identity is expanded to now include larger units of identity and 
solution, this results from an almost ancillary concern for 
strength:.:ming whatever "discipline" such courses represent. Steuart's 
model conscientiously avoids such a "categorical" approach, and 
suggests that individual competence be linked to and enhanced by social 
or group competence. 
As Greene has earlier suggested, the arena of the public must be 
reconsidered in educational practice. While Greene advocates this 
position, she does not articulate a strategy for achieving this aim, or 
if she does, it is almost exclusively couched in terms of individual 
consciousness change. Steuart points to a synergistic effect of 
expanded units of identity. The professional educator or community 
organizer is clearly allied to the interests of the constituency he or 
she serves. Despite technical expertise or status differentials which 
often separate an educator from his or her constituency, Steuart 
suggests that the educator use power not over individuals, but for 
individuals. He has stated this in somewhat different language when he 
advocates that we should 1vork at the behest of, not in behalf of 
others. This distinction is not merely a semantic one, and I wish to 
point out its important implications: first, it is fully a1vare of real 
status and power differentials not only within a social configuration 
(e.g., unit of practice), but between an educator/organizer and the 
constituency he or she serves; second, the issue of service is directly 
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addressed; third, the social and political resources of a units of 
solution are drawn upon in the course of social action; and fourth, the 
ethical issue of shared responsibility for the consequences of any 
interventions is mutually recognized by both educator/organizer and the 
constituency he or she serv~s. It might also be noted here that, while 
"content" of group expertise is undoubtedly affected by the presence of 
an educator/organizer, the greatest attention is most likely to be paid 
to process considerations. (In a sense, content and process are not 
seen as separate, but process considerations enable the unit of 
practice to define and redefine its own content.) 
To return to the ethical dimension, one must recognize that such a 
model of interventions regards the control and "ownership" of such 
interventions as serious issues. The people involved in such processes 
are not treated as means toward an end; a technical rationality is 
avoided (despite the introduction of technical skills into a 
constituency) because the involvement (at whatever level) of people in 
their own development supercedes any preoccupation with "outcomes" or 
efficiency. Steuart 1 s model of education and organizing differs from 
the instrumental design of the Tyler Rationale in several key areas: 
first, the Tyler Rationale operates \vithin a two tier system 
specialists research the educational needs, develop objectives, design 
interventions and formulate evaluation criteria and strategies ·.vhich 
are, in turn, applied to a group of learners; second, educational needs 
are separated from other needs such as social or bio-physical; third, 
the locus of change is seen to he within the individual students; 
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fourth, evaluation and program redesign is seen largely as the task of 
specialists, not the group of learners. Steuart essentially inverts 
the hierarchy of control of the Tyler model. First, status and power 
differences between specialists and community members are reduced (the 
community maintains control of decisions and information); second, 
learners (in this case community members) are rightfully credited with 
knowledge and expertise of their O\ffi community of \vhich fhe specialist 
at first is una1vare -- the community is not viewed as a "deficit 
culture;" third, a cross-cultural perspective is maintained \Yhich 
regards the norms and values of the community as rightfully belonging 
to the community -- the specialist must choose to either \York within 
those norms and values, or select another culture within which one can 
act consistent with one's personal beliefs; and fourth, all aspects of 
community life are seen as integral to community development - no 
bifurcation or categorization separating "educational" from other needs 
is attempted. The participation of community members in the affairs of 
the community is f.oremost all p~anning, impl·ementation and 
evaluation is conducted openly and collaboratively. Feyerabend echoes 
this concern when he states that, if a radical democracy is to be 
achieved, ''Participation of laymen in fundamental decisions is 
therefore required even if it should lower the success ---- rate of 
Steuart's model of community organization and its i~plications for 
education, I believe, should be given careful consideration if we are 
exploring counter-alienating possibilities. Furtherrnore, if we are to 
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restore the social and political bases upon which educational programs 
and advocacy are built, this model is quite appropriate. But what has 
not yet been clearly articulated in my discussion of Steuart's model of 
organizing is a normative framework from which educators/organizers may 
guide their decisions about which constituencies they may seek to 
serve. While thes8 decisions will no doubt be affected by one's 
biography, culture, talents and skills, I believe that a sense of 
social justice is an indispensible part of such a decison making 
process. It is to this topic I now turn. 
D. IDENTITY AND SERVICE: A CONMUNITARIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL 
Guy Steuart 1 s model of community organizing, by describing the 
importance of units of identity, solution and practice, counters the 
atomization of individual identity and self-interest. By recognizing 
units of analysis beyond the individual, by engaging the collective 
interests of networks of people, Steuart directly addresses the 
"transpersonal" and "transbiographic" dimensions of understanding that 
Pinar has only minimally described. Steuart deftly avoids the hubris 
integral to the Tyler Rationale (that is, perpetuating a view of the 
educational constitutency as being a deficit culture) by emphasizing 
the "indigenous expertise" and enabling resources present within 
communities of interest. And contrary to the "mistrust of the social" 
which Pinar (and many curriculum theorists seem to exhibit), Steuart 
suggests that educators and organizers must be sensitive to the "inside 
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view," the social meaning of events, behaviors and conditions, which 
are virtually only able to be arrived at through collaborative 
engagement and dialogue with members of any self-defined community. 
Community organizing, then, in Steuart's model, entails a hermeneutic 
process of interpreting the cultural meanings extant 1vithin a given 
community. Education and community organizing undertaken from such an 
orientation promotes, in the [IGgelian sense of the term, 
"self-consciousness": the "struggle for recognition." It is this same 
struggle for recognition that Arendt, Dewey, Greene, and Giroux point 
to as underlying the importance of the public sphere. It is within 
this public sphere that the individual's identity and agency can be 
recognized and integrated. To be excluded from or to exclude oneseJ..i 
from the public sphere is to be cut off from the full development and 
potentiality of the self. 
As Purpel has indicated in his discussion of religious traditions, 
communities of meaning strive not for assimilation within other 
communities, but strive to keep the distinctions and particularity of 
their beliefs intact. This centripedal tendency may be related to the 
ontological condition of identity. The existence of a cultural· belief 
system, of a community of meaning, derives from a source of identity 
1vhich transcends the ephemeral and subjective limitations of individual 
members, transcends and resists the erosion of distinctiveness as the 
culture encounters other cultures. Alan \.Jatts (1964, 1967), quoting 
\vhat an archbishop of Dublin was reported to have said of the Church, 
may help to make this struggle for identity more perceptible: 
You may persecute us; we are quite used to that. You 
may argue with us and at tack us; we know very well how to 
handle ourselves. But the one thing we will not tolerate 
is that you should explain us (p.ll). 
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\vhat the good archbishop wryly indicates is that the knowledge and 
explanations of a community of meaning must arise from within the 
culture and community. Perhaps the distinction that should be made 
here is one between explanation and interpretation. Explanation 
derives its authority from within a system of meaning that it attempts 
to disclose. It, in a sense, emerges from the "place" of coherence and 
shared meaning. Interpretation, on the other hand, makes no pretense 
about being "inside" the community of meaning it attempts to describe. 
Interpretation "fuses horizons" rather than occupies the ontological 
center of a meaning community. Thus, the expressions conveyed by 
explanations and interpretations are characteristically and 
qualitatively different communications. I am suggesting that one may 
distinguish explanation and interpretation by the manner in which one 
identifies with such expressions. 
This ontological and collective sense of identity as it relates to 
communal meaning is addressed by Gadamer ( 1963, in Rabin01~ and 
Sullivan, 1979) in his article "The Problem of Historical 
Consciousness"~ 
We must say that every expression of life implies a 
knowledge which shapes it from within. Is not expression 
this plastic milieu of the spirit Hegel's Objective 
Spirit -- whose realm encompasses every form of human 
life? In his language, in his moral values and juridicial 
forms, the individual -- the isolated being -- is even then 
and always beyond his particularity. The ethical milieu, 
where he lives and in which he partakes, constitutes 
something "solid" that allo1vs him to orient himself despite 
the somewhat vague contingincies of his subjective 
impulses. Dedication to communal purposes, to action for 
the community, this is \vhat frees man, says Dilthey, from 
his particularity and from his ephemeral existence (p.l22). 
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It is this combined sense of ethical milieu and community that I 
believe needs to be brought into sharper focus in curriculum theorizing 
arid. practice. I have earlier quoted Heraclitus and suggest that his 
comment can be reintroduced here. He stated that "The waking have one 
world in common; sleepers have each a private 1vorld of his OWI:t." An 
ontological awareness can be seen as analogous to wakefulness; 
contrasted against this wakefulness one might pose the somnambulism of 
both extreme subjectivity and utilitarianism. I am using the term 
"extreme subjectivity" in the sense that the individual fails to 
recognize or discounts social interests and values while pursuing self 
interest. 
At this point I wish to refer to Robert Paul Wolff's penetrating 
analysis of liberalism and social justice. In his The Poverty of 
Liberalism (1968), Wolff offers a tightly reasoned analysis of American 
political and social thought as reflected in John Stuart Mill's On 
Liberty and The Principles of Political Economy. The central reason I 
wish to bring Wolff's analysis into this discussion is its significant 
contribution to the articulation of the concepts of social value, 
justice, and ultimately a sophisticated definition of community. I 
believe that Wolff's analysis is critical to an understanding not only 
of social and political thought, but a moral consideration of human 
interests, particularly the moral and ethical consideration of frames 
of reference beyond self-interest. Wolff sets the stage for his 
critique in the following manner: 
Mill begins by distinguishing two spheres of activity 
and experience in each individual's life. The internal 
sphere includes the thoughts, feelings, and other 
experiences of private consciousness, together with those 
actions \'lhich affect in the first instance the 
individual alone. The external sphere is the arena of the 
individual's interactions with other persons, the social 
world in which we impinge upon others and influence their 
lives. On this distinction Mill builds his argument. 
Society, he claims, has no right whatsoever to interfere in 
any matter falling within the inner sphere of any 
individual's life, and it has only a conditional right to 
interfere in social affairs involving interactions between 
several persons. In the latter case, society's guiding 
rule must be the principle of utility or greatest happiness 
principle. Society is to take action only in order to 
promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. 
Where intervention will not serve that utilitarian purpose, 
society has no right to impose itself upon individuals 
(p.S). 
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Wolff points out that the utilitarian purpose, the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, is fundamentally flawed in that it "cannot deal 
consistently with the question of the relation between knowledge and 
happiness" ( p .10). Holff goes on to argue that the right to free 
speech, to dissent, freedom from censorship, and to the pursuit of 
knowledge, is based, not as Mill has suggested upon utilitarianism, but 
upon justice. The crux of Wolff's argument lies in Mi l1 's inadequate 
treatment of inner and outer spheres of activity and the attendant 
confusion between self-regarding and other-regarding norms. Just as 
there is ·neither empirical evidence nor an adequate philosophical 
argument mustered to defend Mill's claim that increased knowledge 
(achieved through the "free market of ideas") leads to the utilitarian 
goal of increased happiness, there is likewise a fundamental 
discontinuity in Mill's rationale that utilitarianism justifies the 
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right of an individual to pursue self-regarding actions which were 
defined a priori as being exclusively within an inner sphere of 
action. Wolff attacks these problems in Mill's argument on two fronts: 
first, by defining "interest" in a manner which is logically consistent 
for both individual and collective contexts (inner and outer spheres); 
and second, (and this is a most clever turn) defines the concept of 
"value" in a purely descriptive, value-neutral manner! I would like to 
remind the reader here that my reason for tracing (albeit in an 
extremely abbreviated manner -- for \Volff 's elegant analysis required 
two hundred pages for its development) the connection between human 
interests and values is to lead to a philosophically defensible 
position for the public good, social justice, and a renewed 
appreciation for a counter-alienating possibility of community. 
Wolff defines "interest" as "the characteristic crientation of men 
toward the world insofar as they are active, rather than merely 
contemplative"(p. 168). In the vernacular, one might simply say that 
one takes an interest in some possible object or state of affairs which 
does or might motivate one to act for or against it. Wolff goes on to 
define a possible "value" as "any object of interest" (p.l68). "Value," 
as h'olff defines it here, does in no 1vay speak to the worthiness or 
evaluative meaning of such possible objects of interest. From these 
fundamental terms, Wolff goes on to define the following discrete 
possible values: 
1. A Simple Private Value: "a possible object of interest whose 
definition makes essential reference 
to the occurence of a state of 
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consciousness in exactly one person 11 
2. A Compound Private Value: 11a possible object of interest whose 
definition is a truth functional 
construct of of definitions of 
simple private values 11 
3. An Interpersonal Value: 11a possible object of interest whose 
definition makes essential reference 
to a thought about an actual state of 
consciousness in another person" 
4. A Social Value: "any experience or state of affairs 
whose definition makes essential 
reference to reciprocal states of 
awareness among two or more persons" 
( pp. 170-181). 
"A simple private value" refers to the possible object of interest 
of an individual to experience a particular thought or sensation such 
as the enjoyment of a brandy (to use \Volff 1 s example). This value 
essentially does not nor need it regard someone else 1 s awareness of 
one's experience; another's awareness of this possible object of 
interest is extraneous to the nature of this value. A 11compound 
private value," refers to a summation or aggregate of simple private 
values; that is, if the possible object of interest is the experience 
of various states of affairs among two or more individuals, the result 
is a compound private value. \Volff maintains that the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number is exactly such a compound private 
value; moreover, he maintains that "utilitarianism in all of its 
varieties concerns itself only with simple and compound private values 
and can be called 'methodologically iudividualist "' (p.l74). I 1vould 
like to suggest that this individualist calculus is prominant in both 
conservative and liberal reform ideologies: in conservative ideologies, 
this individualism is expressed in laissez-faire attitudes advocating a 
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"free market of ideas; 11 in liberal ideologies, interventions are often 
rationalized by the argument that inequalities 
individual's right to the pursuit of happiness -- that 
constrain the 
is, the public 
good is conceived of as the sum or aggregate of individual goods (see 
~veingarten, 1979). Furthermore, even more radical emancipatory 
interests are often expressed in terms of maximizing individual freedom 
and autonomy, reducing social constraints, and presume that a "free 
society" is to be arrived at through the vigilant protection of 
individual rights. Education \vhich seeks the "improvement" of an 
aggregate of individuals might be likened to this orientation to 
compound private interests. 
Even a concern for interpersonal values, values which derive from 
a possible object of interest making reference to the actual states of 
consciousness of at least one other person, fails to achieve a sense of 
community or social interest. Simply attending to the experience of 
the other, the thoughts, feelings, and meanings extant or possible 
within the consciousness of another does not, according to \Volff 1 s 
argument, constitute a social dimension or value. This distinction 
\Volff is making can perhaps be tied to the difference between knowledge 
and understanding __:_ knowledge may imply an awareness of the possible 
objects of interest in the other; understanding implies the confluence 
of our own possible objects of interest and those of others'. That is 
to say, social values reflect an understanding of "reciprocal states of 
awareness among two or more persons." It is this reciprocity of 
awareness (not necessarily shared aims or goals) that most 
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fundamentally grounds a sense of community. Holff describes this 
qualitative. shift in values as follows: 
Hhat exactly is it that conservatives and radicals 
alike miss in liberal society? Can 1ve define more 
precisely the feelings, experiences, states of affairs, or 
sets of relationships that the conservative locates in a 
cherished past and the radical in a longed-for future? The 
answer lies in a certain class of what I have called social 
values, specifically in what I shall call the social values 
of COIIIIIUDity. 
A social value, it will be recalled, is a value whose 
definition makes essential reference to reciprocal states 
of a~Vareness among two or more persons. This reciprocity 
of awareness may be achieved through verbal communication, 
as in a conversation, or it may result directly from 
nonverbal interaction. Sometimes even a glance suffices to 
establish that reciprocity of awareness which, when the 
parties take an interest in it, becomes a social value. 
Most social values involve several persons at most, but 
sometimes large groups of people, even entire societies, 
enter into IVhat can fairly be called a reciprocity of 
awareness. \Vhen this happens, I propose to call the states 
of affairs thus achieved a mode or instance of co111nunity. 
(Thus a comaunity will be a group of persons who together 
experience a reciprocity of awareness, and thus have 
community (pp. 184-185). 
\Vith this sense of social value in mind, and the mode of community 
it indicates, we might look at how such a reciprocity of awareness 
differs from the reciprocity inherent in hegemony. Hhile hegemony may 
he seen as a set of reciprocally confirming beliefs, attitudes and 
practices, what is distinctly absent in such reciprocity is an interest 
in collectiv.,::.y and critically discerning the awareness present among 
the participants. This is precisely what Giroux has pointed out as the 
evisceration of the public sphere due to a lack of historical 
consciousness. Unless the reciprocity of awareness is preserved and 
enhanced through critical reflection, dialogue and discourse, in place 
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of community we are faced with hegemony, 
l~olff goes on to elaborate three major categories of community: 
affective, productive and rational. lvhile I believe it is not 
necessary to elaborate upon each of these categories, it should be 
mentioned here that the interests one brings to this possibility of 
community reflect various reciprocal engagements. A sense of shared 
destiny, the collective nature of labor, and the "concerting of wills" 
through communication and deliberation to achieve collective goals, all 
contribute toward an expanded, integrated identity of community. The 
critical point that Wolff makes with regard to community and the 
possible social values it belies, is that because it can be a social 
value, it transcends private interests, beckons beyond mere 
utilitarianism or instrumentalism toward social justice, and aay be 
seen as an end in itself. Thus, the possibility of community inverts 
the ontology of utilitariansm to offer the counter proposal to the 
utilitarian claim that social awareness and interactions are a means to 
the satisfaction of private interests. This counter proposal suggests 
that the existence of dialogue and community is not accounted for 
within a calculus of private interests; and that the public interest 
leading to social values does not supercede or eclipse private 
interests, but complements and completes them. To state this another 
1vay, communitarian and public interests offer the possibility of 
expanded units of identity for moral and political agency. If 
curriculum theory is to not only consider the human interests in an 
epistemological sense, as Huebner and Habermas have described, then an 
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ontological condition of both private and public interests might be 
attempted. What Wolff's philosophical argument seems to offer for 
curriculum theorizing is a basis for acknowledging the legitimacy of 
both personal and social values. By recognizing and affirming both 
private and public interests, Wolff has contributed significantly to an 
argument for democratic participation and transcending a methodology of 
individualism. I believe, however, that a comment should be made here 
regarding the critical importance of recognizing that the concept of 
social interests does not disregard conflict within communities; what 
social interests and democratic participation safeguard are the 
fundamental rights of individuals and groups to take part in public 
discourse. Self-interest can be tranGcended within such a social 
sphere if a reciprocity of awareness is cultivated and preserved. 
At this point I wish to more explicity link the concept of 
distributive justice and its normative frame1vork as articulated by John 
Rawls (1971) to the possible public interest of community as developed 
by \volff. I perceive this linkage as being important because, while 
\oJolff situates "community" as a end in itself (and unabashedly avoids 
advocating "distributive justice" which he regards as an outgrowth of 
liberalism), one is left lvith a normative ambiguity regarding hoH 
private and social values may be evaluated for their "worthiness." 
Rawls's argument for distributive justice is succinctly summarized 
by Blizek and Cederblom (1973) in their article entitled "Community 
Development and Social Justice." Given my interest in articulating 
curriculum orientations which transcend the individual as a unit of 
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analysis, I find the literature of community development to offer 
language and perspectives of larger units of analysis which are rarely 
present in contemporary curriculum discourse. Blizek and Cederblom 
state that: 
As an example of the kind of principles we believe 
community development theorists should be considering, we 
wish to cite two principles of justice which have been 
proposed recently by Professor John Rawls, and which are 
receiving considerable attention in philosophical circles. 
Rawls argues that the principles of justice are those that 
would be derived by any rational self-interested person who 
did not know in advance what place he would occupy in the 
social system. The perspective from which these principles 
are chosen is what Rawls calls "the original position." 
This perspective is one from which principles are selected 
that 1wuld ensure satisfactory social conditions for the 
least advantaged of the social system. The principles 
which Rawls argues 'vould be selected by those in the 
original position are: 
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
COI;Jj)atible with a similar system of liberty for 
all. 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit 
of the least advantaged ••• and (b) attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity. 
The first principle provides a basic equality of liberty 
and has priority over the second principle such that no 
sacrifice of liberties can be made in favor of, for 
example, an increase in the general economic prosperity of 
the community. Any dimunition of liberty must strengthen 
the total system of liberties shared in equally by all. 
The second principle provides a maximization of the 
m1n1mum. That is, the least advantaged - those with the 
minimum -- are to be improved by whatever inequalities of 
economic or social good (other than liberty) are allowed. 
At the same time, everyone must have an opportunity to 
attain the offices and positions which receive unequal 
shares of economic or social goods (pp. 50-51). 
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The principles of justice cited by Blizelc a.£1d Cederblom, I would 
suggest, can provide curriculum practitioners l'lith a normative 
framework for considering human interactions 1vhich both honors our 
ontological condition (as reflected in the "original position" from 
which such principles mighi: be formulated by rational self-interested 
persons) and a mcral commitment to restructure our social relationships 
in order to preserve democratic rights and redress unjust 
inequalities. In this manner, curriculum practice may serve not only 
the private interests of self-regarding individuals, but the public 
interest which includes an ethical regard for the other. Cultural 
inequalities which may both advertantly and inadvertantly be 
exacerbated by meritocratic or self-interest-based educational programs 
should, I would maintain, be a concern of curriculum practitioners. An 
individualist orientation to curriculum practice fails fundamentally to 
honor social and public interests for justice. 
It, no doubt, can be expected that "Social efforts and political 
movements aimed at the redistribution of power inunediately threaten the 
status guo and stir up resistance from those who have a stake in 
continuing things the way they are" (Albee, 1983, p. 27). As Albee, 
citing Rawls, points out, a critique of social inequalities from the 
perspective of distributive social justice penetrates and disarms many 
of the most prevalent "rationales" for inequalities in our present 
society: 
His [Rawls's] political philosophy does not let status 
and income be determined by the incti vidual's ability and 
talent. He argues that 'there is no more reason to permit 
distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the 
distribution of natural assets than by historical and 
social fortune' (p.74). So in the just society, every 
attempt must be made to counter-balance the social 
inequalities that have led to disadvantage. If justice is 
fairness, Ra1vls argues, it demands maximum social efforts 
to compensate for historical injustice (pp. 27-23). 
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\olithout an appreciation for the community of human existence (and 
I would suggest that we broaden this to the level of cosmic existence), 
without a comprehensive view of private and public interests, without a 
commitment to social justice, and without a sense of moral agency which 
transcends fairness and includes compassion as a moral value, we might 
be doomed to repeat and add to the attrocities already committed in the 
narrow contexts of egocentrism, private interests, or cultural 
imperialism. A broader, more encompassing context need be considered. 
Macdonald (1980) clearly has advocated for such an expanded context to 
be considered as integral to a curricular perspective: 
The focus of curriculum is not simply a context where 
a curriculum is in operation. The focus of curriculum is a 
microcosm of the universe. Blake's grain of sand; to which 
,.,.e bring ourselves, our consciousness, and our cultural 
reality. lve are in effect expressing this in 3. total 
context (p. 22) 
In this chapter I have attempted to trace a revisioning of the 
"rights" afforded to and by our ontological condition, to re-situate 
human agency within an "historical dynamic continuity" which transcends 
egocentric and anthropocentric renderings of order, and a rapprochement 
which reflects an intimacy inherent in an ontological view of the 
universe. I have sought to depict an avenue toward identity l.fhich 
neither denies the anxiety of human uncertainty nor disregards the 
possibility of participating in and working toward the public good in 
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the context of infinite care. I have resorted to a discussion of 
metaphysics, behavioral ecology, and strategies for praxis because I 
believe that curriculum theorists can and should be able to recognize 
the universe in a grain of sand. • . as well a c.; be able to remove the 
grain of sand, when it is an irritant, from one 1 s own or the eye of 
another. 
In this light, I ask all, in our various fields of practice, those 
who seek to educate, to organize, to work for social and cultural 
change, to listen to those with whom we work... and to ourselves: How 
do they/we define themselves/ourselves? To whom or what do their/our 
identities make reference? 'What are their/our aspirations? What 
criteria do they/we employ to assess the success of their/our 
endeavors? In whose interest do they/we work? What remains unspoken? 
I do not presume to answer these questions for others nor even to 
predict what we might find if we were to conduct such inquiry. But as 
one who has sought to cultivate :1 love for the \vorld, a curricular 
perspective which is open to possible meanings concealed under the 
mantle of meanings as presently understood and which fuses the horizons 
of hope and affiliation against the netherworld of despair and 
alienation, I listen to not only the cacaphony of voices, hut the 
harmony, not only the forcefully articulated choruses, but the 
silence. 
lfuat I have expressed in this dissertation is not the "true 
nature" of curriculum theorizing, but an experience of it. T~1is 
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dissertation is not for the reader to believe in, but to inquire 
within. Umberto Eco (1980, 1983), in his rich tapestry of a novel The 
~arne of the Rose, may help me draw this distinction and lead to more 
humble demands: 
"Then this description, passing from auctoritas to 
auctoritas, was transformed through successive 
imaginative exercises, and unicorns became fanciful 
animals, white and gentle. So if you hear there's 
a unicorn in a wood, don't go there with a virgin: 
the animal might resemble more closely the Venetian's 
account than the description in this book." 
"But did the ancient masters happen to receive from 
God the revelation of the unicorn's true nature?" 
"Not the revelation: the experience. They were 
fortunate enough to be born in lands where unicorns live, 
or in times when unicorns lived in our own lands." 
"But then how can we trust ancient wisdom, \·!hose traces 
you are always seeking, if it is handed down by lying 
books that have interpreted it with such license?" 
"Books are not made to be believed, but to be subjected to 
inquiry. When we consider a book, we mustn't ask ourselves 
what it says but \vhat it means, a precept that the 
commentators of the holy books had very clearly in mind. 
The unicorn, as these books speak of him, embodies a 
moral truth, or allegorical, or analogical, but one 
that remains true, as the idea that chastity is a noble 
virtue remains true. But as for the literal truth that 
sustains the other three truchs, we have yet to see 
what original experience gave birth to the letter. 
The literal object must be discussed, even if its higher 
meaning remains good. In a book it is 1vritten that diamond 
can be cut only with a billy goat's blood. My great 
master Roger Bacon said it was not true, simply because he 
had tried and had failed. But if the relation between a 
diamond and goat's blood had had a nobler meaning, that 
1110uld have remained intact. 11 
"Then higher truths can be expressed while the letter is 
lying," I said. "Sti.ll, it grieves me to think this unicorn 
doesn't exist, or never existed, or cannot exist one day.'' 
"It is not licit to impose confines on riivine omnipotence, 
and if God so willed, unicorns could also exist. But console 
yourself, they exist in these books, which, if they do not 
speak of real existence, speak of possible existence." 
"So must we then read books without faith, 1vhich is a 
theological virtue?" 
"There are two other theological virtues as well. The hope 
that the possible is. And charity, toward those who believed 
in good faith that the possible was" (pp. 315-317). 
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I have sought a cosmic, ontological curriculum reality with the 
hope that this possibility exists. I ask the reader to extend a 
charitable view that, if in good faith I have confused the possible 
with the actual, such a belief may have contributed to an ongoing 
tradition of hopeful speculation and inquiry. 
I could not leave this dissertation until it could leave me. Now, 
in truth, it has (or is about to) take on an existence of its o1m. nut 
an opposition remains, and this opposition will remain, even as this 
text remains the same and yet changes through time. Gadamer (1960, 
1976) points to this inherent opposition when he states: 
But precisely what is exhibited in the 1vork of art 
ought to be the essence of being itself. The conflict 
between i"t::vealment and concealment is not the truth of the 
work of art alone, but the truth of every being, for as 
unhiddenness, truth is always such a .2£E_~sil:_~O_l!_ of 
revealment and concealment. The t1vo belong necessarily 
together. This obviously means that truth is not simply 
the mere presence of a being, so it stands, as it were, 
over against its correct representation. Such a concept of 
being unhidden 1vould presuppose the subjectivity of the 
Dasein that represents beings. But beings are not 
correctly defined in their being if they are defined merely 
as objects of possible representation. Rather, it belongs 
just as much to their being that they withhold themselves. 
As unhidden, truth has in itself an inner tension and 
ambiguity. Being contains something like a hostility to 
its 01m presentations, as Heidegger says. What Heidegger 
means cc.r' be confirmed by everyone: the existing thing does 
not simply offer us a recor,nizable and familiar surface 
contour; it also has an inner depth of self-sufficiency 
that Heidegger calls its "standing-in-itself." The complete 
unhiddenness of all beings, their total objectification (by 
means of a representation that conceives things in their 
perfect state) would negate this standing-in-itself of 
beings and lead to a total leveling of them. A complete 
objectification of this kind would no longer represent 
beings that stand in their own being. Rather, it would 
represent nothing more than our opportunity for using 
beings, and what would be manifest would be the will that 
seizes upon and dominates things. In the work of l:lrt, we 
experience an absolute opposition to this 1..rill-to-control, 
not in the sense of a rigid resistance to the presumption 
of our will, which is bent on utilizing things, but in the 
sense of the superior and intrusive power of a being 
reposing in itself. Hence the closedness and concealment 
of the ~10rk of art is the guarantee of the universal thesis 
of Heidegger 1 s philosophy, namely, that .beings hold 
themselves back by coming fonvard into the openness of 
presence. The standing-in-itself of the work betokens at 
the same time the standing-in-itself of beings in general 
(pp. 226-227). 
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This dissertation, then, shares the ontological condition of all 
being: by standing-in-itself it holds back even while coming fonvard 
into the openness of presence. And we each may then take some solace 
in the faith that the opposition of revealment and concealment, of 
affiliation and alienation, bespeaks a transcendence of the 
will-to-control by a will-to-be. Curriculum theorizing, guided by the 
process of ontological her,neneutics, may transcend the imperious, egoic 
will-to-control and its attendant alienation by openness to cosmic 
integration. S•1ch integration unites the chorus and the silence, 
synergy and entropy, community and alienation, within an ever-renewing 
order -- an order not of :nechanical randomness, brute determinism or 
indifference, but compassion (Rudhyar, 1972). 
So in our work and play, our rigo,..ousnesf" ;tnd humor, our 
criticalness and loving, we may come to realize that Rlake 1 s grain of 
sand: provokes the tears 1~hich flush it from our eye to the sea, to the 
oyster, to the pearl we or our progeny may regard. How this pearl is 
regarded is a curricular question ..• but let us leave it to remain yet 
another story for another time. 
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